Daggit v. Commonwealth

9 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Wolford

    4 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 1999)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that for an instruction under KRS § 502.020 to be appropriate "[a]ll that is required is that the appellees agreed to act in concert to achieve a particular objective and that at least one of them fired the fatal shots."

    The defendant admitted firing a shot at the store clerk and was convicted of wanton murder. His claim of entitlement to an instruction on second-degree manslaughter was rejected, because his own testimony proved that if the fatal shot was fired from his gun, he caused the death of the store clerk while engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. KRS 507.020 (1) (b). For other cases of similar import, see, e.g., Couch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 636 (1972); Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 406 S.W.2d 843 (1966); Daggit v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 721, 237 S.W.2d 49 (1951). In all of those cases, the evidence was virtually undisputed not only that the defendant killed the victim, but also with respect to the defendant's state of mind when he or she did so. The only remaining issue was the legal effect to be given to the undisputed facts.

  2. Glasco v. State

    513 So. 2d 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)   Cited 11 times

    See generally, 95 A.L.R.2d 175 (1964). Cf. Howell v. State, 431 So.2d 1328 (Ala. 1983) (conviction of criminally negligent homicide held inconsistent with criminal liability based on complicity); Daggit v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 721, 237 S.W.2d 49 (1951); State v. Robinson, 12 Wn. 349, 41 P. 51 (1895). III

  3. Commonwealth v. Bowling

    497 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 3 times

    Thus it is unnecessary that the corroborative testimony establish guilt. It needs only to tend to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. Daggit v. Commonwealth, Ky., 237 S.W.2d 49 (1951) and Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 440 S.W.2d 520 (1969). An admission against interest by an accused is admissible as corroborative evidence.

  4. Faerber v. Commonwealth

    452 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 3 times

    In the absence of evidence tending to establish any particular degree of an offense, no instruction should be given which injects that particular offense or degree of offense into the case. Johnston v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 766, 186 S.W. 655; Daggit v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 721, 237 S.W.2d 49; Montague v. Commonwealth, Ky., 332 S.W.2d 543; and Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 406 S.W.2d 843. In each of the cases cited the accused was charged with murder and was convicted of a lesser degree of homicide under an instruction unsupported by proof.

  5. Bond v. Commonwealth

    414 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 1 times

    Appellants next say the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction was error. Our attention is "invited" to Daggit v. Commonwealth, Ky., 237 S.W.2d 49. We have accepted the invitation and have examined Daggit and find that in Daggit the "confession of the homicide characterize(s) it as murder.

  6. Creech v. Commonwealth

    412 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 15 times

    See 6 Ky.Digest Criminal Law 511. Each case rests upon its particular facts as those facts may or not fall within the legal concepts. Examples of cases in which the corroborative testimony has been held insufficient include Daggit v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 721, 237 S.W.2d 49; Bryant v. Commonwealth, Ky., 277 S.W.2d 55; Commonwealth v. Truglio, Ky., 371 S.W.2d 648; Hartsock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 861. Without undertaking an analysis of these and other cases of similar import, we consider it sufficient to say that we are persuaded that they impel the conclusion that the evidence at hand was insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplices within the purview of RCr 9.62. We need not decide whether the rationale of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and cases of that tenor was applicable to the trial at which Creech was convicted. It is certain that the principles enunciated in Escobedo, and in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, will be applicable in the event of another trial.

  7. Noe v. Commonwealth

    396 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 12 times

    When they came back a short time later, Smith was dead on the ground with a bullet hole through his heart. In neither Daggit v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 721, 237 S.W.2d 49 (1951), nor Johnston v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 766, 186 S.W. 655 (1916), the two cases cited by appellant in support of his position here, was there any evidence from which a jury could reasonably have drawn an inference that the fatal act was done in sudden heat of passion or in a sudden affray. In this case the evidence was abundantly sufficient to sustain a verdict of manslaughter. Compare, for example, Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 389 S.W.2d 907 (1965).

  8. Hughes v. Commonwealth

    342 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961)

    With respect to the quality of evidence necessary to satisfy the above section of our Code, we have held that corroborating evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Daggit v. Commonwealth, Ky., 237 S.W.2d 49; Williams v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 175, 77 S.W.2d 609. We consider the testimony of two witnesses in determining the sufficiency of the corroborative evidence.

  9. Lee v. Commonwealth

    329 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 26 times
    In Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57, we said that where some of the evidence casts doubt on the accused's claim of self-defense the issue should be submitted to the jury.

    Appellant contends that it was error to have given the voluntary manslaughter instruction. It is contended that the evidence showed either murder or justifiable homicide and that there was no evidence on which to base a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Reliance is placed by appellant on Daggit v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 721, 237 S.W.2d 49. The Daggit case is not in point, since its reversal was primarily placed on the ground that it was error to convict a defendant of voluntary manslaughter who had been charged with being an accessory before the fact to murder. Another person had confessed to the premeditated killing, implicating Daggit as a co-conspirator.