Opinion
FILE NO. CK14-02158 PETITION NO. 19-26453
02-07-2020
D------ T------, PETITIONER, v. N----- W-----, RESPONDENT.
ORDER
REVIEW OF A COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
(Petition for Protection from Abuse)
Before the HONORABLE JAMES G. MCGIFFIN JR., JUDGE of the Family Court of the State of Delaware:
The Court has before it a Request for Review of a Commissioner's Order (ROCO) filed by N----- W----- (Mother) against D------ T------ (Father) on October 31, 2019. Mother is represented by counsel. Father is self-represented. Mother appeals the Commissioner's October 1, 2019 Protection From Abuse (PFA) Order against her. The Commissioner's PFA Order is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2019, Father filed an Affidavit for Emergency Ex Parte Order - PFA and a Petition for Order of PFA against Mother on his behalf and on behalf of the parties' minor child, K----- T------. Mother filed an Answer to PFA on September 30, 2019. The Court held a hearing on the Father's Petition for Order of PFA on October 1, 2019. The Commissioner granted Father's Petition and entered a two-year PFA Order against Mother on behalf of Father and the child. On October 31, 2019, Mother filed the present Request for ROCO. Father filed an Answer to Request for ROCO on November 5, 2019.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A non-defaulting party may timely request judicial review of a Family Court Commissioner's Order. Review of a Commissioner's Order is governed by 10 Del. C. § 915(d)(1), which provides,
Any party, except a party in default of appearance before a Commissioner, may appeal a final order of a Commissioner to a judge of the Court by filing and serving written objections to such order, as provided by the rules of Court, within 30 days from the date of the Commissioner's Order. A judge of the Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Commissioner's Order to which objection is made. A judge of the Court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the order of the Commissioner. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the Commissioner with instruction.
Based on this standard of review, this Court will refer to the record of the Commissioner's proceeding, but will review the law and evidence independently. In reviewing the matter, the "judge will make an independent decision by reviewing the Commissioner's findings of fact determined at the Commissioner's hearing, any testimony and documentary evidence on the record, and the specific objections of the moving party." Because the Commissioner hears and evaluates live witness testimony, the Court gives weight to the Commissioner's assessments of credibility. "[T]he Commissioner has the opportunity to hear and assess witness testimony; thus, the Court applies an abuse of discretion standard of review as to the Commissioner's factual findings, wherein the Commissioner's factual findings are accepted if sufficiently support by the record." "Findings of fact will not be overturned on appeal unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." The Court is not bound by the Commissioner's determinations if it finds those determinations are unreasoned or unsupported.
See Del. Fam. Ct. R. Civ. P. 53.1(e), (g); see also State v. M.S., 2006 WL 4546614, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 8, 2006).
Y.H. v. T.H., 2015 WL 6442087, at *2 (Del Fam Ct July 10, 2015).
See Div. of Family Services v. J.C., 2012 WL 4861601, at *3 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 23, 2012) (citing cases). See also Adams-Hall v. Adams, 2010 WL 3733922, at *2 (Del. 2010) (noting that this approach is within Family Court's discretion); Y.H., 2015 WL 6442087, at *2 ("[T]he Court will give weight to the fact findings of the Commissioner, especially in regards to the credibility of witnesses, even though the Court is not bound by them.").
Cook v. Cook, 2013 WL 6869901, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 24 2013).
Kraft v. Mason, 11 A.2d 227 (Del. 2010).
See J.C., 2012 WL 4861601, at *3.
MOTHER'S OBJECTIONS
Mother raises two objections to the Commissioner's October 1, 2019 Order entering a PFA Order against her on behalf of Father and the child. Mother's first objection is that the Commissioner erroneously found Father established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother committed an act of abuse as defined under Title 10, Section 1041(1)(d) & (h). Mother also objects to the forms of relief the Commissioner awarded to Father. Specifically, Mother asserts it was inappropriate for the Commissioner to award Father sole legal custody of the child, enter a no-contact provision whereby Mother is unable to have any communication or visits with the child, and order Mother to pay Father $6,203 for travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees Father incurred as a result of Mother's abuse because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that she committed an act of abuse. Alternatively, should this reviewing judge find Mother committed an act of abuse, Mother requests the Court restore to her joint legal custody of the child, enter an order allowing contact and visitation between Mother and the child, and reduce Father's award of travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees to $203.
