See United States v. Davis, 87 F.Supp.2d 82, 88 (D.R.I. 2000); Grady v. Bunzl Packaging Supply Co., 161 F.R.D. 477, 479 (N.D.Ga. 1995); 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.103[3][c] at 54-184 (3d ed.) Thus, courts in IDEA cases have awarded costs spent xeroxing documents filed with the court and served on opposing counsel, but not for xeroxing documents used within the firm alone. See Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 931 F.Supp. 474, 483 (S.D.Tex. 1995), aff'd, 118 F.3d 245, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1997) (court filings and hearing transcript). The reason for this rule is sound: Awards for internally-used documents possibly subsidize excessive expenses, particularly in the age of the mega-firm.
See United States v. Davis, 87 F. Supp.2d 82, 88 (D.R.I. 2000); Grady v. Bunzl Packaging Supply Co., 161 F.R.D. 477, 479 (N.D. Ga. 1995); 10 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.103 [3][c] at 54-184 (3d ed.) Thus, courts in IDEA cases have awarded costs spent xeroxing documents filed with the court and served on opposing counsel, but not for xeroxing documents used within the firm alone. See Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 931 F. Supp. 474, 483 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 118 F.3d 245, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1997) (court filings and hearing transcript). The reason for this rule is sound: Awards for internally-used documents possibly subsidize excessive expenses, particularly in the age of the mega-firm.
See 20 U.S.C. §(s) 1415(e)(2). 931 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Tex. 1995). Id. at 482-84.
Id. at 62. See also White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he IDEA creates a presumption in favor of a school system's educational plan, placing the burden of proof on the party challenging it."); Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Michael F., 931 F. Supp. 474, 477 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("The Fifth Circuit has held that there is a presumption in favor of the educational placement established by a student's IEP, and the party attacking its terms should bear the burden of showing why the educational setting established by the IEP is not appropriate."), aff'd as modified, 118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997).
In a case brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. , brought by next friends Mr. and Mrs. Barry F., the undersigned judge awarded costs to the prevailing school district against Plaintiff minor student Michael F. without distinguishing between the minor and his "next friends." Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. , 931 F. Supp. 474, 484 (S.D. Tex. 1996). On appeal, 118 F.3d 245, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1997)(affirming as modified), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1047 (1998), Michael's parents argued inter alia that the district court's award of substantial costs was "inequitable and violates the spirit if not the letter of the IDEA" and would have "a chilling effect on the willingness of parents to contest school district decisions vitally affecting their children by putting such parents at risk of being penalized with a substantial cost assessment, even when they have managed to prevail at the administrative hearing level," as Michael F.'s parents had.
Sanctions are not appropriate unless an attorney is shown to have acted in bad faith, with improper motive, or with reckless disregard of duty owed to the court, and decision to award attorney fees thereunder is committed to court's discretion. See Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School Dist. v. Michael F. by Barry F., 931 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Tex. 1995); see also Specht v. Google, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that a court has discretion to impose sanctions for unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings when an attorney has acted in an objectively unreasonable manner by engaging in serious and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice, has pursued a claim that is without plausible legal or factual basis and lacking in justification, or has pursued a path that a reasonably careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound). Section 1927 does not require a showing of subjective bad faith but, rather, is satisfied "when an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of nonfrivolous claims."
Sanctions are not appropriate unless an attorney is shown to have acted in bad faith, with improper motive, or with reckless disregard of duty owed to the court, and decision to award attorney fees thereunder is committed to court's discretion. See Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School Dist. v. Michael F. by Barry F., 931 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Tex. 1995); see also Specht v. Google, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that a court has discretion to impose sanctions for unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings when an attorney has acted in an objectively unreasonable manner by engaging in serious and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice, has pursued a claim that is without plausible legal or factual basis and lacking in justification, or has pursued a path that a reasonably careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound). Section 1927 does not require a showing of subjective bad faith but, rather, is satisfied "when an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of nonfrivolous claims."
The federal statute that empowers the Court to impose sanctions against an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously," 28 U.S.C. § 1927, is to be construed narrowly and treated with caution so that it does not unduly chill litigants' access to the judicial system. Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School Dist. v. Michael F. By Barry F., 931 F.Supp. 474 (S.D.Tex. 1995) affirmed as modified 118 F.3d 245, 152 A.L.R. Fed. 771, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 690, 522 U.S. 1047, 139 L.Ed.2d 636 (1998); F.D.I.C. v. Calhoun, 34 F.3d 1291 (5th Cir. 1994); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 768 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1985); Mone v. C.I.R., 774 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1985). This statute is a complement to the Court's authority to impose sanctions under F.R.Civ.P. 11 and to the Court's inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct.
Plaintiff claims it is entitled to $225.00 in court filing fees. Filing fees paid to the clerk of the court are a taxable cost. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1); Cypress-Fairbanks Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. by Barry F., 931 F. Supp. 474, 483 (S.D.Tex. 1995). In the itemized list attached to the Bill of Costs and in Exhibit A of the Agreement are charges identified as "court costs/filing fee" totaling $235.00.
The Es may also recover the costs of photocopies as outlined in the federal costs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 931 F. Supp. 474, 483 (S.D.Tex. 1995);Verginia McC, 909 F. Supp. at 1033. The Es submitted supporting documentation indicating they spent $414.33 for photocopying during the administrative hearing.