This argument was not made to the trial court, and no authority is cited to support it. Had the appellees obtained an award of punitive damages the situation might be different, but given the fact that only compensatory damages were awarded by the jury, the trial court clearly had authority under the statute to double the amount of damages. See Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 185, 772 S.W.2d 309, 311 (1989). Finally, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to support a verdict against appellant.
The Arkansas cases cited by Ajax do not establish reliance as essential to a contractual warranty claim. See Ciba–Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 309 Ark. 426, 834 S.W.2d 136, 146–48 (1992) (noting reliance is relevant to whether express warranty was created, and finding no warranty when farmer did not read materials containing warranty before purchasing product), citing Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309, 311 (1989) (analyzing creation of express warranty). IPSCO's doubts before negotiating do not render ineffective the bargained-for guarantees in the contract.
The Arkansas cases cited by Ajax do not establish reliance as essential to a contractual warranty claim. See Ciba–Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 309 Ark. 426, 834 S.W.2d 136, 146–48 (1992) (noting reliance is relevant to whether express warranty was created, and finding no warranty when farmer did not read materials containing warranty before purchasing product), citing Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309, 311 (1989) (analyzing creation of express warranty). IPSCO's doubts before negotiating do not render ineffective the bargained-for guarantees in the contract.
“An affirmation of fact must be part of the basis of the parties bargain to be an express warranty.” Ciba–Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 309 Ark. 426, 834 S.W.2d 136, 147 (1992) (citing Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309 (1989)). “When a buyer is not influenced by the statement in making his or her purchase, the statement is not a basis of the bargain.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Ruddell Lease–Sales, Inc., 43 Wash.App. 208, 214, 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash.App.1986) (“The evidence demonstrates that a significant segment of the buying public objects to buying a Corvette that has been damaged and repaired. Therefore, a wrecked and repaired Corvette does not pass without objection in the trade as a ‘used Corvette’ ” (emphasis original)); see also Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 186, 772 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Ark.1989) (“Currier warranted the car to be a one owner 1984 Datsun. What Spencer purchased was two-thirds of one car and one-third of another [welded together].... [T]he court [properly] found that the car could not ‘pass without objection in the trade under the contract description’ ”); Luther v. Bud–Jack Corp., 72 Misc.2d 924, 926–27, 339 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1972) (“Section 2–314 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that in a sale of a new automobile such as occurred herein, the dealer gives to the purchaser an implied warranty of merchantability, [including] that ... the automobile would be at least such as would pass without objection in the trade under the contract description.... The jury was instructed that it had to determine, therefore, ... whether the 1971 Fiat which the plaintiff bought from the defendant complied with the standards of quality which a purchaser would ordinarily be entitled to expect when buying a new car of the same type”).
See, e.g., Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc., 43 Wash.App. 208, 214, 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash.App.1986) (" The evidence demonstrates that a significant segment of the buying public objects to buying a Corvette that has been damaged and repaired. Therefore, a wrecked and repaired Corvette does not pass without objection in the trade as a ‘ used Corvette’ " (emphasis original)); see also Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 186, 772 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Ark.1989) (" Currier warranted the car to be a one owner 1984 Datsun. What Spencer purchased was two-thirds of one car and one-third of another [welded together].... [T]he court [properly] found that the car could not ‘ pass without objection in the trade under the contract description’ " ); Luther v. Bud-Jack Corp., 72 Misc.2d 924, 926-27, 339 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1972) (" Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that in a sale of a new automobile such as occurred herein, the dealer gives to the purchaser an implied warranty of merchantability, [including] that ... the automobile would be at least such as would pass without objection in the trade under the contract description.... The jury was instructed that it had to determine, therefore, ... whether the 1971 Fiat which the plaintiff bought from the defendant complied with the standards of quality which a purchaser would ordi
Our application of benefit-of-the-bargain damages in common-law fraud cases has nonetheless been limited to instances where the actual product received by the purchaser manifests that it is different from that which was promised. For instance, in Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309 (1989), Currier, a car dealer, placed an advertisement to sell a one-owner 1984 Datsun 300 ZX. Spencer responded to the advertisement and purchased the car for $8,250, with $5,000 paid in cash and the other $3,250 paid by check. Before the check cleared, Spencer experienced problems with his car and discovered the car had been wrecked and consisted of two cars welded together.
See also Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1978) (transferor who lacks actual knowledge that odometer reading is incorrect may still have a duty to state that actual mileage is unknown, and seller had duty to disclose that actual mileage was unknown where, in exercise of reasonable care, he would have had reason to know that mileage was more than that which odometer had recorded or previous owner had certified). [2] In Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309 (1989), this court had an opportunity to consider Arkansas's odometer disclosure law, § 4-90-206(a)(1987). There, Currier sold a 1984 Datsun 300ZX as a one-owner car to Rod Spencer. Spencer later discovered the Datsun had been wrecked and the rear one-third of the vehicle had been replaced with that of another car.
An affirmation of fact must be part of the basis of the parties, bargain to be an express warranty. See Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309 (1989). When a buyer is not influenced by the statement in making his or her purchase, the statement is not a basis of the bargain.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-313(1)(a) (Repl. 2001); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter , 309 Ark. 426, 447, 834 S.W.2d 136, 146 (1992) ; Currier v. Spencer , 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309 (1989). Here, the circuit court found that Ward's repeated statements and assurances that the tractor would have approximately 500–550 hours on it were sufficient to form an express warranty and that it was not necessary for the statements regarding hours to be exact to constitute an affirmation of fact.