Furthermore, to the extent that N. R. challenges the court’s conclusion that sole custody in one of the parents was in the best interests of the children in the present case, we note that our courts have consistently recognized ongoing acrimony and conflict between parents, which was well established in the present case, as a basis for awarding one party sole custody. See, e.g., Daddio v. O’Bara, 97 Conn. App. 286, 297, 904 A.2d 259 ("ample evidence before the court pertaining to the parties’ inability to cooperate and communicate with respect to the decisions regarding the minor child … supported the court’s conclusion that joint legal custody, which requires a level of cooperation between parents, was not in the child’s best interest"), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932, 909 A.2d 957 (2006); see also Lugo v. Lugo, 176 Conn. App. 149, 153, 168 A.3d 592 (2017) (in affirming trial court decision to award sole custody, this court noted that trial court had found "it was abundantly clear that the parties were unable to coparent" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ge v. Liu, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. FA-20-5027193-S (October 23, 2023) (award of sole custody was appropriate given "that the parents have an inability to cooperate and communicate with respect to the decisions regarding the minor child, and … that requiring a level of cooperation between the parents would not be in the child’s best interest"); Adams v. Adams, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. FA-15-6009117-S (September 7, 2018) (award of sole custody to mother was due to "unhealthy and acrimonious" communication between parents, which was "severely damag[ing]" to children); Mondello v. Mondello, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. F
Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Conn.App. 50, 55, 732 A.2d 808 (1999), quoting Walshon v. Walshon, 42 Conn.App. 651, 657, 681 A.2d 376 (1996). See also Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 506 n.6; 72 A.3d 367 (2013); Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn.App. 414, 424, 970 A.2d 743 (2009); and Daddio v. O’Bara, 97 Conn.App. 286, 292, 904 A.2d 259, cert. denied, 280 Conn . 932, 909 A.2d 957 (2006). "The burden of proving a change to be in the best interest of the child rests on the party seeking the change ... To obtain modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order ... Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modification of the existing order."
Emerick v. Emerick, 5 Conn.App. 649, 657 n. 9, 502 A.2d 933 (1985), cert. dismissed, 200 Conn. 804, 510 A.2d 192 (1986); see Tabackman v. Tabackman, 25 Conn.App. 366, 368-69, 593 A.2d 526 (1991); Carroll v. Carroll, 55 Conn.App. 18, 25-26, 737 A.2d 963 (1999). In Daddio v. O’Bara, 97 Conn.App. 286, 904 A.2d 259, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932, 909 A.2d 957 (2006), the Appellate Court reviewed an order of sole custody and stated that "[o]ur review of the record reveals that the court’s determination that it was in the child’s best interest for the plaintiff to have sole legal custody had a basis in the evidence. The record is replete with evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant had been unable, for a significant amount of time, to work together with respect to the child.