DISCUSSION
(1) The Commissioner did not err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother committed an act or repeated acts of domestic violence against Father and the child.
Mother's first objection is that the Commissioner erroneously found Father demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that she committed acts of domestic violence as defined in Title 10, Section 1041(1)(d) and (h) of the Delaware Code. This reviewing judge rejects Mother's objection and finds Father presented sufficient evidence at the PFA hearing to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother committed acts of domestic violence. The Commissioner's factual findings are supported by the record and are accepted in whole.
Title 10, Section 1041 of the Delaware Code provides a list of eight types of conduct which constitute abuse. Section 1041 provides that domestic violence means abuse perpetuated by one member against another member of the enumerated protected classes, including family members and persons living separate and apart with a child in common. In the present case, the Commissioner found Mother committed an act of abuse under Section 1041(1)(d) and (h). Under Section 1041(1)(d), a respondent commits an act of abuse by "[e]ngaging in a course of alarming or distressing conduct in a manner which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress or to provoke a violent or disorderly response." Similarly, under Section 1041(1)(h), a respondent commits an act of abuse by engaging in "any other conduct which a reasonable person under the circumstances would find threatening or harmful."
See generally 10 Del. C. § 1041(1).
See 10 Del. C. § 901(12) (defining "family").
Only July 24, 2019, the Court entered an Order regarding custody and placement of the child. Under that Order, Father is to have primary residential placement of the child during the school year and Mother is to have primary residential placement of the child during the child's summer break. The Court also ordered Mother to provide Father with a P.O. Box address in Arizona and a phone number by which he could contact the child when the child is with Mother. On August 27, 2019, the Court entered an Emergency Order finding that Mother refused to return the child to Father in spite of the July 24, 2019 Order and, therefore, she was in contempt of that Order. To compel her compliance, the Court fined Mother $100 each day she failed to return the child to Father's home beginning August 28, 2019.
At the PFA hearing on October 1, 2019, Father provided the Court with the itinerary for the child's return flight to Delaware on August 17, 2019. Father testified that he received a phone call from Mother on August 16, 2019. During that phone call, Mother informed Father that she was not going to send the child back to Delaware on the August 17, 2019 flight. According to Father, Mother told him that "she's not going to send [the child] back to Delaware. . . There's nothing that that Delaware judge can do to me in Arizona and you and that Delaware judge can kiss my A-S-S." Father then told Mother that he would be in Arizona sometime the next week to pick up the child. After his phone call with Mother, Father contacted the local police in Arizona and asked them to perform a welfare check. Someone at the residence informed the police officer that the child would be on the flight on August 17, 2019. However, the child was not placed on that flight. Father testified that he "tried to call [Mother] and she wouldn't pick up the phone and then [he] sent her text messages all that week . . . you know, asking, you know, can we set up, you know a way to get [the child] back here? You know, and no answer. She . . . she only sent me a[n] emoji -- emoji with someone laughing or something."
Pet'r's Ex. 2.
Tr. of Oct. 1, 2019, PFA Hr'g at p. 9, ll. 18-19.
Id. at p. 9, ll. 18-20.
Id. at p. 9, ll. 20-22, 24, p. 10, ll. 1-2.
Id. at p. 11, ll. 11-13.
Id. at p. 11, ll. 21-23, p. 12, ll. 1-2.
Id. at p. 12, ll. 4-9, 11-12.
Id. at p. 12, ll. 17-18.
Id. at p. 13, ll. 1-3, 5-7, 9-10, 12-13.
Father testified that the parties then had a hearing before this reviewing judge, presumably the emergency hearing on August 27, 2019. Father testified that, at that hearing, Mother indicated "she already enrolled [the child] in [s]chool, you know, which the custody order says that, you know, [the child] could go to school in Delaware and that she's been in school since August 5th."
Tr. at p. 13, ll. 19-24.
