Opinion
Civil No. 3:03-CV-2099-H
February 20, 2004
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Steven Solaja and Jose A. Guzman's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity, filed January 12, 2004; Plaintiff Darin Curtis's Response, filed February 2, 2004; and Defendants' Reply, filed February 17, 2004. Defendants Solaja and Guzman move for summary judgment on their defense of qualified immunity. Upon review of the pleadings, briefs, and relevant authorities, the Court is of the Opinion for the reasons stated below that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2001, Plaintiff Darin Curtis ("Curtis") was leaving the Times Square night club on Arapaho Road in Dallas, Texas, with his friends. (Def.s' App. at 2; PL's App. at 1). Defendant Steven Solaja ("Solaja") and Defendant Jose Guzman ("Guzman") are both Dallas Police Officers who were working security in the parking lot of Times Square that night. (Def.s' App. at 1). Plaintiff claims that he accidentally bumped into Officer Solaja as he was leaving the night club and that he and Officer Solaja exchanged words. ( See PL's App. at 2). Plaintiff claims he began to walk away, but that he then turned and made an obscene gesture at Officer Solaja. ( See PL's App. at 2). Plaintiff claims that after he gestured to Officer Solaja, Officer Solaja ran at him, "tackled" him from behind, and began beating him. ( See id. at 2-3). Plaintiff claims that he began to defend himself, not realizing that it was Officer Solaja who had attacked him. ( Id.).
Officer Solaja claims that Plaintiff was blocking traffic in the parking lot, trying to prevent a female driver from leaving, when Solaja first noticed him. ( See Def.s' App. at 2). Officer Solaja claims that when he ordered Plaintiff to leave the area, Plaintiffs behavior became aggressive, and Officer Solaja determined that Plaintiff was intoxicated. ( See id.) Officer Solaja claims he approached Plaintiff from behind, grabbed his upper arm, turned him around, and was informing Plaintiff that he was under arrest when Plaintiff shoved Officer Solaja, causing Plaintiff to slip and fall. ( See id. at 3). Officer Solaja claims that Plaintiff then "immediately jumped off the ground and attacked [Solaja] by attempting to punch [his] face." ( Id.). Only then, Officer Solaja claims, did Solaja strike Plaintiff. ( Id.).
Plaintiff claims that as Officer Solaja and he were engaged in the struggle, Defendant Guzman approached and began to also beat on Plaintiff using his nightstick and fists. ( See PL's App. at 3). Defendant Guzman claims that he first told Plaintiff to stop resisting arrest, and only after Plaintiff ignored his verbal direction, did Guzman intervene physically. ( See Def.s' App. at 7). Officer Guzman claims he then struck Plaintiff once on the leg with his nightstick, however Plaintiff did not stop fighting Officer Solaja. ( Id.). Officer Guzman claims that he then continued to assist Officer Solaja in attempting to arrest Plaintiff. ( Id. at 7-8).
Both Plaintiff and Defendants agree that after Plaintiff was handcuffed, he was placed in the squad car and taken to the police station. Defendants claim, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that a Dallas Fire Department ambulance checked Plaintiff's injuries in the parking lot of the night club. (Def.s' App. at 4-5). Plaintiff was also taken to the Parkland Hospital emergency room, where Plaintiff refused treatment. ( Id. at 6). Eventually, Plaintiff was charged with public intoxication and resisting arrest. ( Id.). Plaintiff, through his attorney, pleaded no contest to the public intoxication charge. (Def.s' App. at 13-15). The Dallas County Assistant District Attorney assigned to Plaintiffs case dismissed the charge for resisting arrest. (PL's App. at 3).
Plaintiff claims that he did not intend to plead no contest to the public intoxication charge, and that his attorney entered the plea without his permission. ( See PL's App. at 4-5).
On August 14, 2003, Plaintiff filed the instant case in the 116th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff sues Defendants Solaja and Guzman for claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 and pursuant to state law. (Pet. at 3-6). Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action against the City of Dallas and the night club, Arapaho Venture Ltd. d/b/a Times Square. (Pet. at 6). Defendants removed to this court on September 15, 2003. On November 21, 2003, on motion of Defendants, the Court stayed disclosures and discovery pending resolution of Defendants' qualified immunity defense and directed Plaintiff to file a Rule 7(a) reply. Defendants filed the instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 12, 2004, and seek summary judgment on all claims, arguing that the claims are barred by qualified immunity pursuant to federal law and official immunity pursuant to state law.
