If the legislature had intended for statutory gain time to accumulate in the manner urged by petitioner, the Legislature would have said so expressly. Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Accordingly, we deny all the requested relief.
Under general principles of statutory construction, where as here, the legislature has made a mistake in a reference in a statute to another statute and the real intent of the legislature is manifest and would be defeated by adherence to the terms of the mistaken reference, a court may disregard the mistaken reference or read it as corrected in order to give effect to the legislative intent.Id. at 462 n. 14 (citing Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla.Ct.App. 1982)). Finally, because ยง 39-5-40(c) exempts from coverage unfair trade practices regulated by Chapter 57 of Title 38 it exempts from coverage all unfair trade practices regarding the business of insurance.
Under general principles of statutory construction, where as here, the legislature has made a mistake in a reference in a statute to another statute and the real intent of the legislature is manifest and would be defeated by adherence to the terms of the mistaken reference, a court may disregard the mistaken reference or read it as corrected in order to give effect to the legislative intent.Id. at *9 n. 14 (citing Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla.Ct.App. 1982)). Finally, because ยง 39-5-40(c) exempts from coverage unfair trade practices regulated by Chapter 57 of Title 38 it exempts from coverage all unfair trade practices regarding the business of insurance.
Under general principles of statutory construction, where, as here, the legislature has made a mistake in a reference in a statute to another statute and the real intent of the legislature is manifest and would be defeated by adherence to the terms of the mistaken reference, a court may disregard the mistaken reference or read it as corrected in order to give effect to the legislative intent. Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla.Ct.App. 1982). VII
We may correct a statute whose language does not promote the intent of the Legislature due to clerical error in transcription, writing, or redrafting. See Schultze v. Landmark Hotel Corp., 463 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa 1990) (clerical error misidentifying event that tolls statute of limitations for wrongful death action could have been corrected by court so as not to frustrate obvious legislative intent); Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (although legislature failed to amend mandatory gun law to reflect repeal of related statutes, court had power to correct mistake without infringing on powers of legislature); Association of Texas Professional Educators v. Kirby, 788 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. 1990) (where undisputed testimony, official legislative journals and stipulation by attorney general conclusively showed that bill signed by governor was not bill passed by legislature, court would not enforce it). We continue to encourage plain meaning statutory construction.
Such a result would be absurd and contrary to the legislature's clear intent that those charged with sexual offenses under section 800.04 be subject to HIV testing. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have construed section 775.0877(1)(c) as referring to the amended version of section 800.04. See Curry v. Dep't of Corr., 423 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of the state's motion for HIV testing and remand with directions that the court grant the motion.
See James v. Department of Corrections, 424 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1983). In 1978, the legislature rewrote the gain time provisions, repealing sections 944.27, 944.29 and 944.271 and providing for all gain time in section 944.275. Although the legislature failed to also amend the firearm statute to reflect the new statute number, we held that the types of gain time formerly found in section 944.27 and 944.29, which were moved to section 944.275(1) and (3), still remained unavailable to inmates serving a mandatory firearm term; and that the "work gain time" of the former section 944.271, which was moved to section 944.275(2), was likewise still available to inmates serving the mandatory firearm term. James;Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In 1983, shortly after Curry and James were decided, the legislature again amended the gain time statute and abolished the "work gain time" of section 944.275(2), formerly found in section 944.271.
James, 424 So.2d at 827. See also Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982). We recognize that other states have concluded that particular statutes with mandatory minimum sentences exclude deductions for good time.
PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Curry v. Department of Corrections, 423 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). BOOTH, WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.