Father presented the Court with documents from an Arizona court. He asserted the documents were evidence that Mother tried to conceal her physical address from him. One of the documents is an Order from July 22, 2019 regarding a Petition to Enforce a Physical Child Custody Order and request for Protected Address, both filed by Mother before the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County. The Court denied Mother's petition. Another document is an order from August 19, 2019 from Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County regarding a Petition to Enforce a Physical Child Custody Order filed by Mother. The Order denied Mother's Petition. The third document is an Order for Appearance of Person(s) with Physical Custody of the Child(ren) which ordered Mother to produce the child at a hearing on September 16, 2019.
Id. at p. 8, ll. 10-17. See Pet'r's Ex. 1.
Father testified that he went to Arizona and appeared in an Arizona court on September 16, 2019 for a hearing where Mother was ordered to bring the child. At the conclusion of that hearing, Father "got up, gave [the child] a hug, and [he and the child] walked out the door. [Mother] yelled saying that he's taking her. The judge, you know, basically looked at her -- from what [Father] was told from [his] lawyer, looked at her and said 'There's nothing I can do.'" At that point, Mother's "lawyer tried to run in front of [Father] and -- and tell court security and the security told her -- told him that it's nothing that we can do, he has custody of his daughter and [Father] walked out the door and [he and the child] got her on a plane two hours later." Father opined that "[i]f [he] didn't do that, [the child] would still be in Arizona." Father expressed concern that if the Court did not enter a PFA Order against Mother she would be able to go to the child's school in Delaware and take her to Arizona.
Id. at p. 17, ll. 3-8.
Id. at p. 17, ll. 11-16.
Id. at p. 17, ll. 18-19.
Tr. at p. 21, ll. 6-10.
At the October 1, 2019 hearing, Mother asserted she and Father had an agreement from January 2019 that the child would only remain with Father until Mother became "situated" in Arizona, at which time the child would live with Mother. The Commissioner asked Mother, "[D]id you return the child pursuant to Judge McGiffin's order?" Mother responded, "No, sir, I did not." Mother then asserted that a member of the court's staff told her she did not have to return the child. The Commissioner remarked, "The fact of the matter is, Judge McGiffin made a determination about what's in the best interest of the child. You didn't agree with that determination. I get it. And so -- you just didn't abide by his court order." Mother responded, "Because I felt as though that she did not want to go back to her father."
Id. at pp. 28-29.
Id. at p. 32, ll. 15-16.
Id. at p. 32, l. 17.
Id. at p. 32, ll. 19-24.
Id. at p. 36, ll. 13-15, 17, 19-20.
Id. at p. 36, ll. 21-22.
Based on the evidence, the Commissioner held, "The Court is going to find, ma'am, that you've committed an act or acts of abuse within the meaning of the PFA statute." The Commissioner found "that the entire course of conduct that [Mother] engaged in was alarming or distressing and certainly likely to cause fear or emotional distress and clearly it is conduct that a reasonable person under the circumstances would find harmful." Similarly, in the Supplemental Order to the PFA Order, the Commissioner found that Mother committed an act of abuse as defined in Section 1041(1)(d): "[Mother] failed to return the child[] to [Father] in violation of a valid custody order and an order finding her in civil contempt of that order, knowing that her conduct was likely to cause emotional distress to [Father]." The Commissioner also found Mother committed an act of abuse as defined under Section 1041(1)(h): "[Mother] engaged in behavior that was harmful to the child [] by keeping the child from her father in violation of a court order for custody issued in the best interest of the child and an order finding her in civil contempt of the custody order."
Id. at p. 40, ll. 12-14.
Id. at p. 41, ll. 7-12.
The evidence demonstrates Mother's conduct constitutes an act of abuse as defined under Title 10, Sections 1041(d) and (h). Section 1041(d) requires the Court apply a three-step analysis. First, the Court must determine whether the respondent engaged in a course of conduct. Second, the Court must determine whether the respondent's course of conduct was actually alarming or distressing to the petitioner. This requires the Court to examine the totality of the circumstances including how the respondent's actions actually affected the petitioner. Finally, the Court must determine whether the respondent's course of conduct was carried out in a manner likely to cause fear or emotional distress or to provoke a violent or disorderly response. This step requires the Court more objectively examine the nature of the respondent's conduct. This analysis helps prevent findings of abuse in situations where, for instance, a petitioner may be scared by what the respondent says but the respondent's conduct is not actually scary.
