Opinion
22-3197
05-29-2024
JIMMIE LEE CULLEY, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RODNEY MILLER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted May 28, 2024[*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division. No. 3:19-cv-00023-MPB-SEB Matthew P. Brookman, Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
ORDER
Jimmie Culley sued sheriff's deputies, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force during his arrest. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A magistrate judge, presiding with the parties' consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), entered summary judgment for the defendants. Culley appeals, challenging the ruling that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim. Because the deputies did not violate a clearly established right, we affirm.
In reviewing the adverse summary-judgment decision, we recite the facts most favorably to Culley. See Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2019). When the arrest occurred, Culley lived with his brother, Scott, who had called the police on March 10, 2018, to complain that Culley shoved him during a dispute and he "didn't want anything else to escalate." Deputies Matthew Gardner and Logan Osborne of the Sheriff's Office of Vanderburgh County, Indiana, responded. They first talked to Scott, who reported Culley's physical aggression, and then knocked on Culley's bedroom door. When Culley opened the door, he had a drink in his hand and seemed intoxicated to Gardner and Osborne, who feared that he might be unpredictable and dangerous as a result. Gardner grabbed Culley's right arm to arrest him. Culley told them that, because of a previous shoulder injury, he could not be cuffed behind his back, and he "lunged" at them. When a dog in the home then jumped on Osborne's leg, the deputies took Culley to the garage. One of the deputies turned Culley toward a wall and pushed him to the ground, which produced cuts on Culley's wrists. The deputies then picked him up, cuffed him, and shoved him in a police car. Other officers came to the scene to administer a breath test (revealing a blood-alcohol level of 0.13) and to review the use of force, which they deemed proper. After his arrest, Culley spent two days in the local jail, where staff allegedly ignored his requests for medical treatment.
Culley later pleaded guilty to domestic battery and resisting arrest. He admitted that he "knowingly and forcibly resisted law enforcement officers" while those officers were lawfully engaged in their duties and that he "lunged forward" when the deputies were arresting him. He received a one-year suspended sentence.
After Culley sued the two deputies and others, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge (who has since become a district judge) entered summary judgment for Gardner and Osborn, ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim. The judge dismissed the claims against the other defendants because they were not personally involved in Culley's arrest or medical care at the jail.
On appeal, Culley contests only the excessive-force ruling, which we review de novo. See Humphries v. Milwaukee County, 702 F.3d 1003, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012). Culley contends that the deputies violated a clearly established right by shoving him to the ground despite his shoulder injury. Public officials are immune from § 1983 suits unless "(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was 'clearly established at the time.'" District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). To be clearly established, the law must be "sufficiently clear" such that "every 'reasonable official would understand that what he is doing' is unlawful." Wesby, 583. U.S. at 63 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). We can address the second prong first, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), and do so here because it is dispositive.
When defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must identify a legal decision showing that the claimed right as applied to the plaintiff's case was clearly established, see Humphries, 702 F.3d at 1006; Culley points us to none. He cites Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that "officers do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever." But Culley was not an innocent and unprovoked citizen. When the deputies encountered him, he appeared intoxicated; they reasonably feared that he might become dangerous, and he became so when, as Culley later admitted in state court, he lunged at them and resisted arrest before they pushed him to the ground. "Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citation omitted). We recognize that officers may not respond to the wrongdoing of resisting arrest by meting out punishment "on the spot" with "fists or weapons." Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2008). They may, however, "use force reasonably necessary to subdue an aggressor." Id. And Culley has cited no case suggesting that the shove to the ground-after he lunged at the police and resisted arrest despite his declared shoulder injury-was not a reasonable effort to subdue him. Because he has not shown a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right, summary judgment was proper.
AFFIRMED.
[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).