Opinion
A22-0249
09-14-2022
In re the Marriage of: Kyle Jerome Dalen, petitioner A, Appellant, v. Amanda Rose Dalen, petitioner B, Respondent.
Itasca County District Court File No. 31-FA-20-2599
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Michelle A. Larkin Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Kyle Jerome Dalen (father) and respondent Amanda Rose Dalen (mother) were married in 2008. They are the parents of two minor children, Child 1 and Child 2. In 2015, the parties dissolved their marriage through a stipulated joint agreement, which granted them joint physical and joint legal custody of the children. The parties' agreement did not set forth a specific parenting time schedule due to father's work schedule. The children lived full-time with mother, and father rarely exercised his full parenting time.
2. In the fall of 2019, mother limited contact between father and the children after father told her that he had heard voices coming from a Bible he inherited and that he thought he was the Prophet Isaiah. In the fall of 2020, mother obtained a harassment restraining order against father after he appeared at her residence, "wild-eyed" and angry, and tried to force his way in. Mother filed an emergency ex parte motion to modify custody and to suspend or restrict father's parenting time, along with a motion for permanent modification of custody and other relief. In her accompanying affidavit, mother stated that father was "mentally unstable" and that she believed the children would be in "serious danger" if they had unsupervised parenting time with him. Specifically, mother alleged that the children were afraid of father because of his temper, his recent paranoia, his claim that he was a messenger of God, and his threatening text messages.
3. The district court granted mother temporary sole physical and temporary sole legal custody, restricted father's parenting time, and found that mother made a prima facia showing of endangerment that warranted an evidentiary hearing. At the ensuing evidentiary hearing, mother appeared with counsel and father appeared pro se. Mother requested permanent sole physical and permanent sole legal custody of the children, supervised parenting time for father, and a psychological evaluation for father. The district court received several exhibits and heard testimony from mother and father. The district court issued an order containing a detailed review of the best-interest factors under Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (2020). See Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn.App. 1997) (listing factors district court must consider when determining whether to modify child custody). The district court granted mother permanent sole physical and permanent sole legal custody, modified father's parenting time, and ordered father to complete a mental- health evaluation. Father moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, amended findings, which the district court denied. Father appeals.
4. Father contends that the district court knew or should have known that he was mentally ill and therefore should have appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent his interests. A person with a mental illness is not necessarily incapable of participating in his own legal matters. See Knox v. Haug, 50 N.W. 934, 935 (Minn. 1892) ("A person may be insane on some one subject, and still be as able as the sanest to manage his own property and affairs."); Rogers v. Cent. Land & Inv. Co., 183 N.W. 961, 963 (Minn. 1921) (stating that "[m]ere mental weakness does not incapacitate a person from contracting") (quotation omitted). Instead, a person is competent to proceed in a legal matter if he can "fairly and reasonably understand[] the matter in hand." Sullivan v. Brown, 31 N.W.2d 439, 445 (Minn. 1948) (quotation omitted). "A party who is an infant or is incompetent and is not so represented shall be represented by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the action is pending or is to be brought." Minn. R. Civ. P. 17.02. "Competency determinations are within the trial court's discretion, and the court's findings will not be upset unless there is a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Struss, 404 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn.App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. June 9, 1987).
5. Father notes that he was found incompetent to proceed in a separate criminal matter. The underlying competency evaluation in that case was completed eight months after the evidentiary hearing in this case. The district court refused to consider that evaluation, reasoning that it was not completed contemporaneously with the underlying custody proceeding and that father did not move to reopen the proceeding to include the evaluation. The appellate record consists of "[t]he documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings." Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. Our review is limited to the record, and we generally do not consider matters not produced and received in the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). Because father's competency evaluation is not of record and was not considered by the district court, we do not consider it here.
6. Father cites several cases in support of his position, but they are distinguishable. See In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Minn. 1993) (stating that civilly committed patients with developmental disabilities "are entitled to the same procedural protections as mentally ill persons"); Maxfield v. Maxfield, 439 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn.App. 1989) (stating that a GAL can protect a minor child's best interests in a custody action and allow the child "an opportunity to discuss his custodial preference in a relaxed atmosphere"), aff'd, 452 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1990); Schultz v. Oldenburg, 277 N.W. 918, 922 (Minn. 1938) (stating that "[a]n insane person may sue and be sued. In either event he should appear by a friend, general guardian, or guardian ad litem"). Although mother brought up father's mental health, she did not present records showing that father has a mental-health diagnosis, and the district court noted that it could not "diagnose [f]ather with a mental health condition." And there is no evidence that father was civilly committed or had a developmental disability.
7. Father argues that "the [district] court should have taken some action to prevent [opposing] counsel from walking all over a vulnerable pro se defendant." Father asserts that he required a GAL to "determine whether a court-appointed lawyer was needed and [to] move the district court to appoint one." But Minnesota does not recognize a "statutory or constitutional right to counsel in dissolution proceedings." State ex rel. Ondracek v. Blohm, 363 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn.App. 1985). Thus, father would not have been given a court-appointed lawyer even if the district court had appointed a GAL to represent his interests.
8. The district court discussed father's alleged incompetency as follows:
The [c]ourt had the opportunity to observe [f]ather during the [evidentiary hearing]. During [that hearing], [f]ather appeared to be thinking clearly and appeared connected to reality. He appeared to understand the nature of the proceedings and he offered testimony and argument that were germane to the issues of custody, parenting time, and child support. He answered the questions asked of him in a logical manner. Based on these observations, the [c]ourt had no reason to question [f]ather's competency to participate in the proceedings.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's assessment of father's ability to fairly and reasonably understand the matter at hand. See Sullivan, 31 N.W.2d at 445. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte appoint a GAL to represent father's interests in the underlying child-custody matter.
