But here we have compliance. In Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250) (1986), the absent witness had not even been subpoenaed. The same is true in Brown v. State, 169 Ga. App. 520, 521 (1) ( 313 S.E.2d 777) (1984).

" (Cit.)' Ledford v. State, 173 Ga. App. 474, 476 ( 326 S.E.2d 834) (1985)." Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250). This Code section provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all applications for continuances upon the ground of the absence of a witness, it shall be shown to the court . . . that he has been subpoenaed [and] that he does not reside more than 100 miles from the place of trial by the nearest practical route. . . ." OCGA § 17-8-25.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 SE2d 250) (1986). 2.

Each of the statutory grounds for a continuance based upon an absent witness is absolute, so that the failure to substantially comply is grounds to deny a continuance. Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 ( 340 S.E.2d 250) (1986); Brown v. State, 169 Ga. App. 520 ( 313 S.E.2d 777) (1984); McNabb v. State, 69 Ga. App. 885 ( 27 S.E.2d 246) (1943). The trial court is entitled to know what relevant and material evidence the witness will prove in order to exercise discretion in ruling.

See Shaw v. State, 163 Ga. App. 615, 618 (2) ( 294 S.E.2d 676) (1982) (right to compulsory process does not guarantee service of subpoena), rev'd on other gnds., 251 Ga. 109 ( 303 S.E.2d 448) (1983). Because Redd did not show that the witness had been subpoenaed, that she lived within 100 miles of the court, or that he expected to procure her testimony at the next term of court, as required by OCGA § 17-8-25, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250) (1986). 2.

" (Cit.)' Ledford v. State, 173 Ga. App. 474, 476 ( 326 S.E.2d 834) (1985)." Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250). In the case sub judice, defense counsel moved for a continuance based on the absence of a defense witness who had been summoned to court via an order for production of an inmate from the state prison system.

" (Cit.)' [Cit.]" Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250) (1986). Under the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of appellant's motion for continuance.

]" Brown v. State, 169 Ga. App. 520, 521 (1) ( 313 S.E.2d 777) (1984). See also Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250) (1986). "`A motion to continue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and this court will not interfere unless it is clearly shown that he has abused his discretion.

"On these facts, there is no basis for holding the denial of the motion was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. [Cits.]" Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250) (1986). See also Thompkins v. State, 257 Ga. 113, 114 (2) ( 356 S.E.2d 207) (1987).

" (Cit.)' [Cit.]" Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 250) (1986). Appellant concedes that these requirements were not met, but urges that the denial of his motion was nevertheless erroneous because the State had been previously granted five continuances.