the crux of the action, however, is that maintaining the separateness of the corporation and its alter ego would allow the alter ego to avoid either an otherwise enforceable obligation, or the law, or that maintaining the separate corporations would be inequitable. See, e.g., id.; E.S. Preston Assocs. Inc. v. Preston, 24 Ohio St.3d 7, 11, 492 N.E.2d 441, 446 (1986) (per curiam); North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 510-27, 3 N.E.2d 391, 393-99 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655, 57 S.Ct. 432, 81 L.Ed. 865 (1937); Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 447, 164 N.E. 530, 533 (1928); Saeks v. Saeks, 24 Ohio App.3d 67, 70-71, 493 N.E.2d 280, 283 (1985); Khoury v. Board of Liquor Control, 141 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ohio Ct.Com. Pleas), aff'd, 153 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio Ct.App. 1957); see also W.M. Fletcher, J.J. Reinholtz D.L. Nelson, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 41.30 (Perm. ed. Supp. 1988); F.J. Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations § 13(g), at 78 (1931) ("the entire doctrine is . . . a medium to further justice by relieving a complainant of the injustice that would result if the defendant were permitted to abuse the incorporation privilege and then to claim the immunity that normally goes with that privilege").

Accord Univ. Circle Research Ctr. Corp., supra; see also Clinical Components, Inc. v. Leffler Indus., Inc., Ohio App. No. 95CA0085, 1997 WL 28246, (9th Dist. Jan. 22, 1997), unreported. See generally Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 164 N.E. 530 (1928) (followed in St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo. Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 703 (2nd Cir. 1989)). 2. Control over the corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity.

" In the case of Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 164 N.E. 530, Judge Robinson said at page 452, after saying that the cross-petition would be dismissed because it was not filed in time: "However, the grounds of reversal there urged by the defendant in error have been considered for the purpose of determining whether the Court of Appeals reached a correct conclusion, but for a wrong reason." Section 11420-17, General Code, provides:

Under the former practice, a cross-petition in error, timely filed, was required to raise any question not raised by plaintiff in error's petition in error. Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 452, 164 N.E. 530; King v. Real Estate Improvement Co., 116 Ohio St. 185, 155 N.E. 797; Mannix, Assignee, v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St. 102, 19 N.E. 572, 2 L.R.A., 753, 15 Am. St. Rep., 562. The practice outside of Ohio is not uniform.

The official personnel and directorate was decidedly interlocking, and it would be unconscionable to hold that the Standard Bank did not have all the knowledge relative to the stock certificates in question that the Standard Corporation had, if it were necessary to so hold. This court disposed of that question in the case of Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 164 N.E. 530, which case we would approve and follow if it became necessary. It is not necessary to advert to the testimony in support of this proposition, as it is ample, clear and conclusive.

" See, also, Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 447, 164 N.E. 530; Price Hill Colliery Co. v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 38 Ohio App. 151, 175 N.E. 755. This right, or rather obligation, of a court to disregard the corporate entity, when to consider it amounts to only a sham protection for responsible obligors, disposes of the contention of ultra vires, as well as the contention that the corporation is not bound under the circumstances of this case by the individual acts of all of the stockholders.