The Court's analysis of subsection (d) differs from previous Family Court cases that held the Court need only apply an objective, reasonable person standard. See e.g. M.D. v. S.D., 2012 WL 4862963, at *3 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 20, 2012); T.M.G.R. v. M.C.R., 2004 WL 2334158, at *3 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 2, 2004); M.B. v. H.B., 2003 WL 2226503, at *3 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 2, 2003).
Based on this analysis, the Court finds the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates Mother committed an act of abuse against Father as defined under Title 10, Section 1041(1)(d) as she engaged in a course of alarming or distressing conduct which was likely to cause emotional distress or fear to Father and the child.
First, the evidence demonstrates Mother engaged in a course of conduct. Mother's course of conduct began when she informed Father on August 16, 2019 that the child would not be returning on the flight on August 17, 2019. Her course of conduct continued by her continuous refusal to return the child to Father even after August 27, 2019 when she was found in contempt of the July 24, 2019 Order and was ordered to return the child to Father. Mother continued her course of conduct by failing to respond to Father either by phone call or text message, attempting to conceal her address in Arizona from Father, and attempting to prevent Father from leaving with the child at the September 16, 2019 hearing in Arizona. The evidence establishes Mother engaged in a course of conduct.
Second, the evidence demonstrates that Father was distressed by Mother's course of conduct. Father testified that he contacted local police in Arizona to perform a wellness check on Mother's home. This testimony indicates Mother's conduct caused Father distress about the child's wellbeing. Father testified that he was worried that without a protective order there was no way of preventing Mother from removing the child from school in Delaware and taking her back to Arizona. This evidence establishes that Mother's course of conducted distressed Father.
Finally, Mother's course of conduct was done in a manner likely to cause emotional distress or fear. Mother refused to return the child to Father. Even after she was found in contempt of the July 24, 2019 Order by failing to return the child, Mother continued to keep the child in Arizona. Mother was nonresponsive to Father's text messages and phone calls after August 17, 2019. Mother also attempted to conceal her Arizona address from Father, which would make it difficult for Father to locate her and the child. The evidence establishes that Mother's course of conduct was carried out in a manner likely to cause emotional distress to Father.
Mother asserts that her "conduct in refusing to comply with the Court's Order of Custody is not devoid of rationale nor intended or likely to cause fear or distress in Petitioner of the Child." This is because she "did not engage in the kind of 'self-help' or threatening behavior warranting a finding of abuse." Mother argues that she told the Commissioner she believed she was legally allowed to retain the child in Arizona pending her legal actions in Arizona. Mother's rationale for engaging in her course of conduct is not relevant to the Court's analysis as the analysis requires the Court to consider Father's state of mind. Nor is it necessary the Court find Mother "intended" to cause Father or the child distress as intent is not an element of Section 1041(1)(d). While Mother asserts her conduct was not likely to cause fear or distress to Father or the child because Father was able to enforce his custodial rights within one month of the Court's required exchange of the child, the evidence contradicts her assertion. This Commissioner's finding that Mother committed an act of abuse against Father as defined under Section 1041(1)(d) is supported by the record.
Under Section 1041(1)(h), a respondent commits an act of abuse by engaging in "any other conduct which a reasonable person under the circumstances would find threatening or harmful." The Court must apply an objective analysis in determining whether Mother committed an act of abuse under Section 1041(1)(h). The objective analysis requires the Court "to evaluate the objective abusiveness of [the respondent's] actions, notwithstanding their effect on [the petitioner]. In doing so, the statute places the Commissioner in the position of having to determine whether the reaction of the Petitioner was in line with that of a reasonable person in the Petitioner's shoes." Similarly, T.M.G.R. v. M.C.R. held "[i]n applying the reasonable person standard the Court does consider the circumstances present at the time the conduct in question occurred. Thus, the relevant issue becomes whether a reasonable person in [the petitioner's] position and circumstances . . . would find [the respondent's] conduct threatening or harmful pursuant to 1041(1)(h)."
T.M.G.R., 2004 WL 2334158, at *3.
M.D., 2012 WL 4862963, at *3.
T.M.G.R., 2004 WL 2334158, at *3 (citing M.B. v. H.B., 2003 WL 2226503, at *3 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 2, 2003)).
