Opinion
Civ. No. 3:98-CV-0021-M.
April 11, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this date came before the Court Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Both motions were accompanied by briefs and supporting evidence, and each party responded to the other's Motion for Summary Judgment, and filed replies in support of both Motions for Summary Judgment. The matter was argued before the Court on March 30, 2000. Having considered the papers, the summary judgment evidence, the applicable law, and the arguments presented, the Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED, for the reasons detailed below.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Slaughter v. Southern Tale Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Both parties urge, and the Court agrees, that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that the case should be decided as a matter of law.
Since 1968, Plaintiff Dallas Local 367-M Graphic Communications International Union ("the Union") has represented preparatory and press employees at Defendant Taylor Publishing Company, Inc. ("Taylor"). At all relevant times, the Union and Taylor have been parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the "Agreement"). The particular dispute reflected in this case arose from the Agreement in effect from February 24, 1992 to February 28, 1995. In Article 5, the Agreement provides a grievance procedure, with unresolved grievances to be resolved by an arbiter to be selected as described in Article 5.2 of the Agreement.
Taylor Production Services Company, L.P. is a successor of Taylor and will be jointly referred to as "Taylor."
Article 5.3 of the Agreement provides that the decision of the arbiter "shall be final and binding on the parties." It further states "the arbiter shall affirm in to [sic] the position of one of the parties." In response to a Request for Admissions served on the Union by Taylor in this litigation, the Union confirms that "in to" was mistakenly inserted into the Agreement instead of "in toto." The Court therefore analyzes the provision as if the words "in to" were "in toto."
In 1993, Taylor, which is in the yearbook publishing business, installed new machines encompassing the automatic picture placement ("APP") system. That system computerized many of the bargaining unit functions previously performed by employees represented by the Union. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Agreement, Taylor and the Union were to negotiate the job classifications for new machines, so that new positions associated with the APP system which were bargaining unit functions would be so classified. Taylor and the Union did so, and reached agreement on several bargaining unit functions and several non-union functions. However, agreement was not reached on the following positions: Picture Scaler, Art Prep and Art Scanning, Ultradigital Checker, Picture Mounter, Digitizer, Paginator, P-II Proofer, and Machine Room. Although not specifically enumerated in the grievance, the Court finds that the grievance was stated broadly enough ( i.e. listing positions "including but not limited to") to encompass the Ultradigital Checker.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Agreement, the parties submitted for an arbiter's determination whether those positions enumerated above were subject to the Agreement. After an evidentiary hearing on July 11 and 12, 1996, on January 27, 1997, the arbiter, I. B. Helburn, issued his Opinion and Award. Although Taylor urged otherwise, the arbiter found that the Union's grievance was arbitrable and further found, after separately considering each position, that the classifications of Picture Scaler, Art Prep and Art Scanning, and Ultradigital Checker performed bargaining unit functions and were thus within the Union's jurisdiction. He found that the other disputed classifications were not within the bargaining unit functions represented by the Union.
Taylor claims that the Award is not enforceable, since it contends Article 5.3 requires the arbiter to rule completely for one party or the other, which Helburn did not do. Alternatively, Taylor claims that the Art Prep and Art Scanning positions are obsolete, so that the Award should not be enforced as to them, and that the position of Ultradigital Checker was not properly raised in the grievance and further does not actually exist and that the Award with respect to it thus should not be enforced.
The Court is mindful of the strong presumption favoring the judicial enforcement of arbitration awards under labor agreements. See United Paperworkers v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). Only where it is clear that the arbiter exceeded his jurisdiction should this Court refuse to enforce the Award. See U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 922 F.2d 256, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906 (1991).
The basic question raised by both Motions for Summary Judgment is whether Article 5.3 prevented the arbiter from deciding each job classification separately. If it did, as Taylor claims, then the Union would have had to file a separate grievance for every job classification, which would have led to extraordinary waste, duplication and inefficiency.
Were Taylor's position correct, since it urged the grievance was untimely and the arbiter determined otherwise, a total victory by Taylor on all of the disputed classifications would have been unenforceable, since Taylor's position would not have been affirmed "in toto." That result would be wholly illogical and nonsensical. Similarly, if Taylor's argument were to be accepted, once the arbiter decided that a single disputed position was or was not a covered position, in order for his award to be enforceable, he would have had to rule consistently with that determination for all of the other disputed classifications, without regard to the evidence of the duties for each disputed classification. That approach would make the arbiter's determination of bargaining units inherently arbitrary, in contravention of the mandates of the National Labor Relations Act. See generally, Catholic Community Services, 247 N.L.R.B. 743, 744 (1980). Although the Court is not persuaded by the Union's argument that Taylor waived its right to object that the arbiter's Award exceeded his jurisdiction under Article 5.3, the Court is of the opinion that Taylor's manner of presentation at the arbitration hearing, where each position was separately analyzed, is evidence that the parties intended that in such a situation the arbiter could rule separately on each classification.
As the Fifth Circuit held in International Chem. Workers Union v. Day Zimmerman, Inc., 791 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986) (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Texas Steel Co., 538 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977)), the agreement should be "interpreted `expansively as so as to uphold the award, rather than restrictively.'" Given the strong presumption in favor of arbitration awards, and given the Court's view that Article 5.3 can be logically read to require an all or nothing determination of each issue (in this case, as to each position), not the entirety of the matter, the Court concludes that the arbiter did not clearly exceed his authority but, rather, acted consistently with it. The ultimate legal question is whether the Award "draws its essence from the agreement." Folger Coffee v. International Union, UAW Local No. 1805, 905 F.2d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court finds that the award is drawn from the essence of the Agreement and does not reflect some independent form of industrial justice promoted by the arbiter. It is thus enforceable under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
The Court concludes that the arbiter was responsible for interpreting what was arbitrable, that he did so fairly and reasonably, that his award was within the jurisdiction of the Agreement, and that the interpretation of the disputed provision was consistent with the parties' intention. Having so concluded, the Court enforces the arbiter's Award in all respects, including without limitation, that portion of the Award recognizing the positions of Picture Scaler, Art Prep and Art Scanning, and Ultradigital Checker as bargaining unit employees represented by the Union. The Court further finds that any issues of mootness based on the contention that any such positions are now obsolete or nonexistent should be addressed to the arbiter, who retains jurisdiction on issues related to relief.
This Court will, however, retain jurisdiction to enforce the Award to provide for back pay, interest and benefits to those employees occupying the positions determined by the arbiter to be bargaining units, if Taylor does not promptly comply with the arbiter's Award.
The Court finds that Taylor's failure to satisfy the Award was without a substantial basis in law or fact, or alternatively, that it was without justification, and therefore awards the Union its reasonable attorneys' fees, to be determined by the Court upon submission by the Union of affidavits substantiating such fees. Taylor may respond to such affidavits within seven days after they are filed,
In light of the conclusions described above, Taylor's counterclaim is denied.
SO ORDERED.