9. Father contends that the district court violated his First Amendment rights by basing its custody determination on his religious beliefs. The First Amendment prohibits states from interfering with the free exercise of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. Of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015). Father's First Amendment challenge raises a constitutional issue, which is reviewed de novo. Star Trib. Co. v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 683 N.W.2d 274, 283 (Minn. 2004).
10. Father argues that the district court used his religious beliefs "as a primary basis for its conclusion that he was mentally ill." But the district court recognized that it could not "diagnose [f]ather with a mental health condition." Father also argues that it is "impossible to doubt that [his religious beliefs] played a decisive role in the court's analysis." But as father concedes, the district court "had plenty of secular evidence upon which to base its [custody] determination."
11. Of the 88 total findings made by the district court, less than ten mention father's religious beliefs, and those references were relevant to the district court's analysis of the statutory best-interests factors. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(5) (addressing "any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a parent that affects the child's safety or developmental needs"). The district court noted that it "[did] not find that [f]ather is a danger to the children solely based on his religious views" and identified several secular reasons "that unsupervised parenting time with [f]ather would place the children at risk of emotional endangerment." For example,
49. Mother offered into evidence several Facebook posts that [f]ather directed towards [Child 1]. [Child 1] is not on Facebook and does not receive these messages, but [m]other said [f]ather writes these posts to [Child 1] as if [Child 1] were able to see them. These posts include:
a. [F]ather wrote, "So next time I do expect you to shut up and listen when I'm talking to you. Not this talk back sh-t. Or I will hit you up along side the head to
knock some sense into you. This is your only written warning."
b. [F]ather wrote, "[Child 1], you are a r-tard compared to me."
c. [F]ather also posted, "Get off of momma's t-t and come play with the big boys."
d. Father also wrote . . . "Don't forget your sister has friends, you don't."
e. [F]ather wrote, "[Child 1] thinks he's a man at l3 so he can make his own choices. That's fine because right now he's guilty. You better call me by Friday or your dead to me."
50. [T]he parents engaged in a text message exchange to arrange a time for [f]ather to see [Child 2]. During that exchange, [f]ather wrote, "You can tell him [Child 1] if he doesn't want to come with he'll be dead to me just like I am to you. . . You can deal with [Child 1] and tell him to f-ck off from his dad, for the way he's treated me."
51. Father testified that he understands calling [Child 1] a "retard" would be emotionally damaging to [Child 1] if he knew about it. However, he also said that he "would have rather said stuff to [Child 1]'s face rather than on social media."(internal citations to the record omitted).
12. Father cites Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church, 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016) to support his claim that the district court eroded his religious freedom. The district court aptly addressed the inapplicability of that case:
The legal authority cited by [f]ather . . . holds that under the First Amendment, courts cannot overturn the decisions of ecclesiastical bodies with respect to purely ecclesiastical concerns and may not entertain cases that require the court to resolve doctrinal conflicts or interpret church doctrine. The present case does not implicate decisions of ecclesiastical bodies or interpretation of church doctrine, so Pfeil appears to have little applicability here.
13. In sum, the record reflects that the district court did not inappropriately base its decision on father's religious belief or inappropriately restrict father's ability to practice or speak about his religion. To the extent that father's religious beliefs are impacted, the best interests of the child can serve as a compelling state interest justifying intrusion into the realm of fundamental constitutional rights. See Geske v. Marcolina, 642 N.W.2d 62, 68-70 (Minn.App. 2002) (holding that the best interests of a child can serve as a compelling state interest supporting restraint of a parent's speech); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 163 (Minn.App. 2000) (noting that the best interests of a child may serve as a compelling state interest to infringe upon a parent's right to travel), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000); Sina v. Sina, 402 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn.App. 1987) (finding, based on the parties' dissolution agreement, that the best interests of the children took precedence over a parent's freedom of religion).
14. Lastly, father contends that the district court went against the parties' wishes by granting a permanent custody modification even though father's mental illness is treatable. Minnesota law "reflect[s] a settled policy view that stability of custody is usually in the child's best interest." Westphal v. Westphal, 457 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn.App. 1990). To promote such stability, Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2020) requires the court to maintain an existing custody arrangement unless the party seeking modification makes a prima facie case for modification. The court cannot permanently modify a custody order absent an evidentiary hearing at which witnesses may be cross-examined. Clark v. Clark, 358 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn.App. 1984). And if the district court grants a motion for custody modification, specific findings showing that the court considered the factors listed under Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2020) (grounds for modification) and § 518.17 (best-interest factors) are generally required. Abbott v. Abbott, 481 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn.App. 1992). In this case, the district court complied with the hearing and findings requirements for a permanent custody modification.
15. Father asserts that "a temporary change of custody [was] indicated" by the parties and that mother "acknowledged that if father received treatment and was cured, the parents could resume 50-50 custody." Mother testified that she would support father having unsupervised parenting time if he received treatment for his mental illness. Although mother requested both temporary and permanent modification of joint physical and joint legal custody in her motion for custody modification, she requested a permanent modification exclusively at the evidentiary hearing.
16. The district court found that father had engaged in behavior that justified supervised parenting time for father. The district court also found that father had effectively consented to full integration of the children into mother's home, noting that mother has been the life-long primary caretaker of the children, that father rarely exercised his parenting time, and that the children have a significant relationship with their mother's boyfriend and their half-sister, with whom they lived full-time. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iii) (listing full integration with consent of the other party as a basis for custody modification). On this record, which shows that the district court correctly and thoroughly applied the governing law, there is no basis for this court to reverse the district court's custody determination
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.