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Cummings v. Sutton

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Feb 9, 2017
No. 2 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2017)

Opinion

J-A30040-16 No. 2 MDA 2016

02-09-2017

CHARLES D. CUMMINGS AND LISA A. CUMMINGS, HIS WIFE Appellants v. SHERMAN A. SUTTON Appellee


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division at No: 12288-2012 BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STABILE, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:

Appellants, Charles D. Cummings and Lisa A. Cummings, appeal from the judgment entered January 19, 2016. We affirm.

On August 6, 2012, Appellants commenced this action for declaratory relief terminating an easement that runs between their property and that of Appellee. In the alternative, Appellants requested a permanent injunction prohibiting Appellee from using the easement. The trial court conducted a bench trial on November 6, 2015. On November 17, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying relief. The trial court denied Appellants' motion for post-trial relief on December 1, 2015. The trial court's order was reduced to judgment on January 19, 2016. Appellants filed this timely appeal.

The trial court issued the following findings of fact:

The parties' respective homes are situated in the Woodridge II Development. Significantly, the plot plan for the Woodridge II Development reflects the properties owned by each party, as well as the Easement (the "Plot Plan"). The parties each own their respective properties and neither party owns the Easement. Appellee and his family have called the land which comprises Woodridge II home since long before the Development came into existence. Prior to being developed as Woodridge II, the entire parcel was a farm owned by Appellee's grandparents. Appellee's family then sold the property to Hillside Farms, which sold the entire property to Woodridge for development according to the recorded plot plan.

While the Plot Plan clearly indicates the existence of the Easement, the deed to Appellants' property also includes the following reference to the Easement: 'Together with and subject to 40 feet wide [sic] unnamed alley along the southwesterly side of the property described above connecting Sutton Road to another 40 foot wide alley road along the rear and together with and subject to a 40 foot wide alley road along the rear line of the land described above. This description of the Easement is also in Appellee's deed, as well as in various other deeds for properties in Woodridge II that enjoy the right of access to it.

The Easement runs to the left of and behind Appellants' property. Appellants utilize a portion of the Easement to the left of their property as a driveway. The Easement is also adjacent to the rear portion of Appellee's property. Appellee used the Easement to access his property for many years; however, such use was impeded about two years ago when Appellants blocked his access to it by placing large stones across it.

During the bench trial, Appellants made various claims about Appellee's alleged misuse of the Easement, including littering, driving recklessly, being a nuisance, causing damage, and blocking the Easement. Contrary to Appellants' descriptions, the debris that Appellants alleged Appellee littered on their property and/or the Easement was either located on Appellee's property, or was not otherwise deliberately scattered. Also, Appellee only once put a rut in the Easement because his truck started sinking into the ground somewhere above Appellants' driveway and through no fault of his own. It is clear from the totality of the testimony presented at the bench trial that Appellee uses the Easement a reasonable amount of time, as
needed, and in a reasonable manner. Finally, despite the fact that Appellee was not misusing the Easement, he voluntarily agreed, at the close of the bench trial, to continue to refrain from any action that may interfere with Appellants' quiet enjoyment of the Easement.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/25/16, at 6-8 (record citations omitted).

Appellants argue the trial court erred in failing to enter a judgment terminating the easement. Appellants' Brief at 5. In particular, Appellants argue that Appellee's use of the easement is no longer necessary to Appellants due to improvement of public roads along Appellee's property. Appellants also argue that Appellee's easement was merely a temporary license. Appellants' Brief at 10. We review the trial court's decision in a declaratory judgment action for abuse of discretion or error of law. Erie Ins. Grp. V. Catania , 95 A.3d 320, 322 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2014).

The record does not support Appellants' argument. As the trial court explains in its opinion, both parties enjoy the right to use the easement in question in accordance with a plot plan and their respective deeds. Trial Court Opinion, 4/25/16, at 6-7. Appellee's easement did not arise by necessity. Appellants have produced no valid basis for extinguishing Appellee's easement. See , e.g., Riek v. Binnie , 507 A.2d 865 (Pa. Super. 1986); Vinso v. Mingo , 57 A.2d 583 (Pa. Super. 1948). Furthermore, the trial court found no support for Appellants' assertions of Appellee's misuse of the easement. Having reviewed the record, the applicable law, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment in favor of Appellee based on the trial court's April 25, 2016 opinion. We direct that a copy of that opinion be filed along with this memorandum.

Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 2/9/2017

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Summaries of

Cummings v. Sutton

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Feb 9, 2017
No. 2 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2017)
Case details for

Cummings v. Sutton

Case Details

Full title:CHARLES D. CUMMINGS AND LISA A. CUMMINGS, HIS WIFE Appellants v. SHERMAN…

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Feb 9, 2017

Citations

No. 2 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2017)