Opinion
No. CV 03 0522666
June 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. Procedural History
The appellant, Terrance Cummings, brings this action pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), General Statutes §§ 4-166 et seq., appealing a January 30, 2003 decision by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend his operator's license. The appeal to this court was filed in a timely manner on March 5, 2003, the parties have filed briefs and the court heard oral argument on April 7, 2005.
Subsequently, the defendant moved to consolidate this action with Ryan v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, wherein the same legal issue was presented by the parties arising under similar facts. The motion for consolidation was granted by the court, Levine, J., on May 9, 2005. The parties in Ryan had no objection to the consolidation of these matters, and have waived their right to any oral argument or further hearings concerning this appeal.
II. Facts
The facts involved in both cases are not in dispute. On October 15, 2002, Terrance Cummings was convicted of possession of an alcoholic beverage by a minor, in violation of subsection (b) of General Statutes § 30-89. By notification dated November 11, 2002, the DMV suspended the appellant's operator's license, effective December 11, 2002. On November 21, 2002, with the assistance of counsel, the appellant requested the suspension be rescinded pending an administrative hearing to determine whether General Statutes § 14-111e, the applicable DMV suspension statute, was properly applied to this case as a matter of law. After a hearing on this matter on January 8, 2003, the DMV issued a decision, dated January 30, 2003, sustaining the suspension of the appellant's operator's license. It is from this administrative decision that the appellant, Terrance Cummings, appeals.
In the transcript of the proceedings in Cummings, provided to the court as a part of the official record in this case, the court, Downey, J., made a specific factual finding that the appellant was found guilty only of possession of alcohol by a minor, in violation of General Statutes § 30-89(b). The court stated that "I'm going to find that you were in violation of Sub-Section B (SIC), not A (SIC), and further articulate on the record that it is my finding, a finding of fact, that you did not utilize your motor vehicle driver's license in any way in this circumstance."
General Statutes § 30-89 provides
(a) Any person to whom the sale of alcoholic liquor is by law forbidden who purchases or attempts to purchase such liquor or who makes any false statement for the purpose of procuring such liquor shall be fined not less than two hundred nor more than five hundred dollars.
(b) Any minor who possesses any alcoholic liquor on any street or highway or in any public place or place open to the public, including any club which is open to the public, shall be fined not less than two hundred nor more than five hundred dollars. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to (1) a person over age eighteen who is an employee or permit holder under section 30-90a and who possesses alcoholic liquor in the course of his employment or business, (2) a minor who possesses alcoholic liquor on the order of a practicing physician, or (3) a minor who possesses alcoholic liquor while accompanied by a parent, guardian or spouse, who has attained the age of twenty-one.
General Statutes § 14-111e provides
(a) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend, for a period of one hundred fifty days, the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person under the age of twenty-one who has been convicted of a violation of section 30-88a involving the misuse of an operator's license or section 30-89 involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor.
(b) Any person under the age of twenty-one who has not been issued a motor vehicle operator's license under section 14-36 and who has been convicted of a violation of section 30-88a involving the misuse of an operator's license, section 30-89 involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor or subsection (e) of section 1-1h involving the misuse of an identity card, shall not be issued a new operator's license by the commissioner under section 14-36 until a period of one hundred fifty days has elapsed from the date all applicable requirements for any such license have been satisfied by the applicant.
John Ryan was similarly convicted of a violation of subsection (b) of § 30-89 on October 15, 2002, the same day as Cummings' conviction in the companion case which has been consolidated in this matter. Ryan's case then followed a procedural path similar to Cummings' case. The DMV held a hearing on January 8, 2003 to determine whether the relevant suspension statute, § 14-111e, was properly applied to this case as a matter of law. The DMV issued a decision, dated January 30, 2003, sustaining the suspension of the appellant's operator's license. It is from this administrative decision that the appellant, John Ryan, appeals.
