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Culver v. Pierson

COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY
Sep 14, 1888
15 A. 269 (Ch. Div. 1888)

Opinion

09-14-1888

CULVER v. PIERSON et al.

G. A. Angle, for complainant. J. M. Roseberry and L. De Witt Taylor, for defendants.


Bill for relief.

G. A. Angle, for complainant. J. M. Roseberry and L. De Witt Taylor, for defendants.

BIRD, V. C. In 1872 Wilson Pierson died, leaving a last will, and leaving two children and two grandchildren. He devised all his real estate to his son and daughter, William and Pelatiah, for and during the term of their natural lives and the life of the survivor of them. He also gave to them and to the survivor of them, for and during the term of their natural lives, all his personal estate, after the payment of his debts and the settlement of his estate. The testator then declared that both of said gifts were subject to the burden of both of said grandchildren having their homes on the premises, with William and Pelatiah, until they became 21 years of age, in the same manner as they had had their homes with the testator during his life-time. At the death of his son and daughter, the testator gave all of his estate, both real and personal, to his said two grandchildren, and to the survivor of them. The executor named in the will refused to qualify, and the son William was appointed administrator with the will annexed. As such, he filed an inventory of the personal estate, amounting to $1,734. In this were promissory notes of the value of over $1,300. In February, 1875, William purchased a farm, for which he paid $3,100. He and his sister lived together until July 25, 1887, when William departed this life, intestate. T. P. Hoppler was appointed administrator of his estate. William died without ever having filed any account, or having made any settlement or adjustment of his accounts with his sister or with his nephew. As William died in July, 1887, in September his sister filed a bill in this court against William's administrator and his heirs at law,charging that William had invested over $1,300 of the assets of his father's estate in the farm which he purchased in 1875, which farm he continued to hold at his death, and praying that the land might be declared liable for that amount. Before the cause could be heard, Pelatiah died. Silas, one of the grandchildren, was substituted as complainant, having previously purchased the interest of his brother. He filed a supplemental bill, in which he set up the facts as they were presented by the death of both the life-tenants, who were the children of the testator. He, too, prayed that the said moneys might be declared to be a lien on the lands so purchased by William.

