Opinion
8:21-cv-00986-JD-JDA
11-02-2021
Robert C. Dalton, Plaintiff, v. James P. Clements, Tanju Karanfil, Clemson University, South Carolina Department of Agriculture, The State of South Carolina, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by Defendants. [Docs. 18; 22; 23.] Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “Rehabilitation Act”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. [Doc. 14.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action on April 2, 2021, and filed an Amended Complaint on July 22, 2021. [Docs. 1; 14.] On August 5, 2021, Defendants Clemson University (“Clemson”), James P. Clements, and Tanju Karanfil (collectively, the “Clemson Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. [Doc. 18.] The next day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 20.] Defendants The State of South Carolina (“the State”) and South Carolina Department of Agriculture (“the Department”) filed motions to dismiss on August 6, 2021. [Docs. 22; 23.] On August 9, 2021, the Court issued a second Roseboro Order. [Doc. 26.] The Clerk has filed a response from Plaintiff opposing these three motions to dismiss as well as a supplement, second supplement, and third supplement to the response [Docs. 36; 39; 42; 43], and the State and the Department have filed a reply [Doc. 38]. The three motions are all now ripe for review
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Amended Complaint. [Doc. 14.]
Plaintiff is disabled as a result of a traumatic brain injury. [Doc. 14 at 5 ¶ 14, 20 ¶¶ 44-45.] He is the sole representative, member, and stockowner, as well as the managing partner of ESTEC Technology Works, LLC (“ESTEC”). [Id.] In the present lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that Clemson wrongfully denied his request to form a research partnership in connection with his application for a permit to grow hemp in South Carolina (“a permit”) pursuant to South Carolina's Industrial Hemp Pilot Program (“IHPP”). [Docs. 14; 14-1.] Under the IHPP, which began in 2017, public institutions of higher learning “may conduct research or pilot programs [regarding hemp] as an agricultural commodity and may work with growers located in South Carolina.” S.C. Code Ann. § 46-55-20(2) (2017). “Once the institution of higher education engages in research in industrial hemp, the institution shall work in conjunction with the [Department] to identify solutions for applications, applicants, and new market opportunities for industrial hemp growers.” Id. Under the IHPP, the Department would grant up to 20 permits in the first year and up to 40 for the second and third years. Id. § 46-55-20(3). The permits allowed the permittee to grow industrial hemp on up to 20 acres the first year and up to 40 acres in the second and third years. Id. Permits were limited South Carolina residents. Id.
In 2017, Plaintiff applied for a permit, as an individual and as legal representative for ESTEC. [Doc. 14 at 27-28 ¶¶ 72, 75.] He was not a South Carolina resident at the time. [Doc. 14 at 28 ¶ 79.] To be granted a permit, an applicant was required to participate in research with and work with a qualified South Carolina institution of higher education. [Id. at 28 ¶ 76; see also Doc. 14-1 at 18-27.] Plaintiff alleges that he had sought such a partnership with Clemson and identified faculty who were willing to partner with him. [Doc. 14 at 32-33 ¶¶ 88-89, 92-93, 36 ¶¶ 110-11.] However, on September 5, 2017, Defendant Dr. Tanju Karanfil, Clemson's Vice President for Research, informed Plaintiff that Clemson had decided against partnering with him, leaving his permit application incomplete. [Id. at 33 ¶ 94, 36-37 ¶ 112; Doc. 14-1 at 100.] Plaintiff alleges that Clemson's refusal to partner with him or to take other steps to allow him to participate in the IHPP was “motivated primarily by . . . financial” considerations insofar as Plaintiff's research plan would not have provided much money to the Clemson IHPP and because Plaintiff “was in direct competition with [Clemson and Clemson] research parks for research and commercialization funding of innovations.” [Doc. 14 at 38 ¶¶ 116-17; see Id. at 29-30 ¶ 83.]
Plaintiff alleges that the Department “arbitrarily set criteria [for the permit applications] that had the effect of discriminating against [Plaintiff] based upon his disability because [their] criteria were not properly disclosed.” [Doc. 14 at 19 ¶ 42.]
Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Karanfil and Defendant Clements, who is Clemson's president, did not respond to his requests for an explanation as to why Clemson refused to enter into a research partnership with him. [Id. at 6, 33-34 ¶¶ 95, 97, 39 ¶ 121.] He also alleges that the Clemson Defendants did not respond to his “repeated request[s] for his preferred method of effective communication” and did not provide written notice of why they could not do so. [Id. at 16-17 ¶ 35, 25 ¶¶ 63, 66, 39-40 ¶ 121.]
In his supplements to his response opposing the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff represents that although he alleged in his Amended Complaint that Clements did not respond to his request for an explanation as to why the Clemson Defendants would not work with him, Plaintiff actually intended to allege that it was Karanfil who did not respond to that request. [Docs. 39-1 at 16-17; 42-1 at 16-17; 43-1 at 16-17.]
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered significant financial losses as a result of his inability to obtain a permit. [Id. at 37 ¶ 112.]
In his Amended Complaint, he alleges the following causes of action: violations of Titles I and II of the ADA; violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; violations of his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and conspiracy to deprive civil rights. [Id. at 9-10; 25-26 ¶ 68.]
For his remedies, Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages, as well as an injunction requiring that all South Carolina state entities “institute an accessibility policy and training with focus on reasonable accommodations and effective communication for individuals suffering from a traumatic brain injury.” [Id. at 41-42 ¶¶ 123-28.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law.
Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying ‘the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Motion to Dismiss Standards
The Fourth Circuit has been “unclear on whether a dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds is a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).” Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (comparing Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1995), with Abril v. Va., 145 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1998), and Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 626 (4th Cir. 1998)). Because Defendants argue Eleventh Amendment immunity as a subject matter jurisdiction issue and the trend among courts within the Fourth Circuit is to consider sovereign immunity under Rule 12(b)(1), see Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 899 F.Supp.2d 457, 466 (D.S.C. 2012), the Court considers Defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity arguments pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Typically, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). “However, where a party challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the party is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity, the burden of persuasion lies with the party asserting the immunity.” Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 899 F.Supp.2d 457, 466 (D.S.C. 2012). The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: “‘(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.'” Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).
Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled as a matter of law to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as to Plaintiff's claims.
“[A]n unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). “[Sovereign] immunity applies to state agencies that may be properly characterized as ‘arm[s] of the State,' as well as to state employees acting in their official capacity.” Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted); see also Kermode v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 496 Fed.Appx. 483, 488 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “sovereign immunity extends to both the [University of Mississippi] Medical Center itself and to its faculty administrators sued in their official capacities”). “Therefore, absent abrogation of sovereign immunity or consent from [South Carolina, Plaintiff] cannot seek injunctive or monetary relief from” South Carolina. McCray v. Md. Dep't of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). Clemson is an arm of the State of South Carolina for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Martin v. Clemson Univ., 654 F.Supp.2d 410, 428 (D.S.C. 2009).
A claim asserted against a state agency “may survive the Eleventh Amendment bar in one of three recognized ways”: (1) “Congress may abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity”; (2) “a state may waive its immunity”; or (3) “a plaintiff may seek prospective relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law under the principles set forth in Ex Parte Young, ” 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Pickering v. State Police, 59 F.Supp.3d 742, 747 (E.D. Va. 2014).
The Court will discuss the Eleventh Amendment with regard to Plaintiff's claims brought under §§ 1983 and 1985 as well as Plaintiff's ADA claims.
Section 1983 and 1985 Claims
With regard to Plaintiff's claims brought under sections 1983 and 1985, none of the three exceptions applies. First, “Congress has not overridden the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, ” Briggs v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., No. 9:13-cv-1348-RMG, 2014 WL 1278173, at *11 (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2014), or § 1985 cases, see Wilson v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, No. 3:12-cv-1750-TLW, 2014 WL 4954684, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2014) (finding that defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to a § 1985 claim). Second, “South Carolina has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits in federal court.” Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 379 (D.S.C. 2019).
