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rejecting argument that Section 153.004(b) "restricts the trial court's consideration of sexual abuse to abuse committed by one parent against only his or her own child"
Summary of this case from C.L.W. v. R.V.W.Opinion
No. 02-19-00270-CV
08-06-2020
C.W., Appellant v. B.W., Appellee
On Appeal from the 360th District Court Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 360-651763-18 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Bassel, JJ.
Justice Gabriel concurs without opinion.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se appellant C.W. (Father) appeals portions of the trial court's final decree of divorce relating to the two minor children of Father and B.W. (Mother). In three issues, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) ordering that Father shall have no possession of and access to the children at this time, (2) naming Father possessory conservator rather than joint managing conservator of the children, and (3) changing the children's last names from Father's last name to Mother's last name. At trial, Mother testified that she and Father separated over ten years earlier, that Father was incarcerated in Oklahoma for the rape of a child, and that Father has not been a part of the children's lives.
The crux of Father's arguments on appeal is his contention that the trial court could not consider his criminal conviction because it was more than two years prior to Mother's filing suit and because the offense did not involve one of his own children or a child in his household. We disagree. Under Section 153.004(c) of the Texas Family Code, the trial court was required to consider Father's conviction when determining whether to deny, restrict, or limit his possession of the children at issue. And under Section 153.004(b) of the Texas Family Code, for purposes of deciding conservatorship, the trial court was permitted to consider Father's conviction when determining whether he has a history or pattern of past or present sexual abuse directed against a child. Further, although we may have reached a different result regarding Mother's request to change the children's last names, we nonetheless conclude that Mother's testimony provided evidence of substantive and probative character that supports each of the trial court's decisions, which were reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Background
Mother filed an "Original Petition for Divorce and Original Petition to Terminate Parent-Child Relationship" in November 2018. After Father filed an answer, Mother filed a "First Amended Petition for Divorce," dropping her request to terminate the parent-child relationship between Father and their two minor children; Mother requested that she be appointed sole managing conservator and that Father be denied possession of or access to the children because of Father's criminal conviction in Oklahoma for the death or serious injury of a child. Mother further requested that the trial court change her and the children's last names. Mother also requested a permanent injunction against Father.
The case was tried to the bench on May 20, 2019. Although Father received notice of the trial, he did not appear in person or through an attorney. Mother was the only witness who testified at the trial. After the trial, the trial court granted the divorce, appointed Mother as the children's sole managing conservator, appointed Father as the possessory conservator, and ordered that Father shall have no possession of or access to the children at this time. The trial court also granted Mother's requests to change her and the children's last names and entered a permanent injunction against the Father. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making decisions on custody, control, possession, and visitation, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); C.C. v. L.C., No. 02-18-00425-CV, 2019 WL 2865294, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re W.M., 172 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). We also review a trial court's ruling on a request to change the name of a child for an abuse of discretion. Werthwein v. Workman, 546 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see also In re T.G.-S.L., No. 02-12-00391-CV, 2013 WL 43738, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 4, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 755. An abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court's decision. In re M.L., No. 02-15-00258-CV, 2016 WL 3655190, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh'g)).
It is for the factfinder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Id. (citing Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 457 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.), and In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 742 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)). Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error in this context, but they are relevant factors in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion. Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 755 (addressing name change); M.L., 2016 WL 3655190, at *3 (addressing conservatorship); K.T. v. M.T., No. 02-14-00044-CV, 2015 WL 4910097, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (addressing possession and access); T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *3 (addressing name change and citing W.M., 172 S.W.3d at 725); In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g) (addressing conservatorship). Thus, in applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, we use a two-pronged analysis: whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and whether the trial court erred in applying its discretion. C.C., 2019 WL 2865294, at *5; Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 755. The traditional sufficiency review is involved in answering the first question and whether the trial court made a reasonable decision in answering the second. K.T., 2015 WL 4910097, at *3.