This reviewing judge agrees with the Commissioner that a reasonable person in the circumstances and position of both the child and Father would find Mother's conduct threatening or harmful pursuant to Section 1041(1)(h). Mother repeatedly refused to return the child to Father's despite the existing Custody Order and an order finding her in contempt of that Order for her refusal to return the child. She made patently obvious at the August 27, 2019 hearing that she was unwilling to comply with the July 24, 2019 Custody Order and had no plans of returning the child to Father's care. And, Mother has a history of failing to comply with a valid custody order. She began legal proceedings in Arizona, including an attempt to conceal her address from Father. She was nonresponsive to Father's attempts to communicate with her, preventing Father from communicating with the child for a period of one month and impeding his relationship with the child. Given the context of Mother repeatedly disobeying court orders, Mother's attempt to conceal her address from Father, and her failure to communicate with Father and attempt to prevent him from communicating with the child, a reasonable person in the circumstances and positions of Father and the child would find Mother's conduct harmful. This reviewing judge agrees with the Commissioner that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates Mother committed an act or acts of abuse against Father and the child by engaging in conduct which a reasonable person under the circumstances would find threatening or harmful as defined under Section 1041(1)(h).
(2) The remedies ordered by the Commissioner are appropriate.
Mother also objects to the three forms of relief the Commissioner awarded Father. She asserts it was inappropriate for the Commissioner to award Father sole legal custody, enter an order prohibiting contact between Mother and the child, and order Mother to pay Father $6,203 in travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mother committed an act of abuse. Alternatively, Mother asserts that even should this reviewing judge find Mother committed an act of abuse, the Court should restore joint legal custody to the parties, enter an order allowing her to communicate with and visit the child, and reduce the award of in travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees from $6,203 to $203. Mother argues this reviewing judge should alter the forms of relief because her "conduct was not so egregious as to strip [her] of joint-legal custody," the no-contact order is an abuse of discretion, "disproportionate and duplicative punishment" of Mother's conduct, and the award of travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees incurred by Father was not supported by the evidence presented at the PFA hearing.
As part of the PFA Order, the Commissioner awarded Father sole legal custody of the child, ordered Mother to have no contact with the child, and ordered Mother to pay Father $6,203 in travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees.
The Commissioner held,
Both [Father] and [the child] are going to be protected by this order of protection. The order is going to direct that [Mother] stay 100 yards away from both of them, their home, their workplace and the child's school or daycare. I am going to award [Father] sole custody for the duration of this PFA order which will be two years of the child [].
I'm not going to enter a contact order today because I don't believe [Mother] can be relied upon to have visitation with this child without trying to kidnap the child again. And so I am going to award temporary sole custody of the child to father and I'm also going to direct that [Mother] reimburse father the amount of $6,203. . . As for losses suffered by him as the result of the incident of abuse that are suffered in this case, I will give [Mother] six months to pay that.
Tr. at p. 41, ll. 14-17, 19-22.
Tr. at p. 41, l. 24, p. 42, ll. 1-3, 6-9, 11-14.
Title 10, Section 1045 of the Delaware Code provides a list of remedies available if the Court finds a respondent committed an act of domestic violence against a petitioner. Section 1045(a)(2) states, "(a) After consideration of a petition for a protective order, the Court may grant relief as follows: (2) Restrain the respondent from contacting or attempting to contact the petitioner." Section 1045(a)(5) allows the Court to "[g]rant temporary custody of the children of the parties to the petitioner or to another family member." Similarly, under Section 1045(a)(7) the Court may "[o]rder the respondent to pay to the petitioner . . . monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of domestic violence committed by the respondent, including . . . moving or other travel expenses and litigation costs, including attorney's fees."
See generally 10 Del C. § 1045.
This Court affirms the Commissioner's finding that Mother committed an act or acts of abuse against Father and the child. The Commissioner had the authority to grant various remedies as provided under Title 10, Section 1045(a). This reviewing judge is tasked with making a de novo, independent decision based on the Commissioner's findings of facts, the record, and a party's objections to the order. Under Section 915(d)(1), this reviewing judge has the authority to modify in whole or in part the Commissioner's order, including forms of relief. This reviewing judge finds the Commissioner acted within his authority when awarding Father sole legal custody of the child, entering a no contact provision, and ordering Mother to pay Father $6,203 for the travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees Father incurred as a result of Mother's domestic violence.
