Hence, this Court has interpreted Lejeune and subsequent legislation. In Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 95-0539 (La.App. 4th Cir. 10/26/95) 663 So.2d 840, writ denied, 95-2828 (La. 2/2/96) 666 So.2d 1085, this Court did not allow a father to recover damages for mental anguish. In that case, Ronnie Daigrepont, a jockey, was injured during a horse race. His father arrived at the track shortly thereafter and learned of the accident.
Defendants' other cited authorities also involve issues of temporal proximity to the injury-causing event. SeeCurran , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 768 (no bystander claim where parent did not witness event or arrive at scene soon thereafter); Daigrepont v. La. State Racing Comm'n , 663 So. 2d 840, 840-41 (La. App. 1995) (no bystander claim where plaintiff did not witness horse-riding accident, but arrived at scene after son had been transported, was informed of accident, rushed to son's side in hospital emergency room, and later viewed videotape of accident at hospital). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Patricia Grimes heard the shots, immediately ran outside the house, and saw her son's bullet-ridden car (but not her son's body), and that Adolph Grimes, Jr., after being informed of the situation, also ran out of the house to the scene.
Cooper v. Patra, 51,182 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/15/17), 215 So. 3d 889, 892, writ denied, 2017-0476 (La. 5/12/17), 219 So. 3d 1104. See Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Com'n, 95-0539 (La. Ct. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 840 (denying recovery under article 2315.6 when a father arrives upon the scene of an accident, is informed of the accident, rushes to the hospital where his son has been taken, and later views a video tape of the accident). Veroline v. Priority One EMS, 2009-1040 (La. 10/9/09), 18 So.3d 1273, 1276.
The claims brought by the following individuals must be DISMISSED due to lack of standing: See Daigrepont v. State Racing Com'n, 663 So.2d 840, 841 (La.App. 1995) (requiring plaintiff's actual presence at the scene of the injury, and not allowing any further interpretation of the provision in the Louisiana Code establishing a cause of action for IIED); Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 754 A.2d 650, 652-53 (Pa. 2000) (limiting IIED recovery to those plaintiffs "who were present at the time, as distinguished from those who discover later what has occurred," even in those situations where the defendant may be substantially certain that the plaintiff will suffer severe emotional distress as a result of the offensive act). To the extent that these plaintiffs are relatives to any of the deceased servicemen, it should be noted that the dismissal of these plaintiffs' IIED claims does not hinder these individuals' ability to recover any portion of a wrongful death damages awarded to the estates of those servicemen to which these dismissed plaintiffs may be entitled under North Carolina law.
See La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 2315.6. Louisiana courts have interpreted the term "view" to require the plaintiff's actual presence at the event causing the injury. See Daigrepont, 663 So.2d 840, 841 (La.App. 1995) (finding that plaintiffs were entitled to no recovery if "viewing" of injury was only by videotape). Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has left little room for interpretation of this provision, stating that such a law is clear and unambiguous, and therefore no further interpretation of the provision may be made with regard to the legislature's intent in enacting it.
When a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. LA.CIV.CODE art. 9; Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 95-0539 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 840, writ denied, 95-2828 (La. 2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1085. Courts must interpret every provision, considering the purpose of the provision and the interests it furthers and resolves. Succession of Lauga, 624 So.2d at 1165.
LA.CIV. CODE art. 9; Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 95-0539 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 840. The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself.
Therefore, the statute shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent; and this court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the application of statute 33:1996 to the Defendant, THE CITY OF LEESVILLE. Louisiana Civil Code art. 9 ; Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n , 95-0539 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 840.This court, after considering the foregoing motions, evidence presented, arguments of counsel, applicable law, and for reasons stated above, DENIES Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, THE CITY OF LEESVILLE.
Longman v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 1993-0352, 635 So.2d 343, 349 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994). See alsoDaigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Commission , 1995-0539 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 840, writ denied , 1995-2828 (La. 2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1085 ; State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Walker , 1995-0185 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 190. Accordingly, we hold that OLDEB can be applied to cases outside oil and gas matters, and the trial court did not err in allowing the formulas to be applied here.
Therefore, the statute shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent; and this court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the application of statute 33:1996 to the Defendant, THE CITY OF LEESVILLE. Louisiana Civil Code art. 9 ; Daigrepont v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n , 95-0539 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 840. This court, after considering the foregoing motions, evidence presented, arguments of counsel, applicable law, and for reasons stated above, DENIES Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, THE CITY OF LEESVILLE.