III. Discussion A. Review of Administrative Decision
Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., judicial review of an agency decision is very restricted. See, MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 136-37, 778 A.2d 7 (2001). The applicable jurisdictional statute is General Statutes § 4-183(1), which provides: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
The appellants claim that the DMV's actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of its discretion and contrary to law in that its actions were based upon an improper interpretation of §§ 14-111e and 30-89(b). In short, the appellants claim an error of law, based upon facts that are not in dispute. "It is fundamental that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the [agency], on the facts before [it], acted contrary to law and in abuse of [its] discretion . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 254 Conn. 333, 343, 757 A.2d 561 (2000).
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation by an administrative agency. The legal standard governing judicial review of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies is well established. "Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law . . . it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement . . . Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 253 Conn. 661, 669, 757 A.2d 1 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1148, 121 S.Ct. 1089, 148 L.Ed.2d 963 (2001). As noted by the Supreme Court "the factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies are to be given considerable weight by the courts . . . [however,] it is for the courts, and not for administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 109, 653 A.2d 782 (1995).
B. The Suspension of a Minor's License for Possession of Alcohol Alone
The appellants' argument is straightforward: their operator's licenses were suspended pursuant to § 14-111e, a DMV license suspension statute which authorizes a 150-day suspension for a violation of "section 30-89 involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor." (Emphasis added.) § 14-111e. Pointing to this statutory language and relying on Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994), and General Statutes § 1-1(a), the appellants argue that § 14-111e allows for the suspension of an operator's license only when a person has been convicted under both the purchase and possession provisions of § 30-89. Since the appellants were convicted of possession of an alcoholic beverage alone, and not the purchase of it, they argue that the DMV has misinterpreted and misapplied the statute, resulting in the improper suspension of their licenses.
In opposition to the appellants' claim, the DMV argues that it properly applied the license suspension provisions of § 14-111e to the plaintiffs' cases and that the statute applies to either the purchase or possession of alcohol by a person under the age of twenty-one. In support of this position, the DMV argues that although the statutory reference to § 30-89 is followed by language that is conjunctive and not disjunctive in nature, it can be properly interpreted either way. Citing Commission on Hospitals Health Care v. Lakoff, 214 Conn. 321, 329, 572 A.2d 316 (1990), the DMV argues that the word "and" may be interpreted as the word "or" and vice-versa.
The court notes that these two words are not generally interchangeable in the interpretation of statutes. In fact, the use of one and not the other may change the entire meaning of a statute. As such, the court should only view these terms as interchangeable when resolving a statutory inconsistency, resulting in an ambiguity or absurd result in a larger statutory scheme. In Commission on Hospitals Health Care v. Lakoff, supra, 214 Conn. 329-30, the court indicated that the statutory language in question was amended to change the word "and" to "or," and that the legislative history of the amendment indicated that this change was made to clarify the legislative intent of the underlying statute. See discussion of plain meaning rule, infra.
The DMV also argues that in order to suspend a minor's license, he or she need only be found to have violated one of the two subsections set forth in § 30-89, and that this occurred in these cases. First, the DMV notes that § 14-111e speaks of a violation of § 30-89. Section 30-89 contains two subsections. Subsection (a) prohibits the purchase of alcohol by minors and subsection (b) prohibits the possession of alcohol by minors. The DMV argues that a violation of either subsection (a) or subsection (b) constitutes a violation of § 30-89 and therefore may properly result in the suspension of a person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle. In further support of this argument, the DMV argues that if the legislature intended to require a violation of both statutory subsections as a predicate to suspension, it would have included in § 14-111e a specific reference to the two statutory subsections of § 30-89, instead of using language generally identifying § 30-89.
