Daigrepont v. La. St. Rac.

4 Citing cases

  1. Whitfield v. City of New Orleans

    431 F. Supp. 3d 818 (E.D. La. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Defendants' other cited authorities also involve issues of temporal proximity to the injury-causing event. SeeCurran , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 768 (no bystander claim where parent did not witness event or arrive at scene soon thereafter); Daigrepont v. La. State Racing Comm'n , 663 So. 2d 840, 840-41 (La. App. 1995) (no bystander claim where plaintiff did not witness horse-riding accident, but arrived at scene after son had been transported, was informed of accident, rushed to son's side in hospital emergency room, and later viewed videotape of accident at hospital). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Patricia Grimes heard the shots, immediately ran outside the house, and saw her son's bullet-ridden car (but not her son's body), and that Adolph Grimes, Jr., after being informed of the situation, also ran out of the house to the scene.

  2. Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran

    466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006)   Cited 180 times
    Holding that Iran's "conduct in facilitating, financing, and providing material support to bring about this attack was intentional, extreme, and outrageous"

    See La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 2315.6. Louisiana courts have interpreted the term "view" to require the plaintiff's actual presence at the event causing the injury. See Daigrepont, 663 So.2d 840, 841 (La.App. 1995) (finding that plaintiffs were entitled to no recovery if "viewing" of injury was only by videotape). Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has left little room for interpretation of this provision, stating that such a law is clear and unambiguous, and therefore no further interpretation of the provision may be made with regard to the legislature's intent in enacting it.

  3. Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans ex rel. Department of Finance

    720 So. 2d 1186 (La. 1998)   Cited 283 times
    Explaining the well-settled principle that courts should avoid reaching or determining constitutionality unless it is essential to resolution of the case

    LA.CIV. CODE art. 9; Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 95-0539 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 840. The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself.

  4. Haspel Davis v. Bd., Levee

    680 So. 2d 159 (La. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 15 times

    When the law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not result in absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written and no interpretation may be made in search of the legislature's intent. La.C.C. art. 9; Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 95-0539 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/2/96), 663 So.2d 840, writ denied, 95-2828 (La. 2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1085. When a statute is clear the court must give credence to the mandate expressed by the legislature and cannot resort to construing a statute based on the spirit of the law as opposed to the plain wording of the law.