The Court notes that Plaintiff conclusorily alleges that the Department and the Clemson Defendants “conspired to deprive” him of his civil rights [Doc. 14 at 17 ¶ 37], but he does not identify what actions Defendants took that would constitute a conspiracy.
Nor does the Ex parte Young exception apply in this case. Under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, a federal court may “issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.” McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “[t]he Ex parte Young exception is directed at ‘officers of the state [who] are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings . . . to enforce against parties affected [by] an unconstitutional act.'” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56). For the Ex parte Young exception to apply, a “special relation” must exist “between the state officer sued and the challenged statute to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's bar.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157). This “special relation” “requires ‘proximity to and responsibility for the challenged state action.'” Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting S.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Limehouse, 549 F.3d 324, 333 (4th Cir. 2008)). “General authority to enforce the laws of the state is not sufficient to make government officials the proper parties to litigation challenging the law.” Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 331 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The requirement that there be a relationship between the state officials sought to be enjoined and the enforcement of the state statute prevents parties from circumventing a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Hutto v. South Carolina Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 550 (4th Cir. 2014).
Here, with respect to the Ex parte Young exception, Plaintiff has named two officials-Clements and Karanfil-as defendants and he requests an injunction that would require that all state entities “institute an accessibility policy and training with focus on reasonable accommodations and effective communication for individuals suffering from a traumatic brain injury.” [Doc. 14 at 41-42 ¶ 128.] However, Plaintiff has not alleged any ongoing violation of his constitutional rights that such an injunction would remedy. Nor has he alleged any special relation between such an ongoing violation and Clements or Karanfil or that these two Defendants have any authority to put in place any policy that would apply to all South Carolina government entities. As such, his request for this injunctive relief does not fit within the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar. See Doyle v. Hogan, 1 F.4th 249, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted regarding Plaintiff's claims brought under § 1983 and § 1985.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts, pro se, to assert the constitutional rights of other people to an effective communication policy that would accommodate people who have suffered traumatic brain injuries [Doc. 14 at 16, 30 ¶ 84], he lacks standing to do so. See, e.g., Myers v. Loudon Co. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a pro se person's right to litigate for oneself does not create a similar right to litigate on behalf of others).
The Court also notes that “neither States nor state officials acting in their official capacities constitute ‘persons' within the meaning of [§ 1983] when sued for monetary relief.” Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.2d 265, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2020). The same is true for § 1985. Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 562 F.Supp. 579, 585 (D.S.C. 1983). Accordingly, any claims for money damages under §§ 1983 or 1985 against Clemson, the State, the Department, or Clements or Karanfil in their official capacities are also subject to dismissal on this basis.
ADA Claims
The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004). As noted, Plaintiff alleges violations of Title I and Tile II. Title I
With regard to the Title I ADA claims, none of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. And the Court has already noted that “South Carolina has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits in federal court, ” Doe, 359 F.Supp.3d at 379, and explained why Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief does not fit within the Ex Parte Young exception. As with constitutional claims, “[s]overeign immunity has not been abrogated for . . . ADA Title I claims.” McCray, 741 F.3d at 483. Accordingly, the Court recommends granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title I ADA claim on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Title II
“In enacting Title II of the ADA, Congress made it specifically applicable to the States and state entities.” Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 280 (4th Cir. 2020). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that states remain “generally immune from private damage actions by reason of the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006), held that “‘insofar as Title II [of the ADA] creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity.'” Fauconier, 966 F.3d at 280 (quoting Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159). Still, the Court in Georgia declined to decide whether Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity under Title II “premised on conduct that does not independently violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. Rather, the Court directed lower courts to “determine . . . on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.” Id. Accordingly, to apply the Georgia test, courts begin by determining whether plaintiffs have stated a claim under Title II. E.g., Block v. Tex. Bd. of Law Examiners, 952 F.3d 613, 617-18 & n.12 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not even plausibly alleged conduct that violated Title II.