It is insisted on the part of the defendants that the claim is stale, and that, if the complainant ever had any rights as against the defendants, they have been lost by the laches, both on the part of Pelatiah and of the present complainant. In considering this, it will be borne in mind that the estate was held in trust by William, and that the courts look with favor on the prayers of those who ask for aid in the recovery of such funds, and grant to them all reasonable indulgence. This bill was filed within 13 years after the alleged conversion of these funds by William. In the mean time William died. In my judgment, in the light of the many cases on the subject, the claim cannot be regarded as stale. See to this effect the principles and the authorities which support them in 1 Perry, Trusts, §§ 228, 230; also Smith v. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq. 302. It was also urged that the administrator of Pelatiah should have been brought into court, so that her rights, if any, might be adjusted in this suit. It may be that she has some interest in this fund. But let us see as to that. The money claimed is the principal, and nothing else. Whatever interest may have accrued to Pelatiah, in her life-time, was due to her at her death, and remains due to her administrator. The administrator alone is entitled to that, and plainly he alone can bring suit therefor. That is a distinct claim or cause of action; and it seems to me that the joinder of the administrator in this suit would have been not only a misjoinder of parties, but; of causes, and therefore multifarious. If the complainant has any interest in the estate of his aunt, he must claim it through her administrator, after the rights of creditors and the expense of settling the estate are all paid. In a word, it seems to me that the rights of the respective parties to the estate of Pelatiah are separated, and wholly independent, and that good pleading does not require that they should be joined. It is also said that the complainant should be dismissed, because he did not first cite the administrator of William to account in the orphans' court, and by such account learn the true balance in the hands of such administrator, which represents moneys of the estate of the testator of Wilson Pierson, deceased. There is, perhaps, one very satisfactory answer to this, i. e., that the orphans' court could not declare or enforce the lien prayed for in case it should be found to exist. This fact gives this court jurisdiction, and, having this, it is the practice of the court to proceed to the final adjustment and settlement of the rights of the parties. That moneys misemployed by the trustees may be followed by the cestui que trust can no longer be seriously questioned. Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N. J. Eq. 158; Van Syckle v. Kline, Id. 332; Gogherty v. Bennett, 37 N. J. Eq. 87; Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 N. J. Eq. 549; Lathrop v. Gilbert, 10 N. J. Eq. 344; Blauvelt v. Ackerman, 20 N. J. Eq. 141, 148; 1 Perry, Trusts, §§ 127-129; Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 429, 587, 920, 928, 1049, 1058. Did William Pierson, at the time of the purchase of the farm sought to be brought under a lien, have such trust moneys which he used in making the purchase? Although 16 years have elapsed between the granting of letters to William and the filing of this bill, yet, considering the way the administrator managed the estate, I cannot but think it is the plain duty of the court to hold that the burden of showing a proper disposition of the assets which came to his hands devolves on the defendant Hoppler, administrator of William Pierson. During the 14 years that William survived after he became administrator, he never filed any account; inthis he was grossly negligent. After he took the oath of office, all he did was to file an inventory of the personal estate, amounting to $1,734. Now, the plain presumption of law is that he was possessed of the whole of that estate so inventoried at the time of his death, excepting only those small disbursements incident to procuring letters, filing an inventory, and the funeral expenses. It was his duty to file an account, and to make appear, by the records and by his vouchers, the exact condition of the estate. While this last consideration does not relieve the complainant of the burden of showing that the moneys which he alleged were used by William were so used, it undoubtedly, under the circumstances of this case, makes that burden less onerous than it otherwise would be. The circumstances referred to are the moderate means with which William was, at the time, possessed; his actual possession of certain of the notes inventoried three years before; his collection of them just before he made the payment on the farm; and his giving his promissory note for $100 of the purchase money, because he had not sufficient cash to comply with the terms of the sale. The proof is that, just before William made this payment on this farm, he sold a horse belonging to the estate for $128, and collected the moneys therefor; and that he also collected the amount due on a promissory note belonging to the estate of $128.78; and likewise certain notes given by one or more persons by the name of Beers. These are all of the notes that I can trace to the farm so purchased. I believe that more of the moneys of the estate were collected by William, and used in paying for this farm, but the testimony does not enable me to say how much that additional amount was. Nor can I tell the amount of the Beers notes that were collected and paid as part of his purchase money. The inventory shows only the value of the notes, giving neither names of makers nor dates; and not a single witness spoke of the value of the Beers notes. Although one of the nephews had often seen and handled these notes, he failed to give the amounts of them, except the $128.78 as named above. I do not forget that Mrs. Green swore that William Pierson told her that he had collected all of the money due on these notes, and that that, with what he had of his own, enabled him to pay all that was due on the farm except $100; but it does not appear when he collected any of the notes except those named above. That he did collect them all is to me as plain as such a disputed point can very well be made; but the difficulty does not end with the collection. The money must be traced to this farm; for 1 believe the law to be that, in order to establish a lien in such case, you must so trace the trust funds; it not being enough to prove that the trustee collected the moneys and afterwards bought an estate and took the title in his own name. Such funds may go towards swelling the estate of the trustee, as I believe they did in this case; but those particular moneys may have been expended by him in various ways, and at times long gone before he bought the farm now sought to be held. I will advise a decree charging the farm in question with the sum of $256.78, and with the interest on that sum from the time that William accepted his deed, and also the costs of this suit.


Summaries of

Culver v. Pierson

COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY
Sep 14, 1888
15 A. 269 (Ch. Div. 1888)
Case details for

Culver v. Pierson

Case Details

Full title:CULVER v. PIERSON et al.

Court:COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY

Date published: Sep 14, 1888

Citations

15 A. 269 (Ch. Div. 1888)