In the context of a divorce, even when a respondent fails to file an answer to a petition seeking divorce, a petitioner is required to prove the material allegations in the petition at the final hearing because the petitioner's allegations are not taken as confessed by the respondent's failure to answer. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.701; Roa v. Roa, 970 S.W.2d 163, 165 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). In this context, a respondent may raise evidentiary challenges for the first time on appeal. See Ho v. Ho, No. 2-04-231-CV, 2006 WL 239087, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Appointing Father
Possessory Conservator or by Restricting Father's Possession of and
Access to the Children.
In his first issue, Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that Father shall not have any possession of or access to the children. In Father's third issue, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Mother as the children's sole managing conservator and Father as the children's possessory conservator rather than appointing both parents joint managing conservators. Because Father blends his arguments in support of these issues, we will address them together.
Father's brief, which he verified, includes numerous statements that attempt to introduce into this proceeding new facts that were not presented at trial. For example, he disputes Mother's testimony concerning the reasons provided by a doctor for the loss of their unborn daughter several years ago; he provides the date of his incarceration; he denies that the child involved in the offense underlying his conviction was his own child or a member of his own household and denies that the child became pregnant as a result of the offense; he contends that Mother has been convicted of certain crimes in Texas; he denies ever having hurt his wife or children and denies that he ever would hurt them; he denies that the children have had any negative effects from having his last name and claims that Mother is using his incarceration as a tool to keep the children in the dark about him; and he spends considerable time explaining that he loves and misses his children and wants to be part of their lives and expresses his belief that he can benefit his children's lives despite being incarcerated. The role of this court, however, is to evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion by making the decisions concerning conservatorship, possession of and access to the children, and the request to change the children's last names based on the evidence presented to the court at trial. We are bound to determine the case on the record as filed. See Quorum Int'l v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist., 114 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
A. The best interest of the child is the primary consideration when determining conservatorship and possession of and access to a child.
The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court when determining issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to a child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002; C.C., 2019 WL 2865294, at *4 n.1. The trial court has wide latitude in determining the best interests of a child. See Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451; see also Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (listing nonexhaustive factors that court may use to determine best interest). The best-interest determination does not require proof of any set of factors or limit proof to any specific factors. M.L., 2016 WL 3655190, at *3 (citing In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.)).
Under Texas law, there is a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child unless the trial court finds that there is a history of family violence. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b). The Texas Family Code also provides that "[s]ubject to the prohibition in Section 153.004," a party shall be appointed sole managing conservator or both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators unless the trial court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development. See id. § 153.131(a). To overcome the statutory parental presumption, the evidence must support the logical inference that some specific, identifiable behavior or conduct of the parent, demonstrated by specific acts or omissions, will probably cause significant impairment to the child's physical or emotional development if the court appoints the parent managing conservator. M.L., 2016 WL 3655190, at *4 (citing Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990)).
Section 153.004(b) of the Texas Family Code then expressly prohibits a trial court from naming a party as a joint managing conservator "if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present . . . sexual abuse by one parent directed against . . . a child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.004(b). Additionally, when determining conservatorship, a trial court may take into consideration how well the child's best interests would be served with a managing conservator who would be unable to fulfill many of the responsibilities of being a managing conservator because of his incarceration. Crowley v. Hinson-Crowley, No. 03-02-00501-CV, 2003 WL 22860821, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 4, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
As to possession and access, the Texas Family Code also creates a rebuttable presumption that the Standard Possession Order is in the best interest of a child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.252. When, however, sufficient evidence rebuts this presumption, the trial court may order a possession schedule that deviates from the standard possession order. In re S.H., No. 02-15-00360-CV, 2017 WL 2871682, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.256); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.253. The Texas Family Code mandates that a trial court "consider the commission of . . . sexual abuse in determining whether to deny, restrict, or limit the possession of a child by a parent who is appointed a possessory conservator." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.004(c); see also id. § 153.256 (listing factors trial court may consider when ordering the terms of possession of a parent named possessory conservator under an order other than a standard possession order). An order restricting a parent's right to possession of or access to a child may not impose restrictions beyond those required to protect the child's best interest. Id. § 153.193.
B. The trial court properly considered Father's criminal conviction and did not abuse its discretion by appointing Father possessory conservator or by restricting Father's possession of and access to the children.
