Dahlgren v. Blomeen

17 Citing cases

  1. Portmann v. Herard

    409 P.3d 1199 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 8 times

    "[R]eciprocal wills, although executed simultaneously, do not in themselves constitute evidence of a contract to execute [mutual] wills and keep them in effect." Dahlgren v. Blomeen , 49 Wash.2d 47, 50, 298 P.2d 479 (1956).

  2. In re Pennington

    142 Wn. 2d 592 (Wash. 2000)   Cited 79 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Considering the various factors under Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831, to determine whether and how to equitably distribute parties' property at the end of a meretricious relationship in order to avoid unjust enrichment

    See Latham, 87 Wn.2d at 553-54. Among these exceptions were: (1) tracing source of funds, West v. Knowles, 50 Wn.2d 311, 313, 311 P.2d 689 (1957); (2) implied partnership/joint venture, In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72, 78-81, 499 P.2d 864 (1972); (3) resulting trusts, Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wn.2d 808, 812-14, 232 P.2d 827 (1951); (4) constructive trusts, Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376, 389-90, 407 P.2d 967 (1965); (5) tenancy in common, Shull v. Shepherd, 63 Wn.2d 503, 506, 387 P.2d 767 (1963); and (6) contract theory, Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47, 50-52, 298 P.2d 479 (1956). In 1984, this court discarded this presumption.

  3. Connell v. Francisco

    127 Wn. 2d 339 (Wash. 1995)   Cited 110 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Connell, the court concluded that Washington state "limit[s] the distribution of property following a [quasi-marital] relationship to property that would have been characterized as community property had the parties been married."

    To avoid inequitable results under "the Creasman presumption", Washington courts developed a number of exceptions. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72, 79-81, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (implied partnership); Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 (implied partnership); Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965) (constructive trust); West v. Knowles, 50 Wn.2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957) (tracing source of funds); Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47, 298 P.2d 479 (1956) (contract theory); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wn. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957, review denied, 84 Wn.2d 1009 (1974) (constructive trust); see generally Washington State Bar Ass'n, Community Property Deskbook §§ 2.70-2.76 (1989). [5] In 1984, this court overruled Creasman.

  4. Peffley-Warner v. Bowen

    113 Wn. 2d 243 (Wash. 1989)   Cited 15 times
    Recognizing the offensive character of the word meretricious

    Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d at 303-04, citing Washington State Bar Ass'n, Community Property Deskbook § 2.7, at 2-8 (1977). The most common means of avoidance include: (1) tracing source of funds ( West v. Knowles, 50 Wn.2d 311, 313, 311 P.2d 689 (1957)); (2) implied partnership or joint venture ( In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72, 79, 499 P.2d 864 (1972); Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976)); (3) resulting/constructive trust ( Omer v. Omer, 11 Wn. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974)); (4) cotenancy ( Shull v. Sheperd, 63 Wn.2d 503, 387 P.2d 767 (1963)); (5) contract theory ( Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47, 298 P.2d 479 (1956)); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815 (1976) (summarized from Community Property Deskbook §§ 2.8-2.12). Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d at 303-04. Appellant Peffley-Warner contends that the Lindsey ruling gave the parties a right to an equitable division of the community property.

  5. Marriage of Lindsey

    101 Wn. 2d 299 (Wash. 1984)   Cited 62 times
    Recognizing meretricious relationship doctrine and instructing trial courts to make a "'just and equitable'" distribution of property upon termination of such relationships (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976))

    Community Property Deskbook § 2.7, at 2-8. The most common means of avoidance include: (1) tracing source of funds ( West v. Knowles, supra); (2) implied partnership/joint venture ( In re Estate of Thornton, supra; Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976)); (3) resulting/constructive trust ( Omer v.Omer, 11 Wn. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974)); (4) cotenancy ( Shull v. Shepherd, 63 Wn.2d 503, 387 P.2d 767 (1963)); (5) contract theory ( Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47, 298 P.2d 479 (1956); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976)) (summarized from Community Property Deskbook §§ 2.8-2.12). [1] We find the constricting dictates of the Creasman presumption to have made the law unpredictable and at times onerous.

