Cunningham v. Metzger

11 Citing cases

  1. Chmelik v. Vana

    31 Ill. 2d 272 (Ill. 1964)   Cited 83 times
    Rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to exclusivity provision in WCA

    Adhering to what appears to be the distinct majority view in this country, (see: 66 A.L.R. 1406, 1413-1417; 28 A.L.R. 1408, 1409; 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, sec. 221,) the courts of this jurisdiction have consistently concluded that an injury accidentally received on the premises of the employer by an employee going to or from his actual employment by a customary or permitted route, within a reasonable time before or after work, is received in the course of and arises out of the employment. ( Indian Hill Club v. Industrial Com. 309 Ill. 271; Union Starch and Refining Co. v. Industrial Com. 344 Ill. 77; Wabash Ry Co. v. Industrial Com. 294 Ill. 119; Western Coal and Mining Co. v. Industrial Com. 296 Ill. 408; Biggs v. Farnsworth, 336 Ill. App. 417; Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150.) More recently, in both DeHoyos v. Industrial Com. 26 Ill.2d 110, and Carr v. Industrial Com. 26 Ill.2d 347, we have aligned ourselves with those jurisdictions holding that the same result obtains with respect to accidental injuries received on parking lots maintained by employers for the use of their employees.

  2. Rogers v. Industrial Com

    83 Ill. 2d 221 (Ill. 1980)   Cited 13 times
    In Rogers v. Industrial Com. (1980), 83 Ill.2d 221, 225-27, 414 N.E.2d 744, 747-48, the dissent argued that the case was virtually identical to Chmelik v. Vana (1964), 31 Ill.2d 272, 201 N.E.2d 434, and that therefore the outcome should be the same.

    But even if such a showing had been made, it would be of little avail to plaintiff. The regular and continuous use of the parking lot by employees, most particularly at quitting time when there is a mass and speedy exodus of the vehicles on the lot, would result in a degree of exposure to the common risk beyond that to which the general public would be subjected. Cf. Biggs v. Farnsworth, 336 Ill. App. 417; Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150; Murphy v. Meittinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E.2d 252. We conclude that the accidental injury here did arise out of and in the course of the employment * * *.

  3. Decatur-Macon County Fair v. Ind. Com

    371 N.E.2d 597 (Ill. 1977)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that the widow of a fairgrounds caretaker killed by tornado that struck the fairgrounds could not recover benefits without showing that the decedent's employment duties exposed him to some special or heightened danger from the elements

    "[T]he courts of this jurisdiction have consistently concluded that an injury accidentally received on the premises of the employer by an employee going to or from his actual employment by a customary or permitted route, within a reasonable time before or after work, is received in the course of and arises out of the employment. ( Indian Hill Club v. Industrial Com., 309 Ill. 271; Union Starch and Refining Co. v. Industrial Com., 344 Ill. 77; Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Com., 294 Ill. 119; Western Coal and Mining Co. v. Industrial Com., 296 Ill. 408; Biggs v. Farnsworth, 336 Ill. App. 417; Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150.) More recently, in both DeHoyos v. Industrial Com., 26 Ill.2d 110, and Carr v. Industrial Com., 26 Ill.2d 347, we have aligned ourselves with those jurisdictions holding that the same result obtains with respect to accidental injuries received on parking lots maintained by employers for the use of their employees.

  4. De Hoyos v. Industrial Commission

    26 Ill. 2d 110 (Ill. 1962)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that "whether the employer owns or does not own the parking lot is immaterial so long as the employer has provided the parking lot for its employees"

    Therefore, the question presented to the circuit court was not one of disputed fact or whether the decision of the Industrial Commission was manifestly against the weight of the evidence, but whether, when an employer provides a parking lot for employees and an employee falls on the parking lot, this fact being uncontroverted on the record, the employee is entitled to recover as a matter of law. This court has consistently held that where an employee is injured on company property while going to or leaving work such injuries are compensable. ( Wabash Railway Co. v. Industrial Com. 294 Ill. 119; Cunningham v. Metsger, 258 Ill. App. 150.) We have previously pointed out that whether the employer owns or does not own the parking lot is immaterial so long as the employer has provided the parking lot for its employees.

  5. O'Brien v. Rautenbush

    10 Ill. 2d 167 (Ill. 1956)   Cited 31 times
    In O'Brien, this court was relying in part on language explicitly authorizing an action against certain nonemployees, and stated that such language implicitly indicated that an action against a fellow employee was proscribed.