In this case, the trial court found, among other things, that Father "is currently being held in the Lawton Correctional Facility in Lawton, Oklahoma for a conviction of second-degree rape by instrumentation of a minor child." The trial court appointed Mother sole managing conservator and Father possessory conservator, and it ordered that Father "shall not have possession of or access to the children at this time."
Father does not dispute whether evidence was presented at trial to support the trial court's finding relating to his criminal conviction. Instead, he cites Section 153.004 of the Texas Family Code to argue that the trial court could not consider his conviction when determining either conservatorship or possession of and access to the children because he was convicted more than two years before Mother filed this suit. We disagree.
Father argues that Mother misquotes the language of the statute providing the basis for his conviction when she states in her brief on appeal that Father was convicted for "the death or serious injury of a child under title 21, section 1111.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes (rape by instrumentation of minor child)." But this is not the language used by the trial court in the divorce decree nor was it what Mother testified to at trial. Regardless, Father fails to explain how, if at all, Mother's misquotation, if any, in her brief is relevant. Even assuming Mother misquotes the Oklahoma statute providing the basis for Father's conviction in her brief, any such misquotation is not relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
With respect to conservatorship, Subsection 153.004(a) of the Texas Family Code provides that
[i]n determining whether to appoint a party as a sole or joint managing conservator, the court shall consider evidence of the intentional use of abusive physical force, or evidence of sexual abuse, by a party directed against the party's spouse, a parent of the child, or any person younger than 18 years of age committed within a two-year period preceding the filing of the suit or during the pendency of the suit.Id. § 153.004(a). We agree that Subsection 153.004(a) is limited to evidence of sexual abuse committed within the two-year period preceding the filing of the suit or during the pendency of the suit. See id. And we agree that Mother's testimony provided no evidence of sexual abuse falling with that time frame.
Father, however, overlooks the provisions of Subsection 153.004(b). That subsection provides, "[t]he court may not appoint joint managing conservators if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present . . . physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child." Id. § 153.004(b) (emphasis added). This subsection contains no two-year time limitation and instead focuses on a "history or pattern" of physical or sexual abuse. See id. The Texas Family Code does not define "history," but we have previously held that a single act of violence or abuse may suffice to show a history of physical or sexual abuse. See In re J.M., No. 02-16-00428-CV, 2017 WL 3821863, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Subsection 153.004(b) leaves it to the trial court's broad discretion to decide whether an act reaches the threshold of being a "history." See C.C., 2019 WL 2865294, at *12.
With respect to possession of and access to the children, Father overlooks Subsection 153.004(c), which also does not contain a two-year time limitation. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.004(c). Instead, that subsection mandates that a trial court consider the commission of sexual abuse, without reference to any specific time frame, when determining the possession of a child by a parent appointed a possessory conservator. See id. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly considered Father's conviction even if the conviction occurred more than two years prior to Mother's filing suit.
Father next argues that the trial court could not consider his conviction because the underlying offense had no connection to his family, his children, or anyone in his household. We disagree. Father again ignores Subsection 153.004(b), which expressly refers to "sexual abuse by one parent directed against . . . a child," and he again ignores Subsection 153.004(c), which requires the trial court to consider "the commission of . . . sexual abuse" when determining possession. See id. § 153.004(b) (emphasis added), (c). Neither subsection restricts the trial court's consideration of sexual abuse to abuse committed by one parent against only his or her own child or against another child in the household. See id. § 153.004(b), (c). As we have previously stated, "evidence of child abuse is not limited to the particular child involved in the suit; evidence that a parent has abused any child is relevant." J.M., 2017 WL 3821863, at *4 (citing In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d 419, 427 n.12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)).
