Curtis v. Le May

11 Citing cases

  1. Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assoc

    37 A.D.2d 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971)   Cited 49 times

    While the owner does not acquire a fee in the apartment, he does possess so many of the rights and obligations peculiar to fee ownership that the status is for practical purposes indistinguishable. To name a few of these which have received statutory or decisional recognition: The shareholder has been authorized to bring summary eviction proceedings to obtain possession ( Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853). The Statute of Frauds applicable to real estate transactions applies to sales of co-operative stock ( Frank v. Rubin, 59 Misc.2d 796). The stock has been treated as realty in determining the priority of judgment and tax liens ( Matter of Lacaille, 44 Misc.2d 370). Federal and New York State income tax laws give the same privileges to co-operative share owners as they do to fee owners in many respects (see U.S. Code, tit. 26, § 121, subd. [d], par. [3]; §§ 216, 1034, and New York Tax Law, § 360, subd. 12). In addition, alienability, liability for maintenance and repairs, as well as the privileges of making interior alterations, give a popular recognition to the status of realty quite in accord with the decisional law which treats this type of property as realty.

  2. Kenny v. Thompson

    87 N.E.2d 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949)   Cited 2 times

    Therefore, as of September 10, the date of the trial herein, the tenant was not then protected by any such Federal requirement, as he had been prior to July 1, 1947.' See also Kole v. Kousnetz, 1948, 335 Ill. App. 123, 80 N.E.2d 451. It has been recognized, under Acts modeled upon the Federal pattern, that purchasers of apartments under the cooperative plan are to be treated as landlords or owners. See Hicks v. Bigelow, D.C. Mun. Ct., 55 A.2d 924, and Smith v. Feigin, 273 App. Div. 277, 77 N.Y.S.2d 229, affirmed without opinion by the Now York Court of Appeals, 298 N.Y. 534, 80 N.E.2d 668. [See, also, 542 Morris Park Ave. Corporation v. Wilkins, 197 N.Y.S. 625, 627; Curtis v. Le May, 60 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770.] "The appellant further calls attention to the fact that before the argument of this case on appeal, but after the passage of the decree appealed from, Congress extended the Act of 1947 for one year effective April 1, 1948, with certain amendments.

  3. Smith v. Feigin

    273 App. Div. 277 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948)   Cited 6 times

    It would be contrary to fact to assert that this money was paid to purchase an income producing investment, or that it was spent for any other object than to buy office space. Respondent took possession in subordination to appellant's assignor, and can be dispossessed by summary proceedings (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1410; Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853). This is not the situation where a tenant under a lease for a later term applies to dispossess an earlier tenant holding over after his term has expired ( Eells v. Morse, 208 N.Y. 103). The meaning of the word "title" as used in this statute is to be gathered from the context, from the subject matter to which it is applied.

  4. Matter of Jack

    126 Misc. 2d 1060 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1985)

    For instance, a cooperative apartment owner has been authorized to bring summary eviction proceedings to obtain possession akin to the owner of realty. ( Curtis v Le May, 186 Misc. 853.) So, too, the Statute of Frauds applicable to real estate transactions applies to the sales of ownership in cooperative stock certificates.

  5. Adair v. Tookey

    99 Misc. 2d 745 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    (Jimerson Housing Co. v Butler, supra, p 566.) Some courts have held the co-operator to be a landlord (Curtis v Le May, 186 Misc. 853; 930 Fifth Corp. v King, 40 A.D.2d 140; and more recently, Esplanade Gardens v Reed, NYLJ, May 9, 1979, p 13, col 3, and cases cited therein; Chinatown Apts. v Chu Cho Lam, NYLJ, March 23, 1979, p 7, col 1). On the other hand, co-operator shareholders have been deemed by courts not to be tenants within the meaning of article 7A of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law to commence a proceeding for rent deposits to compel building repairs.

  6. Jimerson Housing Co v. Butler

    97 Misc. 2d 563 (N.Y. Misc. 1978)   Cited 11 times
    In Jimerson Housing Co. v Butler (97 Misc.2d 563, 565), the court refused a co-operative corporation the right to bring summary proceedings against a nonpaying proprietary lessee, noting that "[t]he cooperative ownership plan is sui generis", and denying that the resulting relationship was truly that of landlord and tenant.