As noted previously, § 14-111e(a) provides in relevant part: "The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend, for a period of one hundred fifty days. the motor vehicle operator's license . . . of any person under the age of twenty-one who has been convicted of a violation of . . . section 30-89 involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor." The court must focus on the phrase "involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor" which immediately follows the statutory reference to § 30-89. The question of statutory interpretation that this court must address is whether, as suggested by the DMV, this language is merely furnished for the purpose of referring generally to the subject matter of § 30-89 or, whether, as the appellants argue, this language is intended to specifically identify and limit the substantive scope of the DMV's authority to suspend a minor's license to instances involving violations of both the purchase and possession provisions of § 30-89.
C. The Plain Meaning Rule
This case requires statutory interpretation in light of the recent adoption the so-called "plain meaning rule," codified at General Statutes § 1-2z. This statute was enacted in response to the case of State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 816 A.2d 562 (2003). Section 1-2z provides that "[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
"In State v. Courchesne, [the Supreme Court] explained that, as part of the judicial task of statutory interpretation, [it] would not follow the so-called plain meaning rule, which operates to preclude the court, in certain cases, from considering sources in addition to the statutory text in order to determine its meaning. [The court is] cognizant that, subsequent to [its] decision in Courchesne, No. 03-154, § 1, of the 2003 Public Acts (PA. 03-154), has legislatively overruled that part of Courchesne in which [it] stated that [it] would not require a threshold showing of linguistic ambiguity as a precondition to consideration of sources of the meaning of legislative language in addition to its text. State v. Courchesne, supra, 577." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 493 n. 5, 863 A.2d 680 (2004).
As a threshold matter, a court must determine, after considering the text of the statute and its relationship with other statutes, whether the statute is plain and unambiguous and, if it is, whether it yields absurd or unworkable results. See, Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 260 Conn. 21, 42, 792 A.2d 835 (2002) ("In determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction").
There appear to be three general considerations under the statute. The first is whether the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. If the court finds the text of the statute to be clear and unambiguous, the court must nonetheless continue its analysis and consider whether the meaning of the statute remains clear and unambiguous in relationship to other statutes. If the court finds that the statutory text fails either of these tests of clarity, on its face or in relation to other statutes, the court may then look to the legislative history of the statute and other "extratextual evidence" to determine the meaning of the underlying enactment. However, even if the statutory language in question is clear and unambiguous on its face and in relation to other statutes, the court may nonetheless rely upon "extratextual evidence" of its meaning if the application of clear statutory language would yield an absurd or unworkable result.
Turning first to the question of whether the language of § CT Page 9886 14-111e is in some way unclear or ambiguous, the court has "defined the term ambiguous to mean that the text is susceptible of more than one plausible meaning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 150-51, 848 A.2d 451 (2004) (Borden, J., concurring). "Where a statute does not define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, 273 Conn. 287, 292, 869 A.2d 1193 (2005). In this case, the word "involving" is not defined. However, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1997) defines "involve" in pertinent part as "to enfold or envelop so as to encumber," or "to have within or as part of itself: INCLUDE."
Applying these principles to § 14-111e, the DMV suspension statute at issue in this case, the court finds the statutory language in question to have more than one plausible meaning. Section 14-111e could be fairly read to mean that, as a prerequisite to license suspension, a minor must violate the prohibitions on both the purchase and possession of alcohol set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of § 30-89, as suggested by the appellants. However, in the alternative, it is equally plausible that § 14-111e is applicable to any violation of § 30-89, and then refers to the subject matter of that statute, which involves subsection (a) regarding purchase of alcohol and subsection (b) regarding possession of alcohol. The fact that § 14-111e refers to and hinges on the violation of a statute included in an entirely different statutory title supports this alternative reading. Thus, § 14-111e appears ambiguous on its face.
For examples where court has found statutory language ambiguous (post- Courchesne), see Teresa v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 742-45, 865 A.2d 428 (2005) (concluding that the language "shall authorize" of the statute is not plain and unambiguous because it does not expressly require the commissioner to take action); see also Spatola v. Ethics Commission of New Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 04 0093159 (August 17, 2004, Pickard, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 674) (concluding that General Statutes § 7-148h is ambiguous with respect to whether public hearings are authorized and turning to the legislative history of the statute to determine its meaning).