Rather than address Subsections 153.004(b) and (c), Father focuses on distinguishing this case from In re Marriage of Bonner, No. 10-10-00011-CV, 2010 WL 4409704 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.), a case Mother cites on appeal to argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by restricting Father's possession of and access to the children. In Bonner, the trial court named a husband possessory conservator but denied him possession of and access to the children due to the fact that he had been convicted of multiple counts of sexual crimes against children. Id. at *2-3. The children who were the subject of the suit were M.A.B and N.C.B.; their father (Bonner) had been convicted of sex offenses involving their stepsister L.D. and a friend of L.D.'s. Id. at *1-2. Father argues that Bonner is distinguishable because (1) the children were all members of Bonner's household, (2) M.A.B. made an outcry of sexual abuse against Bonner, (3) M.A.B. had observed Bonner sexually assaulting L.D., and (4) all the children were required to assist Bonner in his marijuana-manufacturing operations.
Father argues that Bonner "has absolutely . . . nothing . . . similar to [his] case . . . due to the fact [Father's] felony conviction has no connection [with]/accusation[s involving] . . . his family/children [or] anyone [in] his household." But the distinctions drawn by Father, to the extent they exist, are not relevant. Nothing in Bonner changes the fact that Subsections 153.004(b) and (c) permit a trial court to consider evidence of sexual abuse perpetrated by a parent against any child, including a child outside the household who is unrelated to the parent, when making conservatorship and possession determinations. Thus, the trial court was permitted to consider the evidence regarding Father's conviction regardless of his familial or household relationship to the child involved in that offense.
Given the nature of Father's conviction and his incarceration in Oklahoma, and based on our review and consideration of the entire record of the trial, we conclude that the evidence is of sufficient and probative character to uphold the trial court's decisions to appoint Father possessory conservator and to order that Father shall have no possession of or access to the children at this time. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.002, .004(a)-(c), (e); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72; Bonner, 2010 WL 4409704, at *3; In re E.M.V., 312 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Crowley, 2003 WL 22860821, at *4. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Father possessory conservator and denying him possession of and access to the children at this time. We overrule Father's first and third issues.
Mother testified at trial that she "suffered abuse almost on a daily basis" and that on December 16, 2005, she "lost an unborn child at 32 weeks due to abuse by [Father's] hands." She also testified that she and Father separated in November 2008 and that they have been living apart for over ten years. Father argues that the trial court could not consider Mother's testimony for two reasons. First, it concerned alleged abuse more than two years before the date she filed suit and thus was outside the two-year time limitation imposed by Subsection 153.004(a) of the Texas Family Code. Second, Father essentially argues that Mother's testimony was conclusory because she provided no details about what abuse occurred to corroborate her accusations. For the same reasons stated above, we conclude that trial court could consider Mother's testimony regarding family violence even if it concerned events taking place more than two years prior to Mother's filing suit. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.004(b), (c), (e). Because we conclude that the record supports the trial court's judgment without consideration of Mother's testimony of family violence, however, it is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal for us to determine whether any portion of Mother's testimony was conclusory. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
In a single sentence in his third issue, Father asks this court "to completely dissolve the trial court['s] order of [a] permanent injunction." The divorce decree prohibits Father from the following: (1) causing bodily injury to Mother; (2) threatening imminent bodily injury to Mother and her family; (3) disturbing the peace of Mother and her family; and (4) communicating with Mother or the children in any manner using vulgar, profane, obscene, or indecent language, or in a course of offensive manner. Because Father cites no case law and provides no argument or analysis in support of his one-sentence request, the issue is waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f)-(i); Ellis v. Barineau, No. 02-19-00252-CV, 2020 WL 2608410, at *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Changing the
Children's Last Names.
In his second issue, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by changing the children's last names. He argues that Mother offered no legitimate reason for changing the children's last names and that Mother failed to demonstrate that the different last names would be in the children's best interests. We resolve this issue against Father.
A. The best interest of the child is the primary consideration when ruling on a request to change a child's name in connection with a divorce.
A trial court may order that the name of a child be changed if the change is in the child's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 45.004(a)(1). The basic consideration is the best interest of the child. T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *2. The interests and desires of the parents are of secondary importance. See Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 754; T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *2. This court and some of our sister courts have identified a nonexclusive list of factors to consider when determining whether the name change is in the best interest of a child, including the following factors:
(1) whether the changed name or original name would best avoid embarrassment, inconvenience, or confusion;T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *3 (citing In re A.W.G., No. 02-10-00376-CV, 2011 WL 3795237, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Changing a child's last name may cause disruption and confusion; thus, courts have recognized the benefits inherent in maintaining the status quo and the need for a petitioner to demonstrate that a different last name is in the child's best interest. Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 754.
