Although our new Evidence Code applies to this case, we observe that, under the former Evidence Code, " ‘evidence as to whether a defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time a crime was committed [was] deemed part of the res gestae and [was] admissible as such even though it may [have] incidentally place[d] the defendant’s character in evidence.’ " Hamilton v. State , 295 Ga. 295, 298 (2), 759 S.E.2d 530 (2014) (quoting Cunningham v. State , 279 Ga. 694, 695 (3), 620 S.E.2d 374 (2005), which held that the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s un-redacted statement to police because the portions relating to his purchase and use of drugs before the crime were an integral part of his criminal confession). [E]vidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.... [E]vidence of other acts is "inextricably intertwined" with the evidence regarding the charged offense if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.
Hamilton contends that the trial court erred in denying his objections to Stocks's testimony that Hamilton had drunk beer, appeared inebriated, and smoked marijuana shortly before declaring that he wanted to find Parrish and speak with him. Although Hamilton contends this testimony constituted improper comment upon his character, “evidence as to whether a defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time a crime was committed is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible as such even though it may incidentally place the defendant's character in evidence. [Cit.]” Cunningham v. State, 279 Ga. 694, 695(3), 620 S.E.2d 374 (2005). Judgments affirmed.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cunningham v. State, 279 Ga. 694, 695 (3) ( 620 SE2d 374) (2005). The "failure to make a meritless objection [does not] amount to ineffective assistance."