Opinion
IP02-0952 C B/S
December 3, 2003
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
This matter is before us on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on two claims: (1) a Title VII employment discrimination claim in which Plaintiff alleges she was terminated from her job on the basis of her sex; and (2) a state law landlord-tenant claim. For the reasons stated below, we GRANT summary judgment on the Title VII claim andDISMISS the state law claim.
II. Statement of Facts.
Ms. Camilia Czubaj ("Czubaj"), the plaintiff, was a doctoral student in Educational Leadership at the defendant institution, Ball State University ("Ball State"), during the 2000-2001 academic year. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1. In addition, Czubaj was employed part-time as a graduate assistant both semesters. PL's Opp'n Brief, Ex. A, ¶ 2; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I.
The terms of the graduate assistantship required Czubaj to: 1) have completed a Master's Degree before the Fall 2000 semester began; 2) be enrolled as a regular graduate student (no less than 6 hours per semester or 3 hours per summer term); 3) devote half time (20 hours per week) to teaching and/or related tasks as assigned by the Department Chair; and 4) maintain a minimum of a 3.2 grade point average ("GPA"). Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I; Pl.'s Opp'n Brief, Ex. A, ¶ 4.
Czubaj entered the doctoral program with a Master's Degree in Educational Leadership from Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. F. She enrolled in twelve (12) credit hours in the fall semester and nine (9) in the spring. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. MM.
Dr. Bobby Malone ("Malone"), Czubaj's graduate advisor, assigned her to work for three faculty members: Dr. William Sharp ("Sharp") and Dr. Edward Cox ("Cox") in the Department of Educational Leadership, and Dr. Terry Wiedmer ("Wiedmer") in the Department of Educational Studies. Def's Mot. for Summ. J. at 2; Czubaj Dep. at 95; Aff.'s of Cox, Sharp, Wiedmer. The type and amount of work varied according to a professor's need and the student's availability. It was expected that Czubaj would allot two-thirds of her time to the Educational Leadership Department and one-third to working for Weidmer. The plaintiff's personal records indicate she averaged 28 hours a week in the early fall working for Sharp, Malone and Cox. By early October, she began working about 8 hours a week for Wiedmer as well (although she worked few if no hours for Weidmer during the spring). Czubaj Dep. at 100, 145; Ex. 00. According to the mid-semester evaluations, Weidmer was very pleased with Czubaj's assistance, Cox thought she was "doing excellent work" and Sharp found her work satisfactory. Ex. M. While there is no official timesheet record of the hours Czubaj worked per week, she claims that her department required her to work in excess of 20 hours a week. PL's Opp'n Memo, at 1; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 2; Czubaj Dep. at 158.
Czubaj's male classmates in the doctoral program who also worked as graduate assistants were Momo Fahnbullen and Pi Seungho. Timothy Jahr, on the other hand, had a graduate assistantship but was a student in the master's program. The female graduate assistants, Florence Hamlin and Angela Thinnes, were also doctoral students. Based on Czubaj's personal observations, she estimates the men worked varied times under 20 hours per week. Ex. B at 3; Czubaj Dep. 150. In particular, Czubaj contends that Jahr "worked fewer [hours] than she was required to work." Pl.'s Opp'n Brief at 4. However, so did Ms. Hamlin, a female classmate. Czubaj Dep. 152.
As for Czubaj's academic record at Ball State, she earned a 3.166 GPA in the fall and a 3.14 in the spring; both of which fell below the 3.2 minimum required by the Graduate School, as did her cumulative GPA of 3.142 for the entire academic year. Ex. MM. As a result, Assistant Dean Jacquelyn Nelson ("Nelson") first placed Czubaj on academic probation and informed her that if the probationary status was not removed in the next nine graduate credits she would face academic dismissal. Ex. U. On May 8, 2001, Czubaj was academically dismissed for failure to raise her cumulative GPA to the required 3.2. Nelson also urged Czubaj to wait at least one semester before making an appeal for readmission. Ex. V. Czubaj initiated her appeal for readmission within one week and was denied. Ex. W.