Neither the City of Dallas nor Times Square participated in this motion. Therefore, when the Court refers to "Defendants" in this motion, it is only referring to Defendants Solaja and Guzman. Defendant Arapaho Venture, Ltd. d/b/a Times Square has not been served as of this date.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the facts and law as represented in the pleadings, affidavits, and other summary judgment evidence show that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party as to any material fact. FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Innovative Database Systs. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1993). "The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case." Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of III., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25). If the movant fails to meet its initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
If the movant does meet its burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). A party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or denials in its pleadings unsupported by specific facts presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888; Hightower v. Texas Hasp. Assn., 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995).
In determining whether genuine issues of fact exist, "[f]actual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that a controversy exists." Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625; see also Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). However, in the absence of any proof, the Court will not assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625. A party must do more than simply show some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Friou v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1991).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants Solaja and Guzman move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, arguing that they are barred by qualified immunity pursuant to federal law and official immunity pursuant to state law. "Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right." Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). The Court conducts a two step analysis to determine if an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See id. The Court must determine first if the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the non-movant, show that the officer's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. Id. If the facts do show that the officer's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, then the Court determines if it "would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted." Id. at 624.
A. Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985
First, Defendants in the instant case argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because Plaintiff did not allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. ( See Def.s' Br. at 8). To state a claim for civil conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege: "1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons; 2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right of privilege of a citizen of the United States." Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994). In addition to the four elements above, the plaintiff must also show that the conspiracy was "motivated by a class-based animus. Id. at 653. See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) ("The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.").
In the instant case, Plaintiff has not argued or offered any evidence that Defendants Solaja and Guzman's actions were motivated by any racial or class-based animus. Plaintiff merely asserts that Defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights without ascribing any motivation to either Defendant. ( See, e.g., Pet. at 5). The only fact Plaintiff asserts that could be interpreted as motivation for Defendants' actions is the confrontation between Plaintiff and Defendant Solaja when Plaintiff bumped into Officer Solaja on his way to the parking lot. ( See PL's Br. at 5-7). Plaintiff offers evidence that Officer Solaja was "enraged" by the words exchanged between himself and Plaintiff. ( See id.). However, the words exchanged contain no racial or class-based language from which the Court could infer racial or class-based animus. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence necessary to establish a constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The Court GRANTS summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1985 claim against both Defendants Solaja and Guzman.
B. Civil Action for Deprivation of Right, 42 U.S.C § 1983
Next, Defendants in the instant case argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiff cannot overcome their qualified immunity defense. ( See Def.s' Br. at 9). Plaintiff claims that Defendants acted under color of state law with intent to deprive him of his rights to "freedom from illegal confinement, freedom from physical abuse, coercion, and intimidation." (Pet. at 5). The Court interprets Plaintiff's Petition to be stating claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and excessive force.
1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims fail because probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrest. ( See Def.s' Br. at 9). Defendants argue that two of the reasons Officer Solaja gives as creating probable cause are undisputed by Plaintiff: 1) that Plaintiff was "aggressive and combative"; and 2) that Plaintiff "flipped off a uniformed police officer." (Def.s' Reply at 4). The Court also notes that it was 2:00 in the morning, Plaintiff was exiting a club that served alcohol, and Plaintiff and Officer Solaja bumped into one another as Plaintiff was leaving the night club.
Exactly how or why Officer Solaja and Plaintiff bumped into one another is disputed. Officer Solaja does not remember bumping into Plaintiff, although he does not dispute that this may have happened. (Def.s' App. at 2). Plaintiff claims Officer Solaja purposefully bumped into Plaintiff. (PL's App. at 2).
"Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's personal knowledge, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to occasion a person of reasonable prudence to believe an offense has been committed." Evett v. Dentff, 330 F.3d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 2003) ( quoting Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988)). The Court concludes that Defendants did have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for public intoxication. "The constitutional torts of false arrest, unreasonable seizure, and false imprisonment . . . require a showing of no probable cause." Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants violated one of Plaintiff's known constitutional rights and thus has not defeated Defendants' qualified immunity defense. The Court GRANTS summary judgment on Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims against Defendants Solaja and Guzman.
Even taking the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff admits to arguing with Officer Solaja after they bumped into one another, thereby giving Officer Solaja the opportunity to observe Plaintiff's speech and to smell his breath. (PL's App. at 2).The Court also notes that although Plaintiff now denies being intoxicated, Plaintiff pleaded no contest to the public intoxication charge. (Def.s' App. at 13-15). Plaintiff claims this was due to a miscommunication with the attorney representing him in that matter. (PL's App. at 4-5).
2. Excessive Force
Defendants argues that Plaintiff's excessive force claim fails because Plaintiff's own facts are inconsistent and contradictory. (Def.s' Br. at 12). The Court interprets Defendants to be arguing that no constitutional right was violated. The Court finds that the facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff establish that a constitutional right was violated. Therefore, the Court moves to the second part of the qualified immunity analysis to determine if Defendants are entitled to the qualified immunity defense on Plaintiff's excessive force claim.
Defendants argue that "reasonable officers could have believed that Defendants' actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information Defendants possessed." (Def.s' Br. at 14). The Supreme Court has stated that in evaluating whether an officers' use of force was reasonable, the Court must look to whether the officers' actions were "objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). In other words, the amount of force is judged in the context in which it was used. See Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996).
In the instant case, Plaintiff claims Defendant Solaja tackled him from behind with no warning and punched him the face, breaking his nose. (PL's App. at 2-3). Only then does Plaintiff claim he tried to protect himself. ( Id.). Defendant Solaja claims that he only hit Plaintiff after Plaintiff attacked him when he was trying to arrest Plaintiff. ( See Def.s' App. at 3). The Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact on what occurred between Plaintiff and Officer Solaja, thus making it impossible for the Court to determine if the force used was reasonable. The Court DENIES summary judgment on Plaintiffs excessive force claim against Defendants Solaja and Guzman.
Plaintiff does not specify how he tried to protect himself, but from other evidence Plaintiff submitted, it appears that Plaintiff engaged Officer Solaja in a fist fight.
C. Assault, Battery, and False Imprisonment Pursuant to State Law
Last, Defendants in the instant case argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs state law claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment because Plaintiff cannot overcome their official immunity defense. ( See Def.s' Br. at 18-19). In Texas, government officials are entitled to official immunity "from suit arising from the performance of their 1) discretionary duties in 2) good faith as long as they are 3) acting within the scope of their authority." City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). It is undisputed in the instant case that Officers Solaja and Guzman were performing discretionary acts. The question then becomes whether Defendants were acting in good faith, within the scope of their authority. Texas has adopted substantially the same standard for these two elements of official immunity as that used for qualified immunity under federal case law-objective legal reasonableness. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656.
Defendants argue that for the same reasons they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs claims of false arrest and false imprisonment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they are also entitled to official immunity on Plaintiff's false arrest claim pursuant to state law. ( See Def.s' Br. at 19-21). The Court finds that, for the reasons articulated in the section on false arrest and false imprisonment above, Defendants are entitled to official immunity for Plaintiffs false arrest claim. ( See Section B.1.). The Court GRANTS summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claim of false arrest against Defendants Solaja and Guzman.
Defendants argue that for the reasons they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's excessive force claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they are also entitled to official immunity pursuant to state law. ( See Def.s' Br. at 19-21). Defendants also argue that because any force they used was reasonable, they did not assault Plaintiff. ( See Def.s' Br. at 21). For the same reasons articulated in the section on excessive force above, the Court finds that there are fact issues as to the state law claims of assault and battery. ( See Section B.2.). The Court DENIES summary judgment on Plaintiffs state law claims of assault and battery against Defendants Solaja and Guzman.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Solaja and Guzman for conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, for false arrest and false imprisonment pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, and for Plaintiff's claim for false arrest pursuant to state law. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity is DENIED as to Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Solaja and Guzman for excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for assault and battery pursuant to state law.
SO ORDERED.