To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, plaintiffs must prove “(1) they have a disability; (2) they are otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity; and (3) they were denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of their disability.” Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503 (4th Cir. 2016). Under the ADA, plaintiffs must prove that the disability was a motivating cause of the denial of benefits. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461-62 (4th Cir. 2012). The essence of Plaintiff's Title II claim is that Clemson discriminated against him by refusing to enter a research partnership with him that would have facilitated his application to grow hemp. [Doc. 14 at 19 ¶ 41, 22 ¶ 53, 23 ¶ 56.] He alleges that Clemson was motivated by financial interests insofar as Plaintiff's research plan would not have provided much money to the Clemson IHPP and Plaintiff “was in direct competition with [Clemson and Clemson] research parks for research and commercialization funding of innovations.” [Id. at 38 ¶¶ 116-17.] Although Plaintiff conclusorily alleges that Defendants decided not to partner with him because of his disability, he alleges no facts that would create a reasonable inference that his disability was a motivating cause of Clemson's decision not to partner with him.Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants violated his rights under Title II of the ADA and, thus, Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the Title II claims.
Although Plaintiff's precise allegations are difficult to discern, he also appears to allege that the Clemson Defendants failed to utilize appropriate methods to explain to him Clemson's reasons for declining to enter into the partnership that he sought. [Doc. 14 at 19 ¶ 41, 30 ¶ 84.] However, Plaintiff has not explained why Clemson owed Plaintiff any explanation for its decision to decline his partnership proposal, let alone one that employed his preferred communication method. Nor does he plausibly allege that he was harmed by the lack of such an explanation.
Although Plaintiff's allegations are less than clear, he appears to contend that the South Carolina's hemp statute, as enacted, required Clemson to partner with him. [Doc. 14 at 31 ¶ 86.] That version of the statute provided in relevant part that institutions of higher education
may conduct research or pilot programs as an agricultural commodity and may work with growers located in South Carolina. Once the institution of higher education engages in research on industrial hemp, the institution shall work in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture to identify solutions for applications, applicants, and new market opportunities for industrial hemp growers.S.C. Code Ann. § 46-55-20 (2017) (emphasis added). Plaintiff relies on the emphasized language [Doc. 14 at 31 ¶ 86], but he does not explain how he reads the language to require Clemson to enter a research partnership that it believes will be harmful to its financial interests. The Court does not read the language to require Clemson to do so.
The Court notes that the ADA does not permit civil actions for damages against persons sued in their individual capacities. Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff asserts his ADA claims against Clement and Karanfil in their individual capacities, Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claims on that basis as well.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted as to Plaintiff's Title II ADA claims.
Rehabilitation Act
To the extent that Defendants argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for Plaintiff's claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, they are incorrect. Section 2000d-7 of Title 42 provides that “[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1). This section has been held to effect a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 491 (4th Cir. 2005); Curtis v. DPSCS Campbell Lt. Bilal Ahmed Wexford Health Source, Inc., No. GJH-20-1903, 2021 WL 2414869, at *17 n.21 (D. Md. June 14, 2021). Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff's fails to state a claim for a Rehabilitation Act violation for the same reason that he fails to state a claim for an ADA Title II violation. To establish a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiffs must prove the same three elements they must prove to establish a violation of Title II except that the causation element requires proof that the denial of benefits was solely on the basis of disability. Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461-62. Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Clemson's decision not to partner with him was based solely on his disability. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted as to Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim as well.
The Court notes that the Rehabilitation Act does not permit civil actions for damages against persons sued in their individual capacities. Moore v. Ozmint, 3:10-3041-RBH-JRM, 2012 WL 762460, at *13 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 762439 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2012). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff asserts his Rehabilitation Act claim against Clement and Karanfil in their individual capacities, Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claim on that basis as well.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' motions to dismiss [Docs. 18; 22; 23] be GRANTED.
Because the Court recommends granting Defendants' motions to dismiss for the reasons discussed, the Court declines to address Defendants' alternative arguments.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.