The appointment of a temporary receiver "'is an extreme remedy resulting in the taking and withholding of possession of property from a party without an adjudication on the merits'" (id., quoting Manning-Kranes v Manning-Franzman, 175 A.D.3d 1403, 1403 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Schachner v Sikowitz, 94 A.D.2d 709, 709). A motion seeking such an appointment should be granted only where the moving party has made a "'clear and convincing'" evidentiary showing of "'irreparable loss or waste to the subject property and that a temporary receiver is needed to protect their interests'" (Cyngiel v Krigsman, 192 A.D.3d 760, 762, quoting Magee v Magee, 120 A.D.3d 637, 638).

That plaintiffs seek both equitable and monetary relief is not, in itself, a basis to dismiss the requests for injunctive relief, as an award of damages may not be adequate to fully compensate plaintiffs (see e.g.McMahon v. Cobblestone Lofts Condominium, 161 A.D.3d 536, 537, 78 N.Y.S.3d 2 [1st Dept. 2018] ; Martini v. Lafayette Studio Corp., 234 A.D.2d 146, 146, 651 N.Y.S.2d 44 [1st Dept. 1996] ). Appointment of a temporary receiver was proper to prevent further delays and property deterioration in an already lengthy repair process during which plaintiffs’ apartments have been uninhabitable (see CPLR 6401[a] ; Moran v. Moran, 77 A.D.3d 443, 445, 908 N.Y.S.2d 661 [1st Dept. 2010] ; Cyngiel v. Krigsman, 192 A.D.3d 760, 762, 139 N.Y.S.3d 894 [2d Dept. 2021] ).

We reject that contention. "The appointment of a temporary receiver is an extreme remedy resulting in the taking and withholding of possession of property from a party without an adjudication on the merits..., and should be granted only where the moving party has made a clear evidentiary showing of the necessity for the conservation of the property at issue and the need to protect the moving party's interests" (Suissa v Baron, 107 A.D.3d 689, 689 [2d Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cyngiel v Krigsman, 192 A.D.3d 760, 761-762 [2d Dept 2021]; Vardaris Tech, Inc. v Paleros Inc., 49 A.D.3d 631, 632 [2d Dept 2008]). It is well established that "[t]he appointment of a receiver is a matter of judicial discretion" (R. G. Kenny Elec. v Village Mall at Hillcrest, 50 A.D.2d 802, 802 [2d Dept 1975]; see 64 B Venture v American Realty Co., 194 A.D.2d 504, 504 [1st Dept 1993]). Here, although plaintiff established an interest in the property subject to the agreement, plaintiff did not establish a necessity for a receiver to conserve the property.

Plaintiff thus has not established that her interest in those royalties "is in imminent danger of irreparable loss or waste," within the meaning of CPLR 6401, without a receiver. (Cyngiel v Krigsman, 192 A.D.3d 760, 762 [2d Dept 2021].)

A pre-judgment temporary receivership should be granted only where the moving party has made a "clear and convincing" evidentiary showing of "irreparable loss or waste to the subject property and that a temporary receiver is needed to protect their interests" (Cyngiel v Krigsman, 192 A.D.3d 760, 762 [2d Dept 2021], citing Magee v. Magee, 120 A.D.3d 637, 638 [2d 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

. “Therefore, a motion seeking such an appointment should be granted only where the moving party has made a “clear and convincing” evidentiary showing of “irreparable loss or waste to the subject property and that a temporary receiver is needed to protect their interests” (Cyngiel v Krigsman, 192 A.D.3d 760, 762 [2d Dept 2021] [citations omitted]). Here, plaintiff fails to make the required evidentiary showing.