10 Del. C. § 915(d)(1); Y.H., 2015 WL 6442087, at *2.
The evidence presented at the hearing on Father's petition and the record before this reviewing judge establishes that Mother has a history of acting in blatant disregard for valid court orders regarding placement and custody of the child. The Commissioner expressed his concerns that Mother would continue to disobey the July 24, 2019 Custody Order if she visits the child and there was a risk that Mother would take the child back to Arizona. The Commissioner's concerns are supported by Mother's testimony at the October 1, 2019 hearing as she made clear she did not agree with the July 24, 2019 Order or August 27, 2019 Order and was not willing to abide by either order. This evidence supports the Commissioner entering an order prohibiting contact and awarding Father sole legal custody of the child. However, it has been several months since the Commissioner entered the October 1, 2019 PFA Order and Mother has had no contact with the child. Given this period during which Mother has not been able to communicate with the child and the fact that there is pending custody litigation between Mother and Father, it is reasonable for the child to have contact with Mother. This reviewing judge finds that it is appropriate to modify the provision prohibiting contact in the October 1, 2019 PFA Order to allow Mother to have reasonable telephone contact with the child.
Regarding the award of travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees to Father, Mother argues there was insufficient evidence presented at the October 1, 2019 hearing to support entry of an award of $6,203. Mother also suggests that the Commissioner should have required Father submit an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees before assessing an award of attorney's fees. At the hearing, Father testified that he purchased a plane ticket for the child for a flight on August 17, 2019, which the child never took. Father presented the Court with the itinerary for this flight that shows the ticket cost $203.30. Father testified that he hired a lawyer in Arizona and is "$6,000 in the hole" as a result of hiring the lawyer and pursuing legal relief in Arizona, including registering the July 24, 2019 Custody Order in Arizona and seeking an order for Mother to appear with the child at a court hearing on September 16, 2019. Father also testified that he incurred other expenses when he purchased a plane ticket to Arizona for a September 16, 2019 hearing and for a hotel while in Arizona, though he did not indicate how much he spent on the flight or hotel room. Mother presented no evidence to contradict Father's testimony regarding the travel expenses, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees he incurred.
Tr. at pp. 8-12.
See Pet'r's Ex. 2.
Tr. at p. 14, ll. 23-24
Id. at p. 15, ll. 2-4, 9-11, 13-14, 16-17.
Id. at p. 15, ll. 21-22.
While Mother is correct that it is typical practice for the Court to require a litigant submit an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees before determining whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate, the award of attorney's fees here is distinguishable from that typical scenario. Here, Father is not requesting attorney's fees he incurred in prosecuting his Petition for Order of PFA. Instead, the attorney's fees Father incurred were a direct result of attempting to retrieve the child from Mother in Arizona and were a consequence of Mother's abuse. The purpose of Section 1045(a)(7) is to enable the Court to require PFA respondents make petitioners whole by compensating them for financial losses actually suffered as a direct result of the respondent's acts of domestic violence. Father's testimony establishes that he incurred attorney's fees as a direct result of Mother's domestic violence.
The issue of whether an award of travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees requires the Commissioner make a factual finding as to the credibility of Father's evidence, including exhibits and testimony. This reviewing judge gives deference to the Commissioner's factual findings. Mother presented no evidence to contradict the various expenses Father incurred as a result of her domestic violence. This reviewing judge finds that the Commissioner's award of travel expenses, litigation costs, and attorney's fees is sufficiently supported by the record and is, therefore, affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon a review of the evidence and the record, the Court finds the Commissioner's entry of a two-year PFA order against Mother on behalf of Father and the child was supported by the record. The Court finds that the record supports entry of a provision allowing Mother to have reasonable telephone contact with the child. For those reasons, the Commissioner's October 1, 2019 PFA Order against Mother is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's Protection From Abuse Order dated October 1, 2019 is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part as to the no-contact provision of the Order regarding Mother's contact with the parties' minor child, K----- T------.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mother shall have reasonable telephone contact with the child.
IT IS SO ORDERED this ___ day of FEBRUARY, 2020.
/s/ _________
JAMES G. MCGIFFIN, JR., JUDGE