Czubaj contested her fall and spring grades both informally — in conferences with the professors — and formally, through the Office of the Dean of Students. In accordance with the grade appeal procedure, the Screening Committee reviewed the documentation the plaintiff had submitted to Brian Farber, Acting Program Coordinator, and concluded there was not enough evidence to warrant convening a Hearing Committee to review her grades to determine whether they were the result of either procedural miscalculations or lack of fairness. Farber Aff. ¶ l 2; Czubaj Dep. 119. The one grade Czubaj did succeed in getting raised from "B" to a "B+," despite a charge of academic dishonesty, she nevertheless appealed to the University Review Board. Malone Aff. ¶¶ 9-14.
Ms. Czubaj contends her professors discriminated against her on the basis of her sex by intentionally overworking her and applying more rigid grading standards to her than to her male classmates. Czubaj Dep. 23, 26, 28, 32, 33. The above facts are relevant to her Title VII claim.
Once Czubaj was dismissed from the doctoral program, she was no longer entitled to remain in her university-owned apartment under the terms of the lease. The facts underlying her state law claim against her landlord, Ball State, arose when she moved out of the apartment and the university declined to refund her security deposit. Upon Czubaj's departure, the maintenance supervisor inspected the premises and noted some damage to the apartment that was different from and in excess of any noted by Czubaj in the inventory report she filled out when she moved in. Deborah Newman, the Assistant Director of Housing, determined that Czubaj owed the Defendant $355.00 for cleaning and repairs and withheld the $200.00 security deposit in satisfaction of the debt. Czubaj claims she left the apartment in the same if not better condition than when she took possession. PL's Opp'n Brief, Ex. A, ¶ 12-13; Czubaj Dep. 154-157.
III. Discussion.
A. The Standard on Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and, admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To oppose a motion for summary judgment, "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party — Ms. Czubaj in this case — and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in her favor. See Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Andersoa 477 U.S. at 255). The burden on the moving party, who in the case before us does not have the burden of proof at trial, is to affirmatively demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support a judgment for the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Since the motion asserts that Ms. Czubaj lacks proof to establish several requisite elements of her claim of sex discrimination, Ball State must show the absence of facts to support Czubaj's claim. In response, the plaintiff's burden is to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. Under Rule 56(e), "an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Thus, Ms. Czubaj must introduce specific facts which would permit a reasonable juror to find in her favor.Celotex. at 323-24; Andersoa 477 U.S. at 248. We note that the Seventh Circuit has determined that the summary judgment standard is to be applied with special scrutiny to employment discrimination cases because intent and credibility are such critical issues. See. Senner v. Nortfacentral Technical College, 113 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1997); Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). To that end, we carefully review affidavits and depositions for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination. However, the Seventh Circuit has also made clear that employment discrimination cases are not governed by a separate set of rules and remain amenable to disposition by summary judgment so long as there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts. Giannopoulos v. Brach Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Circ. 1997).
B. Ms. Czubaj's Sex Discrimination Claim.
Czubaj contends that because Ball State unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her sex by grading her differently from male students and overworking her, she failed to maintain a 3.2 GPA, the result of which was academic dismissal from the program and the loss of employment as a graduate assistant. Ball State argues there was nothing discriminatory about the loss of her employment; it occurred simply because her GPA fell below the minimum required to retain the job.
1. The Prima Facie Title Case.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ( 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), specifically makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge any individual because of his or her sex.
