Curry v. Curry

7 Citing cases

  1. Stacy v. Stacy

    480 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)   Cited 7 times

    When a wife permanently leaves her husband under sufficient provocation, she is free to establish her own residence. Darsey v. Darsey (Galveston CA 1946) 196 S.W.2d 524, no writ history; Curry v. Curry (Austin CA 1938) 122 S.W.2d 677, no writ history. In the case at bar, the trial court impliedly found, inter alia, that Mrs. Stacy had been a resident of McLennan County for six months at the time her McLennan County suit was filed, and we cannot say that in making this finding the trial court abused his discretion.

  2. Zieben v. Krakower

    346 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)   Cited 8 times

    Here, under the evidence, it is presumed that the same wife who was named in the deed signed the extension agreement because in each the woman is recited to be the wife of a given signer and no evidence of any man having been married more than once, or that the wife named in the deed had died, is in the record. Curry v. Curry, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 677. Finally, the appellant contends the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow him to open and close the argument to the jury because the only issues submitted to the jury were ones upon which he bore the burden of proof.

  3. Postle v. Postle

    280 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)   Cited 2 times

    Only after a wife permanently separates from her husband, under circumstances justifying it, is she free to choose her own domicile. Worden v. Worden, 148 Tex. 356, 224 S.W.2d 187, 190; Curry v. Curry, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 677, 678; Michael v. Michael, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 630, 79 S.W. 74, 76; Darsey v. Darsey, Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W.2d 524, 526; Mortensen v. Mortensen, Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 297, 300; 28 C.J.S., Domicile, § 12, p. 26. Appellee contends the domicile of the husband is that of the wife only when he provides a 'marriage domicile' where she may go and stay at will.

  4. Kollenborn v. Kollenborn

    273 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)   Cited 13 times

    The Supreme Court, in McCullough v. McCullough, 120 Tex. 209, 36 S.W.2d 459, held that such an allegation in the absence of an exception is sufficient and is a sufficient allegation of a fact to authorize the district court to hear the evidence and on which a valid decree of divorce may be awarded. The McCullough case has been followed in Renfro v. Renfro, Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 348; Curry v. Curry, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 677; Green v. Green, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 331; Sloan v. Sloan, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 294; Radford v. Radford, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 1060; Skop v. Skop, Tex.Civ.App., 201 S.W.2d 77; Davis v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 108 S.W.2d 681; Burks v. Burks, Tex.Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 226, and numerous other cases. The points of error are overruled.

  5. Burks v. Burks

    252 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)   Cited 2 times

    ' The rule in the McCullough case has been expressly followed in Renfro v. Renfro, Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 348; Curry v. Curry, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 677; Green v. Green, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 331; Sloan v. Sloan, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 294; Radford v. Radford, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 1060; Skop v. Skop, Tex.Civ.App., 201 S.W.2d 77, and numerous other cases. We hold that under the rule announced in the McCullough case a divorce petition which alleges the statutory grounds for divorce for cruel treatment is sufficient unless challenged by special exception.

  6. Darsey v. Darsey

    196 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)   Cited 4 times

    When she permanently left her husband under what we deem to be sufficient provocation, she was free to choose her own residence. Curry v. Curry, Tex. Civ. App. 122 S.W.2d 677, and authorities there cited. Appellee testified to numerous acts of cruelty on the part of appellant towards her; that appellant had asked her to leave him and told her that she nauseated him and made him have cramps in his stomach; that he told her to go to Houston and get a job and forget about him; and that he had been guilty of sexual excesses and outrages toward her that rendered their living together unsupportable.

  7. Struble v. Struble

    177 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)   Cited 13 times

    The intention to remain must exist and is to be determined from all facts, circumstances, acts and declarations. See, also, Curry v. Curry, Tex. Civ. App. 122 S.W.2d 677; Percy v. Percy, 188 Cal. 765, 207 P. 369; St. John v. St. John, 291 Ky. 363, 163 S.W.2d 820; MeClintock v. McClintock, 147 Ky. 409, 144 S.W. 68, 39 L.R.A., N.S., 1127. We have undoubtedly made this opinion too extended, but have attempted to detail sufficient facts and circumstances that appear in the record, as well as sufficient citation of authorities, forming the basis for our conclusions, and yet at the same time to sound a warning to newcomers within our gates that divorce applications should and will be carefully scrutinized to determine whether or not the applicant possesses those qualifications of residence required by our divorce statutes.