TS, United States Department of Homeland Security; Assistant Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, moving to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, Rule 12(b)(1) (dkt. entry no. 15); and the Court construing the plaintiffs' single cause of action as a civil rights claim underBivens v. Six Unknown Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agents, 43 U.S. 388 (1971); and the Court noting that Bivens actions, as with actions brought against state officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are subject to the forum state's general personal injury statute of limitations, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees, or Officers, 855 F.3d 1080, 1087 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1988); and New Jersey's two-year personal injury statute of limitations therefore governing the plaintiffs' claim, see N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2; Curbison v. U.S. Gov't of N.J., 242 Fed.Appx. 806, 809 (3d Cir. 2007); and the Court noting that even if the plaintiffs' claim were considered a tort claim against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) ("FTCA"), such claim would be time-barred unless the plaintiffs presented evidence of having made an administrative claim within two years after the claim accrued,see Curbison, 242 Fed.Appx. at 809-10; 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); and it appearing that this requirement is "unambiguous," McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111 (1993); and THE COURT observing that the Amended Complaint alleges that the events underlying the plaintiffs' claim occurred on February 11, 2004 (dkt. entry no. 3, Am. Compl. at 1); and the plaintiffs' cause of action therefore accruing on February 11, 2004, for statute of limitations purposes, see Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.2d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); and the two-year statute of limitations therefore expiring on February 11, 2006; and the plaintiffs filing the Complaint on April

“[A plaintiff] cannot sue a group of defendants for conspiring to engage in conduct that would not be actionable against an individual defendant.” In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Curbison v. U.S. Gov't of New Jersey, 242 Fed.Appx. 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (dismissing derivative conspiracy claim where underlying tort claim was dismissed as time-barred); Weaver v. Brozell, No. 2:23-CV-2116, 2024 WL 4476496, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2024) (same). Counts I and II, alleging conspiracy to commit conversion and conversion,

SeeDondero v. Lower Milford Twp., 431 F.Supp.3d 590, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff'd, 5 F.4th 355 (3d Cir. 2021) (dismissal of underlying federal claims “preclude[d their use] as the anchor violations for [plaintiff's] civil conspiracy claim, compelling dismissal of conspiracy claim); see alsoCurbison v. U.S. Gov't of New Jersey, 242 Fed.Appx. 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A civil conspiracy claim requires a separate underlying tort as a prerequisite for liability. [The plaintiff's] conspiracy claims were premised on the time-barred tort and constitutional claims against the Federal Defendants, and, because the underlying claims were properly dismissed, the conspiracy claims had to be dismissed as well.

Simbraw, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 367 F.2d 373, 373 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (“[A] corporation [must], to litigate its rights in a court of law, employ an attorney at law to appear for it and represent it in the court or courts before whom its rights need to be adjudicated[.]”); see also Lawson v. Natl ContinentalProgressive Ins. Co., 347 Fed. App'x 741, 742 n.l (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Curbison v. U.S. Gov't of N.J., 242 Fed. App'x 806, 808-09 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Kilinc v. Tracfone Wireless Inc., 757 F.Supp.2d 535, 537 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Rhino Assocs., L.P. v. BergMfg. & Sales Corp., 531 F.Supp.2d 652, 656 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Thus, the original complaint lodged with the Court for filing on June 5, 2023, has satisfied Rule 11 only with respect to Ilya Azaryev, the only plaintiff to have affixed a valid signature to that pleading.

; Curbison v. New Jersey, 242 Fed.Appx. 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] civil conspiracy claim requires a separate underlying tort as a prerequisite for liability.”).

In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1999); Boyanowski, 215 F.3d at 405-06 (“The rule that civil conspiracy may not exist without an underlying tort is a common one.”); Curbison v. New Jersey, 242 Fed.Appx. 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A civil conspiracy claim requires a separate underlying tort as a prerequisite for liability.”);

It is well established that a corporation may not appear in federal court as a pro se litigant, but rather it must be represented by a licensed attorney. See Rowland, 506 U.S. at 202-03 ("It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel."); Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 373 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam) ("[A] corporation [must], to litigate its rights in a court of law, employ an attorney at law to appear for it and represent it in the court or courts before whom its rights need to be adjudicated[.]"); see also Lawson v. Nat'l Continental-Progressive Ins. Co., 347 Fed. App'x 741, 742 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Curbison v. U.S. Gov't of N.J., 242 Fed. App'x 806, 808-09 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Kilinc v. Tracfone Wireless Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Rhino Assocs., L.P. v. Berg Mfg. & Sales Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 652, 656 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Thus, the original complaint lodged with the Court for filing on April 17, 2019, has satisfied Rule 11 only with respect to Timothy Rowbottom and James Lee Rowbottom, the only plaintiffs to have affixed valid signatures to that pleading. It is unsigned with respect to TNT International, Inc.

In these motions, Plaintiff sought to proceed pro se and/or be represented by Mr. Arian, a non-attorney. The Court denied the motions on the same day because a corporation is not permitted to proceed pro se or be represented by a non-attorney in federal court. (Docket No. 23) (citing Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993); Curbison v. United States Gov't of N.J., 242 Fed. App'x 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007)). The Court further ordered, in accordance with the prior order from May 17, 2017, that "if Plaintiff does not proceed to secure new counsel, and said counsel does not enter his or her appearance in the instant case, the Court shall dismiss the Complaint, with prejudice, for failure to prosecute.

On July 16, 2012, there was a request to substitute plaintiff's original counsel, Andrew T. McDonald, with Mark Whitcomb, pro se. As Metro Metals is a corporation, see Complaint, the request was denied because Mr. Whitcomb was not an attorney, and corporations may appear in federal court only through licensed counsel. See Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S. Ct. 716, 121 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1993); Curbison v. New Jersey, 242 Fed. Appx. 806, 808-809 (3d Cir. 2007). After denial of the request to substitute Mr. Whitcomb for Mr. McDonald, Magistrate Judge Goodman held a conference at which she directed Plaintiff to obtain counsel within 30 days.

A limited liability company cannot represent itself pro se in federal court, and can proceed only if it is represented by a licensed attorney. Curbison v. U.S. Gov't of N.J., 242 Fed.Appx. 806, 808-09 (3d Cir. 2007); Super 8 Worldwide v. KNR Hotels, No. 09-3302, 2009 WL 4911942, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2009); Koken v. Morelli, No. 06-1024, 2007 WL 2990681, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2007); Beale v. Dep't of Justice, No. 06-2186, 2007 WL 327465, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2007). THE PLAINTIFFS allege that the defendant Gino Palazzolo "is a resident of New Jersey", without providing his address.