In addition, § 14-111e is drafted using unusual, descriptive language following the statutory cross reference to § 30-89. The court finds that the use of such language to describe the subject matter of a cross reference to be sufficiently unusual to warrant a further exploration of the legislative intent of § 14-111e. In fact, § 14-111e is consistently unusual in its reference to the subject matter of both §§ 30-89, as well as 30-88a, another statute prohibiting the misuse of a license to obtain alcohol.
In order to determine whether the cross referencing language of § 14-111e is unusual, the court conducted a search of statutory cross references in titles 14 and 53a of the General Statutes to determine whether the cross references, generally, were followed by language "involving" a description of the subject matter of the statute. Within titles 14 and 53a, the court found the word "involve" and its variations used in fifty different statutes. With the exception of § 14-111e, which uses the word five times, the word was rarely used to describe the subject of a statutory reference or to limit its application. One example can be found in General Statutes § 14-44k(b)(3) where a person is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle if convicted of "evasion of responsibility, involving a commercial motor vehicle, under section 14-224 . . ." There, the statutory reference is to the evasion of responsibility statute, which itself makes no distinction between classes of licensed drivers. Therefore, this is not an instance where there is an attempt to identify or describe a portion or subsection of the evading statute for the purpose of determining a violation. Instead, § 14-44k simply disqualifies a commercial driver from using their commercial license for one year if they violate the evasion law and it is further found that it was done so with a commercial vehicle. Although this is similar to the statute in question in this case, it is not the same as an attempt to describe a violation of a portion or subsection of the referred to statutory provision. In most instances, statutory references in titles 14 and 53a involved the common language of a "violation of," followed by one or more citations to particular sections or subsections of the General Statutes.
Title 14 was selected for the obvious reason of consistency, or the lack of it, within the same title. Title 53a was selected as it represents the penal code, within which the court expects to find relevant cross reference language pertaining to violations of law.
References to the term "involve," as well as all relevant root words, were found in the following statutes in title 14: 14-227a. Operation while under the influence of liquor or drug or while having an elevated blood alcohol content. 14-227b. Implied consent to test operator's blood, breath or urine. Testing procedures. License suspension. Hearing. 14-227c. Blood or breath samples required following accidents resulting in death or serious physical injury. 14-365. Agreement. (Bus Proration Agreement) 14-302. "Yield" signs. 14-282a. Inspection districts for school buses and student transportation vehicles. 14-281c. Report of serious accidents involving school buses or student transportation vehicles. 14-140. When bail may be waived. Failure to appear. Reciprocal agreements. Filing fee for motion to reopen judgment. 14-134. Appeals from commissioner. 14-111m. Notice of failure to comply with a citation. 14-108a. Uniform investigation of accident report. 14-73. Instructor's license. 14-71. Schedule of rates to be filed. 14-54. Location to be approved by local authority. 14-52a. Grounds for refusal to grant or renew dealer and repairer license. 14-12g. Cancellation of motor vehicle registration for violation of mandatory security requirements. Notice. Hearing. Consent agreements. Suspension of motor vehicle operator's license. 14-12a. Registration of certain motor vehicles garaged or operated in Connecticut. 14-44k — Disqualification from operating commercial motor vehicles. 14-111n — Reports of comparable convictions: suspension of license. 14-51 — Definitions. 14-224. Evasion of responsibility in operation of motor vehicles. Racing. Required removal of motor vehicle from traveled portion of highway.
