This is not true, as Rule 12(b)(3) also requires a certificate or affidavit of mailing to the clerk. We emphasize that the timely filing of an appeal is both jurisdictional and mandatory and the court must determine its own jurisdiction even if no party objects; The appellate court cited Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co:, 105 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1982), and Kimbrough v. Sullivan; 131 Ill. App. 2d 313 (1971), in support of its position. However, those cases addressed defects in the proof of service.
In re Estate of Mayfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d 534, 542, 680 N.E.2d 784, 789 (1997). The only case cited by Hagler in support of her motion to dismiss was Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 561, 434 N.E.2d 555 (1982). In that case, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the insured's complaint for lack of diligence in serving the complaint upon the defendant insurer.
Thus, Jones is distinguishable.¶ 21 Claimant also cites to Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co., 105 Ill.App.3d 561, 61 Ill.Dec. 402, 434 N.E.2d 555 (1982), and Kimbrough v. Sullivan, 131 Ill.App.2d 313, 266 N.E.2d 717 (1971), for the proposition that substantial or partial compliance with Rule 12(b)(3) is sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the circuit court. In Curtis, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action.
" Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill.2d 204, 210, 209 Ill.Dec. 735, 652 N.E.2d 275 (1995) . However, in Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co., 105 Ill.App.3d 561, 566-67, 61 Ill.Dec. 402, 434 N.E.2d 555 (1982) , the Fourth District held that very slight defects in proof of service that result in nonconformity with Rule 12(b) 's requirements do not constitute reversible error. The court reasoned that this is especially true where the complaining party is not prejudiced by the other party's failure to comply with the rule's exact requirements.
Two appellate courts have considered this question with opposite conclusions. In Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co. (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 561, 434 N.E.2d 555, the Fourth District Appellate Court considered whether the one-year suit-limitation provision in a standard fire insurance policy should be deemed a statute of limitations or simply another provision of the insurance contract for purposes of Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 103(b)). ( Curtis, 105 Ill. App.3d 561, 434 N.E.2d 555.)
See also Juechter v. Grace (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 606, 607-08, 371 N.E.2d 179, 180-81 (dismissing with prejudice when statute had run; dismissing without prejudice when statute had not run). Defendant cites Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co. (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 561, 434 N.E.2d 555, for the proposition that a circuit court must consider the entire time period in a Rule 103(b) ruling. In Curtis, however, the fourth district never specifically addressed the issue whether or not to consider the time before the statute ran. Justice Mills points out that the main point of contention was whether the standard 12-month limitation period, required in all fire insurance policies, is a statute of limitations for Rule 103(b) purposes.
See Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co. , 105 Ill. App. 3d 561, 566, 61 Ill.Dec. 402, 434 N.E.2d 555 (1982) ; see also Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. , 232 Ill. 2d 209, 217, 327 Ill.Dec. 541, 902 N.E.2d 662 (2009) (citing Curtis , 105 Ill. App. 3d 561, 61 Ill.Dec. 402, 434 N.E.2d 555 ).¶ 22 The State notes that defendant's proof of service did not contain the certification language from section 1-109 and that the separate affirmation under penalty of perjury, which did state it, failed to name the document that it applied to.
We disagree.¶ 18 In support of its position, defendants cite to Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 561, 434 N.E.2d 555 (1982). In Curtis, a proof of service certificate signed by a nonattorney was submitted to the trial court.
(Emphasis in original.) Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 217 (citing Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 561, 566 (1982) ("very slight defects in the proof of service, which result in its nonconformity to Supreme Court Rule 12(b) [citation], seldom constitute reversible error.")). In Secura Insurance Co., our supreme court distinguished Curtis because Secura Insurance Co. involved a complete failure to comply with Rule 12(b)(3) rather than a defect in the form of the notice.
The Fourth District similarly treated as harmless violations of Supreme Court Rule 12(b) (145 Ill. 2d R. 12(b)). In Curtis v. Pekin Insurance Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 561, 566-67 (1982), the Fourth District held that very slight defects in proof of service that resulted in nonconformity with Supreme Court Rule 12(b)'s requirements did not constitute reversible error. The court reasoned that this is especially true where the complaining party is in no way prejudiced or harmed by the other party's failure to comply with the exact requirements of the rule.