Opinion
Civil Action No. 08-36 (RMB).
February 29, 2008
GEORGE F. CUTLER, Plaintiff pro se #144993, Atlantic County Justice Facility, Mays Landing, New Jersey.
OPINION
Plaintiff George F. Cutler, currently confined at the Atlantic County Justice Facility in Mays Landing, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Based on his affidavit of indigence and the absence of three qualifying dismissals within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court will grant plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings his civil rights action against defendants, the Atlantic County Justice Facility ("ACJF") Medical Department and Nursing Staff. It appears that plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and has been confined at ACJF since August 26, 2006. In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that, on October 17, 2007, he was prescribed medication which caused his face, eyes, ears and throat to swell severely, obstructing his sight and breathing. He also developed a rash on his body in reaction to the prescribed medication. (Complaint, ¶ 4). The documents submitted with the Complaint indicate that plaintiff received immediate attention when he developed an allergic reaction. However, plaintiff complains that he still has residual effects from this adverse reaction to the medication. He seeks an unspecified amount in punitive damages from the defendants, and asks that a monitoring system be set up so that this type of incident does not recur.
II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Id.
A complaint is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the former § 1915(d)). The standard for evaluating whether a complaint is "frivolous" is an objective one. Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears "`beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981). However, where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004) (complaint that satisfied notice pleading requirement that it contain short, plain statement of the claim but lacked sufficient detail to function as a guide to discovery was not required to be dismissed for failure to state a claim; district court should permit a curative amendment before dismissing a complaint, unless an amendment would be futile or inequitable); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
Here, any claim asserted against the Atlantic County Justice Facility is subject to dismissal because jail facilities are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983 liability. See Grabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989); Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison, 426 F. Supp. 271, 274 (D.C. Pa. 1976). Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety against this defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
The Court now turns to address the claims as asserted against the remaining defendant, the Medical Department and the Nursing Staff at ACJF.
IV. ANALYSIS
It appears that plaintiff may be a pretrial detainee confined at ACJF at the time of the alleged incidents and presently. As a pretrial detainee, plaintiff's constitutional claims concerning the conditions of his confinement are considered under the due process clause (of the Fourteenth Amendment) instead of the Eighth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1983); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2000); Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 n. 31 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). See also Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000) ( citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979)); Despaigne v. Crolew, 89 F. Supp.2d 582, 585 (E.D.Pa. 2000) and Montgomery v. Ray, 145 Fed. Appx. 738, 740, 2005 WL 1995084 (3d Cir. 2005) (unpubl.) ("the proper standard for examining such claims is the standard set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, . . .; i.e. whether the conditions of confinement (or here, inadequate medical treatment) amounted to punishment prior to adjudication of guilt. . . .") (citing Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 158).
In Hubbard, the Third Circuit clarified that the Eighth Amendment standard only acts as a floor for due process inquiries into medical and non-medical conditions of pretrial detainees. 399 F.3d at 165-67. Pretrial detainees retain at least those constitutional rights enjoyed by convicted prisoners with respect to the conditions of their confinement. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 165-66; Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003).
Here, plaintiff alleges that he had an adverse reaction to a medication prescribed to him by the defendants. However, after the symptoms began to appear, plaintiff did receive immediate medical attention and was given a shot to counteract the adverse allergic reaction. Plaintiff does not allege any permanent disabilities or injuries from this incident, although he does state that he has some residual side effects. He does not allege that defendants have denied treatment in any way. Rather, he appears only to assert negligence on the part of defendants in not monitoring his reaction to the prescription.
Accepting these allegations as true for purposes of screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court finds that there was no denial of medical treatment that was so excessive in relation to any stated purpose of jail security and administration, which would infer that such denial was intended as punishment. See Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 158-63;Newkirk v. Sheers, 834 F. Supp. 772, 781 (E.D.Pa. 1993). Plaintiff has been provided medical care for his requested needs, although the treatment has not met his personal satisfaction. There are no allegations to suggest that treatment has been denied completely. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any serious medical need that has been purposefully or willfully ignored by defendant. At best, plaintiff may be alleging a state law tort claim of medical negligence against the medical staff at ACJF, which is not cognizable in a § 1983 action. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (allegations of negligent treatment are medical malpractice or medical negligence claims, and do not trigger constitutional protections). Therefore, this claim alleging denial of medical care will be dismissed for failure to state a claim at this time.
Moreover, this Court finds that no diversity jurisdiction exists in this matter if plaintiff's medical claim was construed as simple negligence or medical malpractice under state law. Plaintiff can bring such common law claims in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), if the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, and is between citizens of different states. It has long been recognized that, to found jurisdiction upon § 1332, there must be complete diversity among all parties, i.e., each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state from each defendant. Owen Equipment and Erection Co. V. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). In particular, if a sole plaintiff and any one of several defendants are citizens of the same state, complete diversity is lacking and the action would have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
Here, there does not appear to be diversity of jurisdiction between the plaintiff and the defendant medical employees at ACJF. Plaintiff is currently confined in the ACJF in New Jersey, and the defendants are employed at ACJF in New Jersey where the incident occurred. These facts suggest that the defendants likely reside in the State of New Jersey. Therefore, because complete diversity appears to be lacking, the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over any state law claim that may be construed from the Complaint against this defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff may seek to reopen this case if he can show facts to support diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiff does not provide the domicile or residence of the defendants, except to note that they are employed at ACJF in New Jersey.