Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245, 249-250. Curran v. Burkhardt, 310 Mass. 466, 467. Since the plaintiff sustained the burden of proving joint ownership, it was unnecessary to demonstrate that the defendants were also joint keepers.
The statute imposes strict liability on the owner or keeper of a dog which shall "do any damage to . . . the body or property of any person," and proof that the owner was negligent, or otherwise at fault, or knew that the dog had any dangerous propensities is not essential to recovery. Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245, 247. Curran v. Burkhardt, 310 Mass. 466. But the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that she was not "teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog." Sullivan v. Ward, 304 Mass. 614.
We think that if the notice were given before the filing of the bill it would comply with the statute, which requires notice not of the filing or taking of the appeal, but only "of such appeal." Compare Arlington Trust Co. v. Le Vine, 289 Mass. 585; Checkoway v. Cashman Brothers Co. 305 Mass. 470; Curran v. Burkhardt, 310 Mass. 466. Jurisdiction depends on the fact of the notice, not on whether it was pleaded. If given within the time limited, but not set out in the pleadings in a particular case, either because given after the bill was filed or through inadvertence, manifestly an appropriate occasion would be presented for allowance of an amendment of the bill to cause it to state all the jurisdictional requirements of the appeal.
Thus proof of ownership alone has been held sufficient to permit a finding for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Koller v. Duggan, 346 Mass. 270, 272 (1963); Curran v. Burkhardt, 310 Mass. 466, 467-468 (1941). Conversely, evidence that the defendant was the keeper of the dog, without more, has been deemed a proper basis for a determination of liability.
. . " See Rossi v. DelDuca, 344 Mass. 66, 68-69 (1962); Curran v. Burkhardt, 310 Mass. 466, 466-467 (1941); Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245, 247 (1935). The mere ownership of premises upon which a dog is kept does not alone render the property owner liable as a keeper of the dog, even where the dog continues upon the premises with the knowledge, acquiescence or even permission of the property owner.