Dalbkermeyer v. Rader

3 Citing cases

  1. Marshall v. Marshall

    232 Cal.App.2d 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 46 times
    In Marshall v. Marshall, 232 Cal.App.2d 232 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 686], the court stated at pages 250-251: "Defendants next contend that the action is barred by the statute of limitations and by laches.

    The thrust of this argument is that there can therefore be no valid basis for a constructive trust since one of the requisites for its establishment in such a situation is that the grantee has paid no consideration for the transfer. In support of this proposition defendants cite Cooney v. Glynn (1910) 157 Cal. 583, 587 [ 108 P. 506]; Brison v. Brison (1888) 75 Cal. 525, 532 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St.Rep. 189]; Lyttle v. Fickling (1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 383, 388 [ 164 P.2d 842]; Resh v. Pillsbury (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 226, 231 [ 55 P.2d 264]; Dalbkermeyer v. Rader (1928) 96 Cal.App. 23, 28-29 [ 273 P. 600]. However this entire argument proceeds from the fundamental premise that the trial court adopted defendants' theory of case: that the 1935 transfer was an absolute one embracing plaintiff's full legal and equitable ownership and that in accordance with the arrangement fashioned by the pertinent documents the mother, being the actual owner in fact as well as in name, operated the property subject only to the first loan from the insurance company.

  2. Ampuero v. Luce

    68 Cal.App.2d 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945)   Cited 15 times
    In Ampuero v. Luce, 68 Cal.App.2d 811, 819, 157 P.2d 899, 903, this court said: 'No evidence whatever is pointed out to show such relation beyond the fact that they had been close friends since girlhood, had corresponded, visited back and forth, and Mrs. Ampuero considered the respondent the most reliable friend she had.

    ( Schott v. Schott, 168 Cal. 342, supra; Lavely v. Nonemaker, 212 Cal. 380, supra. See, also, Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal.App.2d 145 [ 136 P.2d 376], and Dalbkermeyer v. Rader, 96 Cal.App. 23 [ 273 P. 600].)

  3. Resh v. Pillsbury

    12 Cal.App.2d 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)   Cited 5 times
    In Resh v. Pillsbury, 12 Cal.App.2d 226, 229 [ 55 P.2d 264], the court said: "We see no escape from the conclusion that the entire title to these properties passed upon the execution and delivery of these deeds.... The oral agreement that during her lifetime the grantor should retain the rents and profits from the properties was merged in the written instruments and was nullified thereby (Civ. Code, sec. 1625; Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1856).

    [4] The respondent Resh seeks to void the effect of the rules of law above referred to by contending that a confidential relationship existed between William H. Pillsbury and herself; that under the authority of such cases as Knudson v. Adams, 137 Cal.App. 261 [ 30 P.2d 608], a constructive trust appears; and that, under the facts found, the title to these properties was impressed with an equitable life estate in her favor. In answer to a similar contention the court, in Dalbkermeyer v. Rader, 96 Cal.App. 23 [ 273 P. 600], said: "It may be conceded, as plaintiff contends, that where confidential relations exist between two parties, and one of them accepts a conveyance of real estate upon a parol promise that he will hold it for the benefit of the grantor, or for the benefit of some third person in whom the grantor is interested, and there is no other consideration for the conveyance, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the grantor, or in favor of the third person for whom the property is to be held; . . . But the mere statement of the rule is sufficient to show its inapplication to the facts of the present case because, as indicated by the above italics, the application of the rule depends upon the proposition that there is no consideration for the conveyance other than the mere promise of the grantee to hold the title for the benefit of the grantor or some third person; and here defendant's joint tenancy estates were not conveyed to her for the benefit of someone else, but,