  6. Colwell v. Anderson

    438 P.2d 448 (Wyo. 1968)   Cited 10 times

    Even if the witness was estimating defendant's speed at a rate higher than the plaintiff estimated it, there would be no reason to say it would not corroborate plaintiff's theory that defendant was driving at an excessive rate of speed. For cases which hold that a party is not conclusively bound by his own testimony as against other evidence which the fact-finding body might fairly believe, see the following cases and authority: Gibson v. Mendocino County, 16 Cal.2d 80, 105 P.2d 105, 108; Holland v. Morgan Peacock Properties Company, 168 Cal.App.2d 206, 335 P.2d 769, 773; Valdin v. Holteen, 199 Or. 134, 260 P.2d 504, 509; Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47, 298 P.2d 479, 481-482; Green v. Floe, 28 Wn.2d 620, 183 P.2d 771, 772; Alamo v. Del Rosario, 69 App.D.C. 47, 98 F.2d 328, 331; Annotation 169 A.L.R. 798, 809; and 9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2594a, pp. 597-601 (3d Ed.). In the annotation cited above, it is stated the rule that a party is entitled to the benefit of the testimony of other witnesses in contradiction to his own is especially applicable to circumstances of an accident or similar event.

  7. Humphries v. Riveland

    67 Wn. 2d 376 (Wash. 1965)   Cited 19 times
    Denying half interest in home to party who cohabited with another party because, "[i]n order to have such an equitable claim, appellant must show that there has been some inequitable conduct. . . ."

    Our holding in Creasman v. Boyle, supra, has been misconstrued. Property rights are not determined on the basis of social relationships, moral or immoral. Poole v. Schrichte (1951), 39 Wn.2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044. For reasons heretofore set forth in Poole v. Schrichte, pp. 562-3, and Walberg v. Mattson (1951), 38 Wn.2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (See, also, Dahlgren v. Blomeen (1956) ante p. 47, 298 P.2d 479), our holding in the Creasman case has no application here. In Walberg v. Mattson, supra, p. 812, it is pointed out that in the Creasman case,

  8. Gale v. Kay

    390 P.2d 596 (Wyo. 1964)   Cited 6 times

    This court could hardly claim to be a court of justice if it did not recognize that an injured party, whose testimony consists of a narration of events as they appeared to him at or immediately prior to the happening of an accident causing serious injury and unconsciousness, is not conclusively bound by his own testimony as against other evidence which the fact-finding body might fairly believe. Holdings to this effect and to the effect that the jury is not bound by evidence which is introduced by a party and which negatives his claim have been made in the following Pacific-state cases: Gibson v. Mendocino County, 16 Cal.2d 80, 105 P.2d 105, 108; Holland v. Morgan Peacock Properties Company, 168 Cal.App.2d 206, 335 P.2d 769, 773; Valdin v. Holteen, 199 Or. 134, 260 P.2d 504, 509; Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47, 298 P.2d 479, 481-482; Gioldi v. Sartorio, 119 Cal.App.2d 198, 259 P.2d 62, 65; Green v. Floe, 28 Wn.2d 620, 183 P.2d 771, 772. See also Alamo v. Del Rosario, 69 App.D.C. 47, 98 F.2d 328, 331; Annotation 169 A.L.R. 798, 809; and 9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2594a, pp. 597-601 (3d Ed.)

  9. Iredell v. Iredell

    49 Wn. 2d 627 (Wash. 1957)   Cited 14 times

    Our holding in Creasman v. Boyle, supra, has been misconstrued. Property rights are not determined on the basis of social relationships, moral or immoral. Poole v. Schrichte (1951), 39 Wn.2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044. For reasons heretofore set forth in Poole v. Schrichte, pp. 562-3, and Walberg v. Mattson (1951), 38 Wn.2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (See, also, Dahlgren v. Blomeen (1956), ante p. 47, 298 P.2d 479), our holding in the Creasman case has no application here. In Walberg v. Mattson, supra, p. 812, it is pointed out that in the Creasman case,

  10. In re Thew

    No. 39546-4-III (Wash. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2024)

    Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972); Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965); Shull v. Shepherd, 63 Wn.2d 503, 506, 387 P.2d 767 (1963); West v. Knowles, 50 Wn.2d 311 (1957); Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47, 298 P.2d 479 (1956); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wn.App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974); Washington State Bar Association, Community Property Deskbook §§ 2.70-2.76 (1989). Presumably, these alternative theories of acquiring an adjudicated ownership interest in property by a boyfriend or girlfriend remain available, but Whitney Jacques does not rely on any of them.