Petitioners advance the further argument that section 39.2, when read in conjunction with sections 40.1 and 41(a), does not provide a basis for local authorities to have jurisdiction over two pending applications for the same site from the same applicant. A literal reading of these sections, consistent with our obligation to give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning ( Laidlaw Waste Systems, 230 Ill. App.3d at 135), reveals no prohibition against an applicant having two concurrent applications. In fact, the recent Board decision in Daly v. Village of Robbins (July 1, 1993), Ill. PCB Nos. 93-52, 93-54 (consolidated), aff'd on other grounds Daly v. Pollution Control Board (1994), 264 Ill. App.3d 968, 637 N.E.2d 1153, appeal denied (1994), 158 Ill.2d 568, where the Board affirmed a village's decision granting a second siting request while the applicant's first request was still pending, indicates that the Board does not find the practice objectionable. We decline to recognize an additional jurisdictional requirement where one was not provided by the controlling legislation.

If no constitutional right to due process protection is present, a statutory right to insist that the hearing procedures comport with due process standards of fundamental fairness may be available. See Daly v. Pollution Control Board, 264 Ill. App.3d 968, 970 (1994), citing EE Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 116 Ill. App.3d 586, 596 (1983). For example, the Administrative Procedure Act (the Act) ( 5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 1996)), governs administrative hearings in contested cases when a state agency is involved.

¶ 86 Nonetheless, "[a]lthough a local siting proceeding more closely resembles an adjudicatory proceeding than a legislative one, the local governing body is not held to the same standards as a judicial body." Southwest Energy Corp. v. Pollution Control Board, 275 Ill. App. 3d 84, 91 (1995); see also Daly v. Pollution Control Board, 264 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970-71 (1994) (procedural due process in an administrative proceeding does not require a proceeding in the nature of a judicial proceeding). The protections afforded by the due process clauses of federal and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) do not apply to proceedings to create a pollution control facility.

In recognition of this dual role, courts have interpreted the right to fundamental fairness as incorporating minimal standards of procedural due process, including the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and impartial rulings on the evidence. Daly v. Pollution Control Board, 264 Ill. App.3d 968, 637 N.E.2d 1153 (1994). In order to determine whether the proceedings at issue were fundamentally fair, we must first ascertain the appropriate standard of review.

TOTAL's final unfairness argument is that the council did not follow its own rules regarding the conduct of the hearing in that the objectors were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses called by the applicant. TOTAL cites Daly v. Pollution Control Board, 264 Ill. App.3d 968, 970-71 (1994), for the rule that a fair administrative hearing must include the opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and impartial rulings on the evidence. We do not see that the rule set forth in Daly was violated in this case.

A fair hearing before an administrative agency includes notice and the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and impartial evidentiary rulings. Daly v. Pollution Control Board, 264 Ill. App.3d 968, 970-71, 637 N.E.2d 1153 (1994). The record reveals that McElroy had access to his personnel file eight months prior to discharge, had an opportunity to view the complaints leveled against him and prepared a detailed response to each charge.

Nevertheless, procedural due process in an administrative proceeding must include the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and impartial rulings on the evidence. ( Daly v. Pollution Control Board (1994), 264 Ill. App.3d 968, 970-71.) Due process, therefore, guarantees the right to an impartial tribunal.