    Zimmerman v. Kennedy, 405 Ill. 306; Union Drainage Dist. No. 5 v. Hamilton, 390 Ill. 487; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. De Lasaux, 336 Ill. 522. Although of initial impression to this court, the question raised by plaintiff's first contention has been considered on at least five occasions by appellate tribunals of our State. The problem was first presented in Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150, (2d Dist. 1930) where the court held that sections 6 and 29 of the Workmen's' Compensation Act (now section 5(a) and (b), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 48, par. 138.5,) prevented an injured employee from recovering against a negligent coworker. Four years later a similar result was reached by the Appellate Court for the First District in Bentley v. Lippert, 277 Ill. App. 615.

  6. Warner v. Leder

    234 N.C. 727 (N.C. 1952)   Cited 47 times
    In Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6, 9, the president and executive officer of the corporate employer was held immune from action by injured employee.

    The decisions of this Court, in the Essick and Bass cases, are in accord with numerous decisions, in other jurisdictions, to the effect that an employee, subject to the provisions of a Workmen's Compensation Act whose injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, cannot maintain an action at common law against his co-employee whose negligence caused the injury. Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150; Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 190 N.E. 815; Caira v. Caira, 296 Mass. 448, 6 N.E.2d 431; Murphy v. Miettinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E.2d 252; Behan v. Maleady, 249 A.D. 912, 292 N.Y.S. 540; Schwartz v. Forty-Second St., M. St. N. Ave. Ry., 175 Misc. 49, 22 N.Y.S.2d 752; Pantolo v. Lane, 185 Misc. 221, 56 N.Y.S.2d 227; Landrum v. Middaugh, 117 Ohio 608, 160 N.E. 691; Rosenberger v. L'Archer (Ohio App.), 31 N.E.2d 700; Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Or. 271, 186 P.2d 790; Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73; Peet v. Mills, 76 Wn. 437, 136 P. 685, L.R.A. 1916A 358, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 154. We hold that an officer or agent of a corporation who is acting within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of the corporation, and whose acts are such as to render the corporation liable therefor, is among those conducting the business of the corporation, within the purview of a.s. 97-9, and entitled to the immunity it gives; Essick v. Lexington, et als., supra; Peet v. Mills, supra; Hade v

  7. Olson v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, A. F. A. M

    226 Minn. 141 (Minn. 1948)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that an icy sidewalk was a hazard arising out of employment

    An employe who has arrived on the premises and who, preparatory to the actual commencement of work, is injured in going to a dressing room or locker to dispose of his street clothes sustains such injury as an incident of his employment, and it is compensable. See, Corpora v. Kansas City Public Service Co. 129 Kan. 690, 284 P. 818; Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150. It is immaterial that here respondent's personal room, located on the working premises, was used as a dressing room or locker. Obviously, it was likewise immaterial whether respondent intended to go directly to the furnace or to stop first at his room to remove his coat.

  8. Di Libero v. Middlesex Construction Co.

    63 R.I. 509 (R.I. 1939)   Cited 30 times
    In Di Libero v. Middlesex Const. Co., 63 R.I. 509, 9 A.2d 848 (1939), we established three criteria necessary to demonstrate a nexus or causal connection such that the injury would be cognizable despite the going-and-coming rule.

    In these circumstances, we think that there was some evidence to support the findings of fact by the trial justice, that such findings clearly bring the instant case within the principle contended for by the respondent, and show that the petitioner suffered an injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. The decree, upon the evidence and findings of fact in the instant case, comes also within the principles and findings in many other cases, some of which are Stacy's Case, 225 Mass. 174; Roberts' Case, 124 Me. 129; Terlecki v. Strauss, 85 N.J.L. 454; Hager v. State Comp. Comm., 112 W. Va. 492; Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150. For the reasons stated, the respondent's appeal is denied, the decree appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.

  9. Parnham v. Carl W. Linder Co.

    183 N.E.2d 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962)   Cited 12 times

    The evidence is that plaintiff was an employee of one of the defendants. He had just finished his work for the day and had left the building where he was employed in the usual and customary way. His business connection with one of the defendants included leaving the premises of his employer. (Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150.) Plaintiff was on the premises of his employer, one of the defendants, at the time he was injured.

  10. Biggs v. Farnsworth

    84 N.E.2d 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949)   Cited 5 times

    In view of the conclusion of this court it is not necessary that we go into the question of whether the verdict of which complaint was made, was inadequate, as contended by plaintiff. If an accident arises out of and in the course of employment of a common employer of a plaintiff and a defendant, all such persons are bound by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act ( Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150), and the Workmen's Compensation Act abolishes the common-law right of redress for damages for personal injuries received in the course of employment, against any person bound by the provisions of the Act (1947 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, par. 143 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 143.21]; O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 305, Ill. 244, 255). The question for consideration in the instant case is whether defendant in this action was a person bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act, so as to bar a right of recovery by plaintiff as against defendant under the facts.