(2) the length of time that the child has carried the original name;
(3) the degree of community respect associated with the original and changed names;
(4) whether the change will positively or adversely affect the bond between the child and the parent or the parent's families;
(5) the preference, maturity, and age of the child; and
(6) whether the party seeking the name change is motivated by an attempt to alienate the child from a parent.
B. The trial court acted within its discretion in granting the request to change the children's last names.
Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by changing the children's last names, arguing that there was no evidence to support the trial court's decision. According to Father, the trial court could not consider his criminal conviction when deciding whether to change the children's last names for the same reasons he contends the trial court could not consider it in connection with his first and third issues—namely, because he was convicted more than two years prior to Mother's filing of suit and because he says the underlying conviction did not involve an offense against his own children or a child in his household. We disagree for three reasons.
First, as to Father's argument that Mother offered no evidence of negative effects suffered by the children as a result of having his last name, "there is no requirement that an existing last name be proven detrimental to a child to obtain an order changing the child's name." Id. at 759. The basic consideration is the child's best interest, taking into account the nonexclusive factors described above. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 45.004(a)(1); T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *3.
Second, Subsection 153.004(a) of the Texas Family Code, which contains the two-year time limitation that Father relies upon, does not address a request to change a child's name; it concerns conservatorship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.004(a).
Third, evidence that a parent has been convicted of a sex offense against any child is relevant to at least the two following best-interest factors relating to a name-change request: (1) whether the changed name or original name would best avoid embarrassment (the first factor) and (2) the degree of community respect associated with the original and changed names (the third factor). See T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *3. Father cites no authority standing for the proposition that the date of a parent's conviction of a sex offense against a child or the parent's relationship to the child involved in underlying offense renders the offense irrelevant to a name-change request, and we are aware of none.
Father further argues that Mother's testimony evidences that she wants to change the children's last names because she basically wants to "erase" Father, and he argues that given the ages of the children, the "court should allow their input." Specifically, Mother's testimony reflected that the children were nine and eleven years old at the time of trial. When she was asked why she sought a name change for the children, Mother stated in response, in part: "[Father] has never been a part of these children's lives. I feel that it is best to erase all of that, if possible, away from them, so that he has no way of contacting them, if that even happens."
We agree that this is some evidence that Mother's request to change the children's last names was improperly motivated by an attempt to alienate the children from Father (the sixth factor listed above). And we agree that for older children, a child's preference regarding a requested named change is "an extremely significant factor." See In re J.N.L., 528 S.W.3d 237, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). But while Mother's testimony regarding her motives and the absence of evidence regarding the children's preferences given their ages are both concerning, these were but two of several factors for the trial court to take into consideration in light of the other evidence at trial. See T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *3.
Evidence relating to other factors supports the trial court's decision. Specifically, Mother's testimony established that Father had been incarcerated in Oklahoma for the "[r]ape of a [fourteen-]year[-]old child," that Mother and Father had been separated since 2008 (i.e., for most of the children's lives), and that Father had never been a part of the children's lives. From this testimony, the trial court could infer that the children could have embarrassment and anxiety due to the reputation associated with Father's last name. See J.N.L., 528 S.W.3d at 242 (holding that trial court could infer that having father's surname could cause child to experience anxiety and embarrassment when father was incarcerated for a violent crime and was a sex offender).
Although we may have reached a different decision, after reviewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude that there was some evidence of substantive and probative character to support the trial court's decision and that the trial court's decision was reasonable. See T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *2 ("An appellate court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because the appellate court would have ruled differently in the same circumstances."). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the children's last names be changed from Father's last name to the Mother's (new) last name. We overrule Father's second issue.
The record does not reflect whether the new last name chosen by Mother for herself and for the children was her maiden name.
V. Conclusion
Having overruled all three of Father's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice Delivered: August 6, 2020