Dakutak v. Dakutak

12 Citing cases

  1. Slorby v. Slorby

    760 N.W.2d 89 (N.D. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    Lee v. Lee, 2005 ND 129, ¶ 6, 699 N.W.2d 842. "Interpretation of a judgment is a question of law, and an unambiguous judgment may not be modified, enlarged, restricted, or diminished." Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750. However, if the judgment is ambiguous, the district court may clarify the judgment.

  2. In the Interest of S.J.F. v. R.C.W

    615 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 2000)   Cited 9 times
    Stating benefit of delay inured to the benefit of the obligor because he did not have to pay child support during the period of the delay

    Greenwood, at ¶ 8; Schmalle, at ¶ 26. A judgment should be construed to give effect to each and every part of it and to bring all the different parts into harmony, if this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation. Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 11, 562 N.W.2d 750. [¶ 15] We construe the Court of Appeals' judgment to clearly and unambiguously authorize the trial court to order genetic testing on its own motion upon remand.

  3. Duray v. Greenwood

    1999 N.D. 126 (N.D. 1999)   Cited 24 times
    Stating where a spouse "cannot be adequately restored to independent economic status," "a court should consider whether, in addition to rehabilitative support, permanent spousal support is also necessary."

    [¶ 8] "Interpretation of a judgment is a question of law, and an unambiguous judgment may not be modified, enlarged, restricted, or diminished." Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750. "[T]he question whether a judgment is ambiguous is a question of law." Id. "There is an ambiguity when language can be reasonably construed as having at least two alternative meanings.

  4. Hogen v. Hogen (In re Curtiss A. Hogen Tr. B)

    2020 N.D. 71 (N.D. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    There is an ambiguity when language can be reasonably construed as having at least two alternative meanings. Dakutak v. Dakutak , 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750 (citations omitted). [¶14] While a modification is not permitted, a clarification is permissible.

  5. Helbling v. Helbling

    2019 N.D. 27 (N.D. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    " Orvedal v. Orvedal , 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89 ; see also Greenwood v. Greenwood , 1999 ND 126, ¶ 8, 596 N.W.2d 317 (" ‘If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, we afford the judge’s clarification considerable deference.’ " (quoting Dakutak v. Dakutak , 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750 ) ).Rath , at ¶¶ 14-15.

  6. Upton v. Nolan

    2018 N.D. 243 (N.D. 2018)   Cited 3 times

    Orvedal v. Orvedal , 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89 ; see also Greenwood v. Greenwood , 1999 ND 126, ¶ 8, 596 N.W.2d 317 (" ‘If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, we afford the judge’s clarification considerable deference.’ " (quoting Dakutak v. Dakutak , 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750 ) ). Nonetheless, in this case, although neither party moved to amend the divorce judgment, the court amended rather than clarified, the judgment, and the hearing notice and hearing itself involved the parties’ competing motions for contempt sanctions under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-10."Id. at ¶ 15.

  7. Rath v. Rath

    2014 N.D. 171 (N.D. 2014)   Cited 20 times
    Affirming order denying motion to hold Kayla Rath in contempt; reversing district court's amendment to judgment on due process and notice grounds

    Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89; see also Greenwood v. Greenwood, 1999 ND 126, ¶ 8, 596 N.W.2d 317 (“ ‘If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, we afford the judge's clarification considerable deference.’ ” (quoting Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750)). Nonetheless, in this case, although neither party moved to amend the divorce judgment, the court amended, rather than clarified, the judgment, and the hearing notice and hearing itself involved the parties' competing motions for contempt sanctions under N.D.C.C. ch. 27–10.

  8. Kannianen v. White

    788 N.W.2d 340 (N.D. 2010)   Cited 6 times

    [¶ 7] If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, the judge's clarification is entitled to considerable deference. Simburger, at ¶ 7; Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 16, 562 N.W.2d 750. When one trial judge interprets the decree of another, however, the interpreting court is in no better position than we are to discern the original judge's intentions, and this Court reviews such interpretations de novo. Simburger, at ¶ 7; Dakutak, at ¶ 6. The district judge who presided in this case was not the judge in the original divorce action.

  9. Simburger v. Simburger

    2005 N.D. 139 (N.D. 2005)   Cited 24 times

    Id. "If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, we afford the judge's clarification considerable deference." Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750. However, when one trial judge interprets the decree of another, the interpreting court is in no better position than we are to determine the original judge's intentions, and this Court reviews such interpretations de novo.

  10. Quamme v. Bellino

    2002 N.D. 159 (N.D. 2002)   Cited 10 times
    Using the term "temporary" to describe rehabilitative spousal support award for a period of four years

    A trial court's clarification of a previously entered decree by that same court is given considerable deference by this Court in construing the original order or decree. Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750; Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476, 478 (N.D. 1994). The trial court clearly did not intend the motion would expire on September 1, 1999 if not resolved at that time by the court, and we give deference to the trial court's view of its order continuing the motion.