(Citation omitted.) Curtis v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 158 Ga. App. 379, 381 (1) ( 280 SE2d 404) (1981). "The law does not afford relief to one who suffers by not using the ordinary means of information, whether the neglect is due to indifference or credulity."

See also Peagler v. Huey, 183 Ga. 677 (5) ( 188 S.E. 906) (1936): "Evidence that at the time the maker signed the note it was distinctly understood that the maker would not have to pay the note is not permitted to compete with the written contents of the note which fails to contain the alleged stipulations." See Dendy v. Gamble Copeland, 59 Ga. 434 (1877); Byrd Co. v. Marietta Fertilizer Co., 127 Ga. 30 ( 56 S.E. 86) (1906); Cobb Bank Trust Co. v. Henry, 246 Ga. 225, 227 ( 271 S.E.2d 444) (1980); Curtis v. First Nat. Bank, 158 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 280 S.E.2d 404) (1981). Weintraub's evidence, proffered to establish an alleged oral agreement that he was not to be obligated on the note, must be excluded.

(Citations omitted.) Martin v. Alford, 214 Ga. 4, 7(1) ( 102 S.E.2d 598) (1958); see also, e.g., Results Oriented v. Crawford, 245 Ga. App. 432, 438-439(1)(b) ( 538 S.E.2d 73) (2000), aff'd Crawford v. Results Oriented, 273 Ga. 884 ( 548 S.E.2d 342) (2001); Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Conley, 181 Ga. App. 152, 153 ( 351 S.E.2d 498) (1986); Curtis v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 158 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 280 S.E.2d 404) (1981).Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, supra.

Parris Son v. Campbell, 128 Ga. App. 165, 168 ( 196 S.E.2d 334). A party to a contract who can read, must read or show a legal excuse for not doing so, and ordinarily if fraud is an excuse, it must be such fraud as would prevent the party from reading the contract. Curtis v. First Nat. Bank, 158 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 280 S.E.2d 404). One cannot claim to be defrauded about a matter equally open to the observation of all parties where no special relationship or trust or confidence exists.

In the absence of special circumstances, there is no fiduciary relationship between a bank and its borrowers. Curtis v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 158 Ga. App. 379, 380-381 (1) ( 280 S.E.2d 404) (1981). The trial court correctly determined that there was no evidence of special circumstances imposing upon the bank the duties of a fiduciary in favor of the companies under OCGA § 23-2-58.

"`An oral agreement between the parties, made contemporaneously with the execution of the note or prior thereto relating to a condition not expressed in the note is incompetent to change the contract as represented on the face of the note.' [Cit.] Evidence as to an alleged understanding which is antagonistic to and inconsistent with the terms of the instrument is inadmissible to vary such terms and legally insufficient to sustain a defense of fraud. [Cits.]" Curtis v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 158 Ga. App. 379, 381 (1) ( 280 S.E.2d 404) (1981). As parol evidence is inadmissible to challenge the unambiguous terms of the contract, we conclude that the appellant's enumeration is without merit.

However, in the case sub judice, there were no circumstances as would create a confidential relationship between plaintiff and Cohen so as to impose upon plaintiff a duty to disclose any knowledge it had as to the matters at issue. Curtis v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 158 Ga. App. 379, 380-381 (1) ( 280 S.E.2d 404); Boatman v. Citizens c. Nat. Bank, 155 Ga. App. 848, 850 (2) ( 273 S.E.2d 190); Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga. App. 755, 757 ( 250 S.E.2d 155). The state court did not err in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Judgments affirmed. Cooper and Blackburn, JJ., concur.

OCGA § 23-2-51. It is undisputed, as discussed above, that plaintiffs made no inquiries to the bank about Brown or any of his businesses, including Macon Auto. Plaintiffs do not cite to any cases in this state in which a legal or equitable duty has been recognized under similar circumstances, nor are we aware of any. Cf. Big Bend Agri-Svcs. v. Bank of Meigs, 174 Ga. App. 493 (1) ( 330 S.E.2d 422) (1985); Curtis v. First Nat. Bank, 158 Ga. App. 379 (1) ( 280 S.E.2d 404) (1981); Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga. App. 755, 758 ( 250 S.E.2d 155) (1978). The bank had no duty to make gratuitous revelations to plaintiffs concerning Brown or any of his businesses.

However, "fraud cannot consist of mere broken promises, unfulfilled predictions or erroneous conjectures as to future events." Curtis v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 158 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 280 S.E.2d 404). We find no evidence authorizing a recovery by plaintiff on his fraud claim.

Marchman Oil Chem. Co. v. Southern Petroleum c. Co., 167 Ga. App. 691 (1) ( 307 S.E.2d 509) (1983). See also Curtis v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 158 Ga. App. 379 (1) ( 280 S.E.2d 404) (1981); Boatman v. C S Nat. Bank, 155 Ga. App. 848 (2) ( 273 S.E.2d 190) (1980); Hyman v. Horwitz, 148 Ga. App. 647 (1) ( 252 S.E.2d 74) (1979); Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga. App. 473 ( 251 S.E.2d 360) (1978); Cooper v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 137 Ga. App. 605 (2) ( 224 S.E.2d 442) (1976); Pulliam v. Merchants c. State Bank, 33 Ga. App. 68 (2) ( 125 S.E. 509) (1924). 2.