On the plaintiff's consolidated appeal to this court, Held: 1. The trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of C Co., our Supreme Court previously having determined in Cunha v. Colon ( 260 Conn. 15), that a lessor and a lessee are not joint tortfeasors within the meaning of the statute (§ 52-572e) that provides that the release of one joint tortfeasor does not discharge other tortfeasors unless the release so provides, and, therefore, because C Co.'s liability was derivative of that of its lessee, A, the release of the lessee from liability operated to release the lessor; moreover, the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that A's bankruptcy discharge negated the release because A's bankruptcy discharge did not extinguish her liability but merely prohibited the plaintiff from enforcing it, whereas A's release from liability extinguished her liability. 2.

The Fourth Count of the operative Substituted Complaint is identical to the Thirteenth Count of the original complaint. The City's final claim is that the release of Kennedy operates to release the City, citing the two leading cases on this topic: Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709, 735 A.2d 306 (1999), and Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). In the former case, the plaintiff Alvarez, who had been injured by a driver employed by the defendant New Haven Register, sued the driver and the Register.

Our review of this question of law, therefore, is plenary. See, e.g., Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). Our analysis begins with a brief review of this court's decision in Connecticut College v. Calvert, supra, 87 Conn. 427-30.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). "[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case."

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). "[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case."

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). "[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case."

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). "[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case."

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). "[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred. . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case."

" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). "A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence."

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 18 n. 6, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). STANDING AND JUSTICIABILITY