A plaintiff may establish a case of sex discrimination either through direct evidence or indirect evidence, using the burden-shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Because Czubaj does not claim to have direct evidence of intentional discrimination by Ball State, she must present indirect evidence that she was subjected to sexual discrimination by her professors and, as a consequence, was dismissed from the graduate program and terminated as a university employee. To do so, Czubaj must first establish a prima facie case. If she does, she raises a presumption of discrimination which Ball State must rebut by producing evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation of its adverse employment action. If Ball State meets that burden, Czubaj must show, through admissible evidence, that Ball State's explanation is pretextual.See Freeman v. Madison Metropolitan School Dist., 231 F.3d 374, (7th Cir. 2000);Stewart v. Henderson 207 F.3d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 2000).
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Czubaj must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer's legitimate performance expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly-situated male graduate assistants. Logan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 919 (7th Cir. 2001); Wyninger v. New Venture Gear. Inc., 245 F. Supp.2d 976, 988-989 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
Plaintiff meets the first and third prongs of the test. Czubaj, a woman, is for purposes of a sexual discrimination case a member of a protected class. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). She also suffered an adverse employment action when her graduate assistantship was terminated as a consequence of her academic dismissal from the graduate program.
The parties dispute the remaining two prongs of the test: whether Czubaj met the legitimate performance expectations of Ball State and whether she was treated differently from other similarly situated graduate students on the basis of her sex.
2. The legitimate performance expectations of Ball State.
From the perspective of Ball State, the only performance expectation at stake in this case is the Graduate School's requirement that Czubaj, like all other doctoral students, maintain a 3.2 GPA in order to remain in the program. The GPA requirement is also a mandatory term for employment as a graduate student. Ex. U. Czubaj neither disputes her knowledge of this requirement nor her failure to fulfill it. PL's Opp'n Brief, Ex. A, ¶ 4; Czubaj Dep. at 92; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I. Instead, Czubaj argues that she was prevented from achieving the 3.2 GPA because of the discriminatory actions of her employer. Pl.'s Opp'n Memo, at 3.
We look first to determine whether Czubaj was in fact graded differently or given a more taxing workload because of her sex. These might be plausible reasons for her earning a lower than required GPA. Czubaj testified that her grades were not computed accurately; that is, the professors uniformly failed to adhere to the guidelines set forth in the course syllabi. Czubaj Dep. 137:13, 139:6. None of the professors to whom she appealed informally — Cox, Sharp, McKinney, Malone, Rosenman — found miscalculations in her grades and, with the exception of Malone who raised her grade from a "B" to a "B+", each believed Czubaj had been graded properly. See Cox, McKinney, Malone, Rosenman affidavits. Czubaj then formally appealed her grades to the Office of the Dean of Students. Finding no procedural irregularities, the members of the Review Board ultimately decided there was not enough evidence to support an appeal on the grounds of subjective unfairness because it would require them to substitute their judgment of the merit of her work for the judgment of her instructors. Czubaj Dep. 137.
It is troubling, though not conclusive, that throughout the entire academic appeals process Czubaj failed to mention gender as a factor in the grades she received. Absent some evidence of gender-based discrimination, it is simply beyond the reach of the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the University Review Board by imputing gender discrimination to the calculation of her grades based on subjective reasons. There is a well-established reluctance in caselaw for courts to undertake the judicial review of academic decisions; a faculty's professional judgment in genuinely academic decisions is shown great deference. University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985). Moreover, federal courts do not presume to sit as "super-personnel departments," Heerdink v. Amoco Oil Co., 919 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990), or super-doctoral faculty committees, Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 763 F. Supp. 995, 997 (N.D. Ind. 1991). For us to re-evaluate Czubaj's academic performance as a doctoral student would be an inappropriate exercise of judicial review, especially in the total absence of any evidence of gender-based discrimination beyond the fact that Plaintiff is a woman.
3. Less favorable treatment by Czubaj's supervisors.
In order to establish the fourth element of her prima facie case, Czubaj must present evidence that she was treated less favorably than male classmates in an employment position similar to hers. To meet this burden, Czubaj must demonstrate that there is someone who is directly comparable to her in all material respects. In this inquiry, a "court must look at all relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case." Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002); Greer v. Board of Educ., 267 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2001); Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 818-819 (7th Cir. 2002). Some relevant factors to consider include the comparable experience, education, qualifications of at least one other employee. See Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). It is also useful to inquire whether the plaintiff and others dealt with the same supervisors and were subject to the same workplace standards. Pattersoa 281 F.3d at 680.
