Opinion
21CA000015
09-24-2021
CATHERINE E. CZYZ Relator v. RICK CASTERLINE AND SHEILA CASTERLINE, d/b/a A VILLAGE LOCK-UP STORAGE, ET AL., Respondents
For Relator CATHERINE E. CZYZ For Magistrate Hollins LISA M. ZARING Montgomery Johnson, LLP For Judge Ellwood MICHAEL L. CLOSE KATHARINE R. MARKIJOHN KIMBERLY VANOVER RILEY Montgomery Johnson, LLP
Character of Proceedings: Writ of Mandamus
Judgment: Dismissed in Part
For Relator
CATHERINE E. CZYZ
For Magistrate Hollins
LISA M. ZARING
Montgomery Johnson, LLP
For Judge Ellwood
MICHAEL L. CLOSE
KATHARINE R. MARKIJOHN
KIMBERLY VANOVER RILEY
Montgomery Johnson, LLP
Judges: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
OPINION
HOFFMAN, J.
{¶1} On July 7, 2021, Petitioner, Catherine E. Czyz, filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus against Respondents, Rick and Sheila Casterline, Judge David A. Ellwood, and Magistrate Marcia A. Hollins. Ms. Czyz seeks a monetary judgment against the Casterlines and information regarding the name of their insurance company; a contempt finding and incarceration of Judge Ellwood, Magistrate Hollins, and the attorneys involved in the underlying action; and punishment for "all of those involved" under civil and criminal penalties. Judge Ellwood and Magistrate Hollins separately moved to dismiss the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Ms. Czyz has not perfected service of the petition on the Casterlines, under Civ.R. 3(A).
CIVIL RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD
{¶2} Respondents Judge Ellwood and Magistrate Hollins move to dismiss Ms. Czyz's petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint, and dismissal is appropriate where the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In construing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the court must presume all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). Before we can dismiss the petition, it must appear beyond doubt that petitioner can prove no set of facts entitling her to recovery. See O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus.
{¶3} Finally, under Civ.R. 10(C), "[a] copy of any written instrument attached to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes." Therefore, we are permitted to consider all materials Ms. Czyz attached to her petition, as part of the petition, without having to convert the matter to a summary judgment proceeding. See Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25950, 2015-Ohio-1394, ¶ 14 (Citation omitted.) (" 'Material incorporated in a complaint may be considered part of the complaint for purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.'")
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶4} Ms. Czyz incorporated our previous decision, Czyz v. Best Choice Moving, Inc., Guernsey No. 14 CA 23, 2015-Ohio-3563, into her petition as "Exhibit A." Therefore, we will consider the 2015 decision as part of the petition for purposes of the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions and reference it in the facts and procedural history of the present matter. We will also reference the facts contained in Ms. Czyz's petition where appropriate.
{¶5} On December 11, 2013, Ms. Czyz filed a Complaint for Possession against Best Choice Moving, Inc. Id. at ¶ 2. She alleged Best Choice Moving agreed to retrieve her property in New Jersey and deliver it to a home in St. Clairsville, Ohio. Id. Instead, her belongings were delivered to a storage facility in Old Washington, Ohio, named "A Village Storage Lock-Up." Id. The complaint requested the return of her property. Id.
{¶6} Ms. Czyz served Best Choice Moving with a copy of the complaint. Id. at ¶ 3. Thereafter, Ms. Czyz moved for a default judgment and a Writ of Possession against Best Choice Moving. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court denied the motion concluding, "A Village Lock-Up Storage" should have been named as an additional party. Id. The trial court gave Ms. Czyz leave to join the additional party. Id.
{¶7} Ms. Czyz filed an Amended Complaint adding A Village Storage Lock-Up as a defendant. Id. at ¶ 5. A Village Storage Lock-Up moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the basis that Respondents herein, Rick and Sheila Casterline dba A Village Storage Lock-Up, was the correct entity. Id. The trial court thereafter granted Ms. Czyz 30 days within which to file a Second Amended Complaint. Id.
{¶8} Ms. Czyz did not file a Second Amended Complaint and instead filed a Motion for Default Judgment on Amended Complaint and Writ of Possession against A Village Storage Lock-Up and a Motion for Default Judgment on Complaint and Amended Complaint and Writ of Possession against Best Choice Moving. Id. at ¶ 6. The Court denied both motions stating Ms. Czyz failed to comply with its previous orders. Id.
{¶9} Ms. Czyz thereafter complied with the trial court's orders and filed a Second Amended Complaint against Best Choice Moving, Rick and Sheila Casterline dba A Village Storage Lock-Up, and Roman Sakhorov. Id. at ¶ 7. The Casterlines dba A Village Storage Lock-Up filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. Id.