References to the term "involve," as well as all relevant root words, were found the following statutes in title 53a: 53a-40. Persistent offenders — definitions, 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences. 53a-119. Larceny defined. 53a-260. Location of offense. 53a-39c. Community service labor program. 53a-22. Use of physical force in making arrest or preventing escape. 53a-19. Use of physical force in defense of person. 53a-282. Money laundering. Presumptions. 53a-300. Act of terrorism. Enhanced sentence. 53a-223b. Criminal violation of a restraining order: Class A misdemeanor. 53a-217. Criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D felony. 53a-180. Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree: Class D felony. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor. 53a-21. Use of physical force in defense of property. 53-206b. Unlawful training in use of firearms, explosive or incendiary devices or techniques capable of causing injury. Class C felony. 53a-185. Loitering on school grounds: Class C misdemeanor. 53a-136a. Robbery involving occupied motor vehicle. Penalty. 53a-117m. Damage to railroad property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. 53a-117. Criminal mischief in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. 53a-110. Affirmative defenses to criminal trespass. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony. 53a-61aa. Threatening in the first degree: Class D felony. 53a-193. Definitions. (Obscenity and related offenses). 53a-16a. Affirmative defense in certain situations involving firearms; exceptions. 53a-28. Authorized sentences. 53a-217c. Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver: Class D felony. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. 53a-117. Criminal mischief in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
The question arises as to whether the use of unusual cross reference language gives rise to sufficient ambiguity to cross the threshold established by the plain meaning statute, permitting judicial review of extratextual evidence of legislative intent. In this case, the court finds that the use of unusual language in a statute, in relationship to other statutory language, to be sufficiently ambiguous to seek extratextual evidence of its meaning.
Looking next to the statutory scheme of the Liquor Control Act, General Statutes § 30-1 et seq., there are numerous provisions directed at preventing underage drinking. The Liquor Control Act not only prohibits the purchase of alcohol by minors, but also prohibits the possession of alcohol by minors in public places. Over the course of many years, the General Assembly has tied liquor control violations by minors to the motor vehicle licensing laws of our state. In 1978, the legislature prohibited the misrepresentation of age and the misuse of a license to obtain alcohol, now codified in § 30-88a. In 1993, the legislature tied a violation of § 30-88a to an operator's license suspension. Subsequently, in 1996, the legislature applied the license suspension provisions of § 14-111e to violations of § 30-89 "involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor."
The court notes that the 1993 enactment used the word "involving" for the first time in § 14-111e. At that time, the license suspension provision applied to "a violation of 30-88a, involving the misuse of a motor vehicle operator's license." Public Acts 1993, No. 93-315, § 1. Since § 30-88a includes prohibiting misrepresentation of age as well as misuse of a license, without using separate subsections, this language may have been an attempt to bifurcate the statute and apply the license suspension provision of § 14-111e to only one of the two prohibitions included within the statute. A review of the legislative history of the 1993 enactment fails to elucidate this issue.
The appellants argue that the DMV license suspension statute properly applies to § 30-88a, which prohibits the misuse of a license to obtain liquor, because there is a rational relationship between misuse of a license and the resulting suspension. They contend, however, that no such nexus exists between possession of liquor by a minor and the suspension of his or her license. The court finds this argument to be unavailing and, in fact, finds that it further supports this court's decision to review extratextual evidence in order to determine the legislative intent of § 14-111e. Under the construction urged by the appellants, if a minor were to purchase liquor on behalf of another minor, either by misrepresenting his age or by misusing his license, that minor would be subject to the suspension provisions of § 14-111e. The minor who received the liquor and then possessed it in public in violation of section 30-89(b) would not, however, be subject to the suspension provisions of § 14-111e even though it is likely that such a minor would now pose a greater potential danger of underage drinking and driving than the minor who purchased the alcohol in the first instance. Therefore, if the court were to adopt the appellants' interpretation of the DMV suspension statute it would lead to an absurd and inconsistent result, undermining the statutory scheme of the Liquor Control Act wherein the minor who purchased the alcohol would be punished with the loss of his or her driver's license, but the minor who possessed the fruits of that purchase would escape equal punishment.
There is a clear public policy against underage drinking and driving. Although the penalty for operating under the influence is the same for minors and adults, the permissible blood-alcohol content (BAC) for minors is set by statute at .02, compared with .08 for adults. See General Statutes §§ 14-227a and 14-227g.
