Opinion
No. 05-04-00468-CV
Opinion Filed March 8, 2005.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-10588-B.
Affirmed.
Before Justices MOSELEY, FRANCIS, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees under the worker's lien statutes. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
A third party brought a Ferrari automobile to appellee Hanna's Auto Care Center for repairs. Hanna's disassembled the vehicle to diagnose the problem and requested a substantial deposit from the third party before it would repair the vehicle. The deposit was never made. The vehicle was left in Hanna's shop for several months. Because Hanna's had not been paid for the repair work and its customary storage fee for vehicles left more than thirty days, Hanna's sent a notice claiming a worker's lien to the record owner of the vehicle, Daimler Motors, Inc.
Daimler filed this lawsuit against Hanna's for conversion, an accounting of the repair and storage charges, and an injunction. Daimler claimed the lien notice was defective, that Hanna's did not perform the repairs it claimed, and that Hanna's improperly included storage charges in its claim for a worker's lien. Hanna's answered and filed a counterclaim for payment for the repair work and storage fees under the worker's lien statute and requested attorney's fees. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 70.001, 70.008 (Vernon 1995 Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
Following a nonjury trial, the trial court rendered judgment that Hanna's had a valid worker's lien under section 70.001(a)(2) of the property code for repairs in the amount of $5,000 and the right to retain possession of the vehicle until this amount was paid. The trial court also awarded Hanna's reasonable attorney's fees under property code section 70.008, which provides that:
The court in a suit concerning possession of a motor vehicle, motorboat, vessel, or outboard motor and a debt due on it may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 70.008.
In two points of error, Daimler argues the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Hanna's because Hanna's was not the prevailing party. In general, the prevailing party is the party that either successfully prosecutes the action or defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not to the extent of its original contention. FDIC v. Graham, 882 S.W.2d 890, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). The prevailing party is the party vindicated by the judgment rendered. Dear v. City of Irving, 902 S.W.2d 731, 739 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied). Daimler's main argument is that storage fees are only recoverable under the garagemen's lien provided by property code section 70.003. Daimler claims Hanna's did not qualify for a statutory garageman's lien because the vehicle was not delivered for storage and Hanna's did not provide notice for such lien under property code section 70.004. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 70.003-.004 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). While the trial court did not award Hanna's a lien for the storage charges, it did award a lien for the repairs and denied all of Daimler's causes of action. Hanna's thus prevailed over all of Daimler's causes of action and prevailed on its claim for a worker's lien to the extent of the reasonable value of the repairs. We conclude that Hanna's was the prevailing party and the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to Hanna's under property code section 70.008. We overrule both of Daimler's points of error.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.