{¶10} The magistrate conducted a final pretrial at which Ms. Czyz failed to appear. Id. at ¶ 9. The magistrate recommended Ms. Czyz's case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id. The trial court adopted the magistrate's decision. Id. Ms. Czyz subsequently filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and Motion to Re-Set Pre-Trial Mediation. Id. at ¶ 10. Ms. Czyz also filed for default judgment against Roman Sakhorov and Best Choice Moving. Id. The trial court denied all of the motions. Id. Ms. Czyz appealed to this Court.
{¶11} In a decision issued by this Court on August 28, 2015, we affirmed the trial court's denial of Ms. Czyz's Motion for Default Judgment against Best Choice Moving, A Village Storage Lock-Up, and Roman Sakhorov. Czyz, 2015-Ohio-3562, at ¶ 18, 25. However, we concluded the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Ms. Czyz's case because she was not given notice that her failure to appear at the final pretrial could result in dismissal. Id. at ¶ 36. Therefore, we reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶12} In her petition, Ms. Czyz makes several factual allegations that contradict the facts and procedural history as set forth above and contained in our 2015 opinion. Specifically, in ¶ 27 she alleges:
This Honorable Court sustained Petitioner's objections to any award of storage costs, or any costs or claims, as no claims for damages or costs or attorney's fees and costs were raised by the Casterlines in the lower Court, and this Honorable Court directed a reverse (sic) and remand for the lower Court to issue a writ of possession and replevin with no payment of money to be made by Catherine E. Czyz to the Casterlines from the return and retrieval of her belongings.
{¶13} This is factually incorrect. We did not address let alone sustain anything regarding storage costs, claims for damages or attorney fees. Although we ordered a reversal and remand to the trial court, we did not do so for the trial court "to issue a writ of possession and replevin with no payment of money to be made by [Ms. Czyz] to the Casterlines for the return and retrieval of her belongings." (Petition, ¶ 27) Instead, we reversed the trial court's decision that dismissed Ms. Czyz's case and remanded the matter to the trial court so it could proceed accordingly. Czyz at ¶ 36, 40. We did not order the trial court to issue a writ of possession and replevin.
{¶14} We acknowledge that in deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(16) motion, the court is required to presume all factual allegations in the complaint are true. Here, however, Ms. Czyz incorporated our 2015 decision into her petition under Civ.R. 10(C). Therefore, we take judicial notice of the facts as contained in this Court's 2015 opinion. See State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan, 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 16, 661 N.E.2d 170 (1996) (A trial court may take judicial notice of "appropriate matters" in considering a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion.)
{¶15} Ms. Czyz claims she "has been forced by the Casterlines, Best Choice Moving, Inc. and all of the attorneys and public officials involved, to endure eight (8) years of costly protracted, fruitless litigation, forcing her to travel between Florida, Ohio, and New Jersey, ultimately, for the spoilage and/or destruction and/or theft of her belongings." (Petition, ¶ 42).
{¶16} Ms. Czyz requests the following relief:
1. [F]or sanctions, and/or actual and/or punitive damages, prejudgment and post-judgment Interest, and/or other relief allowed by the Court in the amount $168,774.11 plus $2,000,000.00 for a total Judgment against the Casterlines of $2,168,774.11, and
2. [F]or additional relief that the Casterlines provide the name of their insurance company, the claim number and contact information for the insurance company within ten (10) days of this Court's Order or be held in Contempt of Court, and
3. [F]or all attorneys, judges and/or public officials involved in the lower Court with the Casterlines (including, but not limited to: Judge David
A. Elwood (sic), Magistrate Marcia A. Hollins, Daniel Padden, Esq., Stephanie Church, Esq., Margaret Schlosser, Esq., Sheriff Jeffrey D. Paden and the Casterlines to be held in contempt of Court, arrested by the Ohio state police and jailed, and
4. [F]or this Honorable Court to use all of the Power vested in it to punish all of those Involved listed above with all civil and criminal remedies at its disposal and punish them to the fullest extent of the law, forthwith.
{¶17} As noted above, Respondents Judge Ellwood and Magistrate Hollins filed Motions to Dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The Guernsey County Clerk of Court's docket indicates Respondents, Rick and Sheila Casterline, have not been served with a copy of the petition per Civ.R. 3(A) because they refused service. The clerk notified Ms. Czyz of this fact on July 14, 2021, but Ms. Czyz has not made any further attempts to serve the Casterlines.
ELEMENTS/PURPOSE OF WRIT OF MANDAMUS
{¶18} R.C. 2731.03 provides: "The writ of mandamus may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment, or proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, but it cannot control judicial discretion." For a writ of mandamus to issue, the relator must have a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, the respondent must be under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and relator must have no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle, 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 451 N.E.2d 225 (1983).
