Curtis v. City of North Richland Hills

Full title: BOB R. CURTIS, Plaintiff, VS. CITY OF NORTH RICHLAND HILLS, TEXAS…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Texas

Date published: Feb 26, 2004

NO. 4:03-CV-243-A (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2004)

Opinion

NO. 4:03-CV-243-A

February 26, 2004

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

JOHN McBRYDE, District Judge

Came on for consideration the motion of defendant, City of North Richland Hills, Texas, for summary judgment. The court, having considered the motion, the response of plaintiff, Bob R. Curtis, the record, the summary judgment evidence, and applicable authorities, finds that the motion should be granted.

I. Plaintiff's Claims

On January 17, 2003, plaintiff filed his original petition in the 236th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas. On April 1, 2003, defendant filed its notice of removal, bringing the action before this court. Plaintiff, a former member of defendant's police department, claims that he was wrongfully terminated in violation of his due process rights and in breach of his employment contract with defendant. He admits that he resigned his position, but claims that he was constructively discharged. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement and damages.

II. Grounds of the Motion

Defendant maintains that plaintiff cannot prevail on his claims, because he voluntarily resigned and was not constructively discharged. In sum, plaintiff cannot show that his due process rights were violated or that his employment contract was breached.

III. Applicable Summary Judgment Principles

A party is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact and as to which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The movant may discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials of pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256. To meet this burden, the nonmovant must "identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s]."Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994). An issue is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Unsupported allegations, conclusory in nature, are insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1984).

The standard for granting a summary judgment is the same as the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. See also Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (explaining the standard to be applied in determining whether the court should enter judgment on motions for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).

IV. Undisputed Evidence

The following is an overview of evidence pertinent to the motion for summary judgment that is undisputed in the summary judgment record:

Plaintiff began his employment with defendant's police department in 1981. In late 1999 or early 2000, plaintiff submitted copies of diplomas and official transcripts to Terri Bilger ("Bilger"), a secretary with defendant's police department. The documents showed that plaintiff had earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Harrington University in May 1997 and a Master of Science degree from Harrington University in December 1999. Bilger prepared a form F-7 (Report of College Education), which plaintiff and defendant's chief of police signed. The form was then submitted to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education ("TCLEOSE"). In December of 2000, a member of defendant's police department became suspicious of the degrees and ordered another officer to perform a preliminary investigation into the credibility and accreditation of Harrington University. That officer concluded that Harrington University was a "diploma mill" from which degrees could be purchased in any field. These findings were reported to the chief of police, who ordered a formal Internal Affairs investigation to determine whether plaintiff had knowingly attempted to misinform defendant and TCLEOSE regarding his educational achievements.

On January 19, 2001, plaintiff was told that defendant had learned that Harrington University was not an accredited university, that the Internal Affairs division would be investigating the matter, and that plaintiff would be suspended with pay pending the outcome of the investigation. Plaintiff met with various officers who told him that Internal Affairs would investigate the matter and that he would likely face criminal charges and the loss of his peace officer license. Defendant gave plaintiff the opportunity to resign in lieu of its going forward with the investigation. Plaintiff was allowed to telephone his wife and they concluded that, under the circumstances, plaintiff should resign, which he did.

Plaintiff thereafter submitted a civil service grievance form, but his request for hearing was denied based on his resignation.

V. Law Applied to the Facts

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued employment by defendant that could only be terminated in accordance with recognized principles of due process. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985); Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1983). The issue is whether plaintiff can show that his due process rights were violated since he admittedly resigned his position. To prevail, plaintiff must establish that he was constructively discharged and that defendant's conduct was motivated by a desire to avoid subjecting its actions to the scrutiny of a termination-related hearing. Fowler v. Carrollton Pub. Library, 799 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1986).

Constructive discharge occurs where an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation. Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1990). In sum, plaintiff must show that his working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. Id.

Resignations are presumed to be voluntary and the burden is on the employee to negate the presumption. Gonzalez v. Dep't of Transp., 701 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 587 (Ct.Cl. 1975)). An employee can show that his resignation was involuntary if (1) the employer forced his resignation through coercion or duress or (2) if the employer obtained the resignation through deceit or misrepresentation of a material fact.Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995). Duress or coercion is not established by showing that the employee was forced to choose between unpleasant alternatives, such as termination or criminal charges. Id. And, the fact that the employee perceived his only option to be resignation is irrelevant. Id.

Here, the summary judgment evidence establishes that plaintiff was given the choice of resigning or facing an Internal Affairs investigation while being placed on leave with pay. Plaintiff does not dispute that defendant had reason to believe that he had submitted false information regarding his having earned Bachelor's and Master's degrees. And, plaintiff does not allege, nor has he presented evidence to show, that defendant was motivated by a desire to avoid subjecting its actions to the scrutiny of a termination-related hearing. See Fowler, 799 F.2d at 981. Rather, defendant intended to afford plaintiff the due process of an investigation and whatever might follow. Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to show that defendant obtained his resignation through coercion, duress,¹ deceit or misrepresentation of any material fact. Rather, a jury could only find that no reasonable employee would have felt forced to resign under the circumstances.

1 The fact that plaintiff had only a short time in which to make his decision does not make that decision involuntary. Stone v. Univ. of Md., 855 F.2d 167, 177 (4th Cir. 1988). He was not forced to choose between resigning or being fired. He merely had to decide whether he wanted to avoid an investigation.

Because plaintiff voluntarily resigned, he is precluded from bringing a claim for breach of his employment contract. Muckelroy v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 884 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). And, he is not entitled to any procedural remedy. Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1989).

VI. Order

For the reasons discussed herein,

The court ORDERS that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and is hereby, granted; that plaintiff take nothing on his claims against defendant; and, that such claims be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.