Cusano v. Cusano

5 Citing cases

  1. 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella

    142 N.J. Super. 546 (Law Div. 1976)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses

    43, all arise out of the receivership proceeding: the receiver's allowance ($15,000); his expenses and disbursements, including transcripts of extensive hearings on claims ($4,299.43), and the broker's commission on the sale of the real estate ($6,6000). Whether such costs should be awarded to the prevailing party was discussed in Cusano v. Cusano, 19 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div.), certif. den. 10 N.J. 310 (1952), where a partner who successfully defended against a dissolution application appealed the action of the trial court in charging the custodial receiver's allowance against the partnership.

  2. Menz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    80 T.C. 1174 (U.S.T.C. 1983)   Cited 7 times
    In Menz, we found that the taxpayer had not received unrestricted control over the funds borrowed for the purpose of paying interest.

    Regarding dissolution: Under New Jersey law, which is the law applicable to RCA, a limited partnership can be dissolved for the willful or persistent breach of the partnership agreement or the misconduct of a general partner. See Cusano v. Cusano, 19 N.J. Super. 255, 88 A.2d 342 (1952); N.J. Rev. Stat. secs. 42:1-32, 42:2-13 (1953). 13 Because PPI Dover was wholly-owned by CPI and acted as CPI's nominee, control by PPI Dover was essentially the same as by CPI itself.

  3. McGlynn v. Schultz

    90 N.J. Super. 505 (Ch. Div. 1966)   Cited 41 times

    N.J.S.A. 42:2-13; N.J.S.A. 42:1-21. Cf. Cusano v. Cusano, 19 N.J. Super. 255 ( App. Div. 1952). It is precisely this holding that was the basis for his being enjoined from exercising his powers as general partner in N.C.A. and other limited partnerships upon complaints filed by limited partners, some of whom are defendants in this case.

  4. State v. Speare

    86 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 1965)   Cited 28 times
    Involving condemned property zoned residential and fronting on highway, with respect to which both commercially- and residentially-zoned comparison properties were used in valuing residentially-zoned property; ruling that weight to be accorded allegedly comparable sales is for jury to decide, but not mandating only "premium" comparable sales approach

    Notwithstanding its unavailability at the trial, evidence which is merely cumulative does not so qualify. Cusano v. Cusano, 19 N.J. Super. 255, 271 ( App. Div. 1952). We are satisfied that the contract in question did not qualify as newly discovered evidence calling for a new trial.

  5. Minter v. Bendix Aviation Corp.

    26 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1953)   Cited 17 times

    To justify the granting of a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear: (1) that such evidence would probably have changed the result of the trial; (2) that it was unobtainable by the exercise of due diligence for use at the trial; and (3) that the evidence is not merely cumulative. Christie v. Petrullo, supra; State v. Hunter, supra; cf. Cusano v. Cusano, 19 N.J. Super. 255, 271 ( App. Div. 1952). A motion for a new trial is addressed to a discretionary power of the trial judge, to be exercised, however, not according to whim or caprice, but by sound application of rules of law controlling the determination of the motion.