Opinion
No. W2003-02350-CCA-R3-HC.
Filed May 10, 2004.
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County; No. P-27495; Arthur T. Bennett, Judge.
Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Samuel Curry, pro se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General Reporter; Kathy Denise Aslinger, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Joe G. Riley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which John Everett Williams and Alan E. Glenn, JJ. joined.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Samuel Curry, appeals the trial court's denial of his application for writ of error coram nobis, application for the writ of habeas corpus, and motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Finding that the instant petition is not proper as either a motion for writ of error coram nobis, application for writ of habeas corpus relief, or petition to reopen a post-conviction petition, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court.
On January 10, 1994, Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, he received range I, concurrent sentences of twelve years for the robbery and life for the murder. See Samuel D. Curry v. State, No. 02C01-9508-CR-00219, 1996 WL 275033, *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Jackson, May 24, 1996), perm. to appeal denied, (Jan. 27, 1997), perm. to appeal dismissed, (Tenn. June 28, 1999). Seven months later, Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that trial counsel was ineffective. Id. The lower court denied post-conviction relief. Id. This decision was affirmed by a panel of this Court. Id.
On July 11, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se motion captioned "Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus." As grounds for relief, Petitioner alleged (1) the State withheld evidence concerning the criminal background of the victim, (2) the trial court failed to explain to the Petitioner that a life sentence could possibly mean forever and, if the Petitioner was released, the conviction could be used for enhancement purposes on any future convictions, and (3) the judgment is void because the Petitioner was insane at the time the crime was committed and at the time the pleas were entered. On this same date, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. As basis for the motion to reopen, Petitioner alleged that newly discovered evidence exists in the form of "a list of witnesses that . . . if this court will permit, will be giving sworn "Affidavits" to the extent of this Defendants [sic] competentcy [sic] at the time he so entered this plea. . . ."
On September 2, 2003, the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissed all three applications. In support of this action, the trial court made the following conclusions:
. . . The defendant has not presented any newly discovered evidence that might have resulted in a different judgment at trial. The defendant should have litigated this issue at trial or during his original post-conviction filed on this case. This issue, therefore, has been previously determined or waived. These petitions/applications are merely fishing expeditions.
. . .
There is no proof to support conclusory allegations or an involuntary guilty plea. . . . All allegations about prosecutorial misconduct, coerced guilty pleas, or unknowing guilty pleas have been previously determined or waived in prior post-conviction proceedings and appeals. There is no newly or subsequently discovered evidence that would support any of the conclusory allegations made by the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal document in the trial court on September 19, 2003.
I. Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Petition
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's dismissal of the motion to reopen. In seeking review of the trial court's denial of a motion to reopen, a petitioner shall file, within ten days of the lower court's ruling, an application in the Court of Criminal Appeals seeking permission to appeal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c)(2003) (emphasis added); Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 28 § 10(b). The application shall be accompanied by copies of all the documents filed by both parties in the trial court and the order denying the motion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c) (emphasis added); see also Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 28 § 10(b). Petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking appellate review. Specifically, Petitioner failed to timely file his application and Petitioner filed his application in the wrong court.
An appeal as of right is not available for review of a lower court's denial of a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); see also John Harold Williams, Jr. v. State, No. W1999-01731-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn.Crim.App. at Jackson, Mar. 23, 2000), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2000). In order to obtain appellate review of the trial court's order, a petitioner must comply with the statutory requirements contained in Section 40-30-117(c). See John Harold Williams, Jr. v. State, No. W1999-01731-CCA-R3-PC; William Lee Drumbarger v. State, No. M1999-01444-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn.Crim.App. at Nashville, Dec. 7, 1999); Lucy Killebrew v. State, No. 03C01-9809-CR-00320 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Oct. 5, 1999), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2000). The failure of a petitioner to comply with statutory requirements governing review of a denial of a motion to reopen deprives this Court of jurisdiction to entertain such matter. John Harold Williams, Jr. v. State, No. W1999-01731-CCA-R3-PC. Finally, neither the Post-Conviction Procedure Act nor the Rules of the Supreme Court permit this Court to suspend the statutory requirements. Id. Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain this matter.
II. Habeas Corpus
In Tennessee, habeas corpus relief is only available when a conviction is void because the convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence has expired and he is being illegally restrained. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). In other words, habeas corpus relief will only be granted where the petition shows that the judgment is "void" and not merely "voidable." McLaney v. Bell, 59 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999)). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the judgment is "void." McLaney, 59 S.W.3d at 92 (citing Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000); State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 500, 281 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (1964)). That burden entails showing that the jurisdictional defect appears in the record of the original trial, thereby creating a void judgment. Id. (citing State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000)). In other words, "[t]he writ will issue only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a court lacked jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant or that the sentence has expired." Id. (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)). Where the allegations in a petition for writ of habeas corpus do not demonstrate that the judgment is void, a trial court may correctly dismiss the petition without a hearing. McLaney, 59 S.W.3d at 93 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109 (2000); see, e.g., Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164 (parenthetical omitted)).
In the present case, the petition fails to allege any ground demonstrating that the judgments were void. Additionally, the grounds alleged by Petitioner fail to assert that his sentences have expired. Thus, the trial court properly denied habeas corpus relief.
III. Writ of Error Coram Nobis
To the extent that the Petitioner seeks the benefit of a writ of error coram nobis, his claim is time barred. The statute of limitations for that form of relief is one year from a judgment's finality. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103 (2000). Moreover, the Petitioner has not demonstrated the applicability of any basis upon which he might be excused from the statute of limitations bar. See generally Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001) (due process may toll statute of limitations where petitioner facing death penalty seeks to present claim of newly discovered evidence). Additionally, we are compelled to note that none of the issues raised by the Petitioner falls within the general framework for coram nobis relief. See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105 (1997) (writ of error coram nobis available for "subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial") (emphasis added). With respect to the writ of error coram nobis, the Code provides: Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105. Moreover, "[t]he relief obtainable . . . shall be confined to errors dehors the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105 (emphasis added). In the present case, the petition filed in 2003 was clearly outside the statute of limitations as the Petitioner was convicted in 1994. Furthermore, it appears from the record before this Court that the Petitioner's competency and sanity were addressed pretrial through mental evaluations and were also addressed in the post-conviction proceeding. See Samuel D. Curry, No. 02C01-9508-CR-00219, 1996 WL 275033, *1 (counsel testified that he reviewed the case including evaluations that the petitioner was competent to stand trial). In this case, the Petitioner's claims, even if taken as true, do not constitute newly discovered evidence. He is not seeking to bring new evidence before the court which might have had an effect on the judgment. Finally, the issues raised by Petitioner could have been raised through a post-conviction proceeding. Indeed, the voluntariness of his plea was litigated at the post-conviction level. Id. The Petitioner has already sought post-conviction review, and the statute of limitations has long since expired. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202. Coram nobis relief, therefore, cannot lie.
Accordingly, the State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.