Ms. Czubaj has compared herself primarily to Jahr. PL's Opp'n Memo, at 4. In terms of comparable experience, education and qualifications, we conclude Ms. Czubaj and Mr. Jahr were not similarly situated because Czubaj, a doctoral student, had already earned her master's degree while Jahr was working on his during the 2000-2001 academic year. Yet, when comparing working conditions, they appear far more similarly situated. For example, they both worked for Doctors Sharp and Cox in the Department of Educational Leadership. Czubaj worked for a third professor in an outside department, and the defendant offers that Jahr, too, worked for a third professor in department other than Educational Leadership. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7. Moreover, according to the terms of any graduate assistantship offered in the Educational Leadership department, a minimum 3.2 GPA is a mandatory term of employment, regardless of whether one is in the master's or doctoral program. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that the Czubaj and Jahr are similarly situated employees.
However, Czubaj has failed to offer specific facts to establish that she was treated less favorably than Jahr or others. First, she points to a female classmate, Hamlin, whom she also estimates worked fewer than 20 hours per week Czubaj Dep. 152. Second, her estimates of how many hours her male classmates were assigned to work are, by her own admission, purely guesses based on when she happened to see them in the office. The graduate assistants were not obliged to keep uniform office hours and Czubaj admits that it is entirely possible to fulfill the work expectations outside of the faculty offices, department office or the hours one is physically present in the office. Czubaj Dep. 150-152. The Seventh Circuit has established that "a party to a lawsuit cannot ward off summary judgment with an affidavit or deposition based on rumor or conjecture." Palucki v. Sears. Roebuck Co., 879 F.2d 1568 (7th Cir. 1989). We have searched the record to find a more reliable basis for the statements in Czubaj's affidavit that might permit a reasonable juror to find in her favor and find no such support.
4. Legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Ball State's action.
Even assuming Czubaj established a prima facie case of sex discrimination — which we conclude she has not — Ball State could still prevail on its motion because it has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her academic status and employment: namely, her failure to maintain a 3.2 GPA after two semesters of graduate coursework. This requirement was a universally applied and fundamental criterion for remaining in the doctoral program and retaining her employment. Czubaj has admitted that she knows of no graduate student, male or female, who has been permitted to remain in the doctoral program with a GPA lower than 3.2. Czubaj Dep. 117.
C. Ms. Czubaj"s security deposit claim.
Ball State elected not to refund Czubaj's security deposit in order to apply it to the costs of cleaning and repairing the apartment upon her departure. As evidence of the deteriorated condition of the apartment after her tenancy, Ball State relies on the inventory she signed upon moving in and the report of the maintenance supervisor who inspected the apartment when she moved out. Newman Aff. ¶¶ 12-16; Ex. 1. On the inventory, Czubaj indicated that the walls and/or ceilings of several rooms had marks on them. Ex. 1. While not specifically described as "soot" stains by Czubaj, they could be the same marks on the walls that the maintenance supervisor noted as such. We will not attempt to resolve these conflicts, however, believing them to be better addressed in another forum. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), we decline to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over what we regard as a minor state law claim, having granted summary judgment on the Title VII claim over which we have original jurisdiction. We therefore DISMISS the state law claim without prejudice; Czubaj may pursue the refund of the security deposit from Ball State in the appropriate state court.
28 U.S.C. § 1367, Supplemental Jurisdiction: (c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion.
Having failed to present legally sufficient evidence to support her Title VII claim, Ms. Czubaj's case is subject to summary dismissal Accordingly, we GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim. For the reasons stated above, we DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff's landlord-tenant claim which arises under state law.
It is so ORDERED.