D. Extratextual Evidence of Legislative Intent
The court has determined that the language of § 14-111e is capable of two different meanings, is ambiguous in relationship to other statutory provisions and, if the appellants' view is adopted, could lead to an absurd result. Therefore, the court finds § 1-2z does not prohibit the court from considering extratextual evidence to determine the legislative intent of the statute. "When [a court] must consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of a statute, [it may also look] to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomes v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 87 Conn.App. 416, 423, 866 A.2d 704 (2005).
In order to determine the legislative intent of § 14-111e, the court needs to look no further than the floor debate on the adoption of Substitute for Senate Bill 204, An Act Increasing Penalties to Minors for Violations of the Liquor Laws. The language that was ultimately adopted by the legislature originated in the House of Representatives by way of an amendment. Representative Fox, the Chairperson of the Joint Committee on General Law, the committee of origination, stated on the floor of the House that "if one . . . has been convicted of 14-89, which relates to the possession of alcohol by a minor, then there would be a loss of license . . ." 39 H.R.Proc., Pt. 11, 1996 Sess., p. 3777-78. This was echoed by the comments of his co-chair, Senator Kissel, who on the floor of the Senate stated that the bill was intended to apply to any minor who is determined to have "violated any of the laws regarding [a] minor's possession of alcohol, that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles will suspend their license to drive . . ." 39 S.Proc., Pt. 6, 1996 Sess., p. 1949.
Substitute for Senate Bill 204, engrossed as Public Acts 1996, No. 96-199, provides: Section 14-111e of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof: The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend, for a period of [not more than thirty] NINETY days, the motor vehicle operator's license OR NONRESIDENT OPERATING PRIVILEGE of any person convicted of a violation of section 30-88a involving the misuse of a motor vehicle operator's license OR SECTION 30-89 INVOLVING THE PURCHASE AND POSSESSION OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR BY A MINOR. (Bracketed language is repealed. Upper case language is new.)
Although Senator Kissel was commenting upon different language than was ultimately adopted, his purpose for this legislation could not have been made more clearly. The language "involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor" was adopted in the House at a later date.
The House amendment added the language "involving the purchase and possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor" to § 14-111e, which is the focus of this court's deliberations. From language clearly expressed on the floor of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, the intention of the proponents of the bill containing this language was to suspend the driver's license of any minor found to be in violation of subsection (b) of § 30-89 involving the possession of alcohol. Therefore, since § 14-111e, the suspension statute, does not make reference to either of the two subsections of 30-89 — subsection (a) for purchase, or subsection (b) for possession — the language following this statutory reference is not intended to limit its application to instances where both subsections have been violated and, instead, must be construed by the court to be a reference, albeit unusual, to the subject matter of the statute.
Section 14-111e, prior to the enactment of Public Acts 1996, No. 96-199, included similar language following a cross-reference to § 14-88a, which prohibits the misrepresentation of one's age to obtain alcohol, as well as the misuse of an operator's license to obtain alcohol. Section CT Page 9895 14-111e(a) provides for license suspension of ". . . any person under the age of twenty-one who has been convicted of a violation of section 30-88a involving the misuse of an operator's license . . ." It is interesting to note that this original DMV suspension provision may have been intended to bifurcate the single section provision of § 14-88a and apply the suspension only to the misuse of an operator's license, and not to misrepresenting one's age in some other fashion to obtain alcohol. (See footnote number 9.) When § 14-111e was amended by Public Acts 1996, No. 96-199, the language following the reference to § 14-89, "involving the purchase and possession," may have been used for language consistency within the statute.
IV. Conclusion
The DMV's interpretation of § 14-111e in these cases is not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Therefore, the court sustains the suspension of the appellants' licenses to operate motor vehicles.
BY THE COURT
Mark H. Taylor, Judge