    01 [5], p 2-12.7.) In Curtis v Le May ( 186 Misc. 853, 856), the court held that, for purposes of instituting a summary proceeding to evict a former tenant, the petitioner, holder of such an occupancy agreement, is "more of an owner-lessee than [a] mere lessee". In Matter of Lacaille v Feldman ( 44 Misc.2d 370, 384), the court found that the co-operator's interest was "in the nature of a quasi-real property interest".

  7. Matter of Lacaille

    44 Misc. 2d 370 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964)   Cited 22 times
    Filing of warrant gives State equal parity with creditor who has docketed judgment; State obtains choate lien on real property and inchoate lien on personalty until levy.

    The co-operative tenant has been considered as in the nature of an owner, not merely a naked lessee — so that, for purposes of summary proceedings, he has been regarded a landlord. ( Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853, 856; 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51; see Smith v. Feigin, 273 App. Div. 277, affd. 298 N.Y. 534; see, also, Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc.2d 588, 591.)

  8. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp.

    43 Misc. 2d 588 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1964)   Cited 28 times

    Some courts, for the very limited purpose of enforcing restrictive plans under which co-operative apartment houses are constructed and leased, have referred to the lessee as an owner of the co-operative apartment ( Penthouse Props. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., 256 App. Div. 685). Others have regarded the lessee as a title holder to permit him to bring dispossess proceedings to recover possession of the co-operative apartment ( Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853). However, a landlord is defined as one entitled to the rent for use and occupancy of any housing accommodation.

  9. Matter of Miller

    205 Misc. 770 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1954)

    Considered separately the shares of stock and the lease each would be considered personalty for purposes of estate distribution (Surrogate's Ct. Act, § 202, subds. 1, 8; Schmitt v. Stoss, 207 N.Y. 731; Wells v. Higgins, 132 N.Y. 459) and the fact that the stock ownership is prerequisite to the procurement of the lease would not seem to affect the legal classification of these assets. Some courts, for the very limited purposes of dispossess proceedings, have disregarded the corporate entity in co-operative apartment enterprises and have regarded a lessee as either an owner-lessee or a title holder of certain space (Smith v. Feigin, 273 App. Div. 277, affd. 298 N.Y. 534; Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853; see 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51) while in other instances the shareholder-lessee has been considered a tenant (Greenberg v. Colonial Studios, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 87, revg. 105 N. Y. S. 2d 494; Braislin, Porter & Baldwin v. Sawdon, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 774; cf. Dunbar Apts. v. Nelson, 136 Misc. 561). Such rulings, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with the generally accepted classification of an estate measured by a definite number of years as personalty and not realty (see Despard v. Churchill, 53 N.Y. 192; Matter of Ehrsam, 37 App. Div. 272; Matter of Althause, 63 App. Div. 252, affd. 168 N.Y. 670; Rodack v. New Moon Theatre, 121 Misc. 63; Durand v. Lipman, 165 Misc. 615, 622; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N.Y. 501; Decedent Estate Law § 80, subd. 1, and Restatement, Property, § 8). The testator was an attorney and was familiar with this traditional classification.

  10. Matter of Miller

    205 Misc. 770 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1954)

    Considered separately the shares of stock and the lease each would be considered personalty for purposes of estate distribution (Surrogate's Ct. Act, § 202, subds. 1, 8; Schmitt v. Stoss, 207 N.Y. 731; Wells v. Higgins, 132 N.Y. 459) and the fact that the stock ownership is prerequisite to the procurement of the lease would not seem to affect the legal classification of these assets. Some courts, for the very limited purposes of dispossess proceedings, have disregarded the corporate entity in co-operative apartment enterprises and have regarded a lessee as either an owner-lessee or a title holder of certain space ( Smith v. Feigin, 273 A.D. 277, affd. 298 N.Y. 534; Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853; see 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51) while in other instances the shareholder-lessee has been considered a tenant ( Greenberg v. Colonial Studios, 107 N.Y.S.2d 87, revg. 105 N.Y.S.2d 494; Braislin, Porter Baldwin v. Sawdon, 68 N.Y.S.2d 774; cf. Dunbar Apts. v. Nelson, 136 Misc. 561). Such rulings, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with the generally accepted classification of an estate measured by a definite number of years as personalty and not realty (see Despard v. Churchill, 53 N.Y. 192; Matter of Ehrsam, 37 A.D. 272; Matter of Althause, 63 A.D. 252, affd. 168 N.Y. 670; Rodack v. New Moon Theatre, 121 Misc. 63; Durand v. Lipman, 165 Misc. 615, 622; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N.Y. 501; Decedent Estate Law § 80, subd. 1, and Restatement, Property, § 8).