{¶19} Thus, "[m]andamus is an extraordinary remedy 'to be issued with great caution and discretion and only when the way is clear.'" State ex rel. Taylor v. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 166, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977), citing State ex rel. Kriss v. Richards, 102 Ohio St. 455, 457, 132 N.E. 23 (1921), and State ex rel. Skinner Engine Co. v. Kouri, 136 Ohio St. 343, 25 N.E.2d 940 (1940), paragraph one of the syllabus. "Extraordinary remedies, i.e. mandamus * * * are available only when usual forms of procedure are incapable of affording relief. They may not be employed before trial on the merits, as a substitute for an appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors, or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having proper jurisdiction." State ex rel. Woodbury v. Spitler, 34 Ohio St.2d 134, 137, 296 N.E.2d 526 (1973).
It is the well-settled general rule in Ohio that the issuance of a writ of mandamus rests, to a considerable extent at least, within the sound discretion of the court to which application for the writ is made. The writ is not demandable as a matter of right, or at least is not wholly a matter of right; nor will it issue unless the relator has a clear right to the relief sought, and makes a clear case for the issuance of the writ. The facts submitted and the proof produced must be plain, clear, and convincing before a court is justified in using the strong arm of the law by way of granting the writ. (Citation omitted.)
{¶20} State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 161, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967).
ANALYSIS
A. Ms. Czyz failed to caption her writ of mandamus in the name of the state on relation of relator.
{¶21} Magistrate Hollins asks the Court to dismiss Ms. Czyz's petition because it is not captioned in the name of the state on Ms. Czyz's relation as required by R.C. 2731.04. This statute provides, in pertinent part: "Application for the writ of mandamus must be by petition, in the name of the state on the relation of the person applying, and verified by affidavit. * * *"
{¶22} This serves as an independent ground for dismissal, in addition to our dismissal on the merits per our discussion below. In Shoop v. State, 144 Ohio St.3d 374, 2015-Ohio-2068, 43 N.E.3d 432, the Ohio Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. It first addressed the merits of appellant's original action in procedendo and mandamus and found appellant was not entitled to relief. Id. at ¶ 7, 9. In addition to addressing the merits of the case, the Court also concluded the court of appeals properly dismissed appellant's petition because it was not brought in the name of the state as required by R.C. 2731.04. Id. at ¶ 10.
{¶23} Following Shoop's analysis, we find Ms. Czyz's Petition for Writ of Mandamus subject to dismissal under R.C. 2731.04. Even though Magistrate Hollins raised this issue in her Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Czyz did not file a response or seek to amend her petition. Therefore, Ms. Czyz's failure to comply with R.C. 2731.04 serves as an independent ground to dismiss her petition.
B. Ms. Czyz failed to allege a clear legal right to command Judge Ellwood or Magistrate Hollins to take action that they have a clear legal duty to take.
{¶24} Based on our prior decision in Czyz v. Best Choice Moving, Inc., Ms. Czyz requests this Court order the following mandamus relief: (1) sanctions, actual or punitive damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest totaling $2,168,774.11 against the Casterlines; (2) insurance information from the Casterlines; (3) that certain public officials, including Respondents, and attorneys be held in contempt of court, arrested, and jailed; and (4) this Court punish all involved with civil and criminal remedies. (Petition, ¶ 43, items 1-4).
{¶25} R.C. 2731.01 defines "mandamus" as a writ that commands the performance of an act "which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." Thus, the essential purpose of a writ of mandamus is "to require a public official to complete a specific act which he [or she] has a legal obligation to do." State ex rel. Verbanik v. Bernard, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2006-T-0080, 2007-Ohio-1786, ¶ 6.
{¶26} In our 2015 decision, this Court ordered none of the relief Ms. Czyz now claims she is entitled to by way of mandamus. The writ fails to identify any legal obligations either Judge Ellwood or Magistrate Hollins failed to satisfy per our previous decision. Instead, the Court's 2015 decision remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings and the trial court complied with this mandate. We also find Judge Ellwood and Magistrate Hollins have no duty to grant the relief Ms. Czyz requests in her petition regarding monetary damages, criminal sanctions, and contempt.
{¶27} Finally, there was nothing in our previous decision ordering the trial court to issue a writ of possession and replevin. We merely reversed the trial court's decision and remanded it for further proceedings. Czyz, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 14 CA23, 2015-Ohio-3562, at ¶ 40. If Ms. Czyz was not satisfied with the manner in which the trial court handled the matter on remand or the decisions it made, she had an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal as a writ will not issue to control judicial discretion. State ex rel. Martin v. Russo, 160 Ohio St.3d 21, 2020-Ohio-829, 153 N.E.3d 20, ¶ 10, 11.
{¶28} Therefore, we conclude Ms. Czyz's allegations are insufficient to state a claim for mandamus relief against Judge Ellwood or Magistrate Hollins. We grant Judge Ellwood's and Magistrate Hollins's Motions to Dismiss.
{¶29} MOTIONS GRANTED.
{¶30} CAUSE DISMISSED AS TO JUDGE ELLWOOD AND MAGISTRATE HOLLINS.
{¶31} COSTS TO RELATOR.
{¶32} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hoffman, J. Baldwin, P.J. and Delaney, J. concur