Opinion
INDEX NO. 503488/2017
07-07-2019
TYRONE CULLER, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, KINGS COUNTY SURROGATE'S COURT, KINGS COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR, RICHARD BUCKHEIT, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND XYZ CORP. 1-10, Defendants.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22 PRESENT: HON. PAUL WOOTEN Justice SEQ NO. 1
The following papers were read on this motion by plaintiff.
| PAPERS NUMBERED | |
|---|---|
| Notice of Motion/ Order to Show Cause — Affidavits — Exhibits | 1, 2 |
| Answering Affidavits — Exhibits (Memo) | 3 |
| Replying Affidavits (Reply Memo) | 4, 5 |
| Transcript | 6 |
This is an action commenced by Tyrone Culler (plaintiff) against the defendants for, inter alia, racial discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation and defamation/libel. Before the Court is a motion by defendants New York State Unified Court System and Kings County Surrogate's Court (collectively, the Court defendants), pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) and (7), for an Order dismissing plaintiff's Verified Complaint as asserted against them.
BACKGROUND
According to the Verified Complaint, plaintiff is an African-American male who has been employed by the City of New York as a community assistant/case manager assigned to the Kings County Office of the Public Administrator (KCPA) located at the Kings County Surrogate's Court since 2014. In his Verified Complaint, plaintiff alleges that since he was appointed as the Kings County Public Administrator in 2015, defendant Richard Buckheit (Buckheit) has engaged in racial discrimination against plaintiff. Specifically, the Verified Complaint alleges that Buckheit changed plaintiff's desk assignment after a Caucasian employee complained about him, suspended plaintiff after he corrected the work of a Caucasian employee, demoted plaintiff after he requested that a union representative be present at a meeting between him and Buckheit, made a statement that plaintiff stole the assets of a decedent's estate, suspended plaintiff for 30 days without pay after plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with KCPA's Equal Employment Opportunity Office, and published a statement to KCPA staff that plaintiff unlawfully took money from a member of the public.
By Summons and Verified Complaint dated February 20, 2017, plaintiff brought the instant action against, among others, the Court defendants and Buckheit. With respect to the Court defendants, the Complaint sets forth several causes of action alleging the following: they violated Executive Law § 296 et seq. (the New York State Human Rights Law [NYSHRL]) by discriminating against him on the basis of race (first) and retaliating against him (third), and promoting a hostile work environment (fifth) and violated New York City Administrative Code § 8-107 et seq. (the New York City Human Rights Law [NYCHRL]) by discriminating against him on the basis of race (second), retaliating against him (fourth), and promoting a hostile work environment (sixth). The Complaint also alleges causes of action against the Court defendants sounding in defamation and libel per se (seventh) and negligent supervision (eighth).
The Court defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) and (7), based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the failure to state a claim. In particular, the Court defendants argue that plaintiff's NYCHRL claims, as well as his defamation and libel per se and negligent supervision claims against them are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In support of this argument, the Court defendants initially note that, as part of the Judicial Branch of the New York State government, they are instrumentalities of the State of New York. The Court defendants further note that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State cannot be sued for the acts of its officers, agents or employees unless the State waives such immunity or consents to such a lawsuit. According to the Court defendants, the Court of Claims is the only tribunal in which the State has consented to being sued for money claims arising from the acts of its officers, agents, or employees. Under the circumstances, the Court defendants maintain that plaintiff's libel per se and negligent supervision claims against them must be dismissed inasmuch as plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the tortious conduct of their purported employee/agent.
Further, with respect to plaintiff's claims against them under the NYCHRL, the Court defendants contend that the City of New York does not have the authority to waive the State's sovereign immunity by promulgating the NYCHRL. Accordingly, the Court defendants argue that, as instrumentalities of the State, they are not subject to the provisions of the NYCHRL. In support of this contention, the Court defendants rely on the Appellate Division, Second Department's ruling in Jattan v Queens Coll. of City Univ. of N.Y., 64 AD3d 540 [2d Dept 2009].
Finally, the Court defendants argue that plaintiff's tort and NYSHRL claims against them must be dismissed inasmuch as the allegations in the Complaint fail to state a claim against them. In this regard, the Court defendants note that the Complaint alleges that plaintiff was controlled and supervised solely by Buckheit. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Buckheit determined plaintiff's title, salary, and work location, monitored plaintiff's work performance, and disciplined plaintiff. The Court defendants further note that the Complaint alleges that plaintiff is employed by, and receives his salary from, the City of New York and the KCPA. The Court defendants also contend that they do not oversee the operations of the KCPA or supervise the work of Buckheit. In this regard, the Court defendants note that under the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act (SCPA), the salaries of the KCPA and its staff are paid by, and expressly required to be included in the annual budget of the City of New York. In addition, all commissions received by the KCPA are to be deposited in the City's treasury and subject to audit by the City Comptroller. The Court defendants also note that, under § 1110 of the SCPA, the City is responsible for the faithful execution by the KCPA of the duties of that office and is subject to suit for the misconduct and negligence of the KCPA. Under the circumstances, the Court defendants maintain that plaintiff has not and cannot allege facts that would justify holding them liable for defamation per se, negligent supervision, or for the actions of Buckheit under the NYSHRL since, as a matter of law, the City supervises and controls the operations of the KCPA.
In opposition to the Court defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff initially notes that, under applicable case law, his claims against the Court defendants under the NYSHRL are not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity since, when it enacted the law, the legislature made its provisions applicable to the State. In addition, plaintiff argues that he has stated a claim against the Court defendants inasmuch as the City and the Court defendants acted as a single employer with respect to plaintiff and are jointly liable for the discriminatory actions taken against him. In support of this argument, plaintiff notes that the Court defendants appointed Buckheit to his position as Commissioner of the KCPA. Plaintiff further argues that the Court defendants oversee the operation of the KCPA. In this regard, plaintiff submits a partial copy of the "Guidelines for the Operations of the Offices of the Public Administrators of New York State," which was enacted by the Administrative Board for the Offices of the Public Administrators. Plaintiff also submits a list of the members sitting on this Administrative Board, which includes several Judges of the Surrogate's Court as well as an individual from the Office of Court Administration. Under the circumstances, plaintiff maintains that he has stated a claim against the Court defendants under the NYSHRL because they, along with the City, functioned as his employer. Plaintiff further contends that since the Court defendants functioned as his employer, he has stated claims against them sounding in negligent supervision as well as libel perse.
In reply to plaintiff's opposition papers, the Court defendants note that plaintiff has not addressed their arguments that his negligent supervision and libel per se claims, as well as his claims under the NYCHRL are barred inasmuch as the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. The Court defendants further contend that plaintiff's claims under the NYSHRL must be dismissed since plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing him to be a court employee with the standing to assert a discrimination claim against them based upon their own actions, or the actions of their agent. Further, the Court defendants argue that the Administrative Board's guidelines are concerned with the Public Administrator's public duty to administer the property of persons who die intestate, and do not concern internal KCPA operations such as personnel management and supervision. Under the circumstances, the Court defendants argue that there is no basis for plaintiff's NYSHRL claims against them.
STANDARD OF LAW
CPLR 3211(a), provides that:
"a party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that:
[2] the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause of action;
[7] the pleading fails to state a cause of action."
Subject matter jurisdiction "refers to objections that are 'fundamental to the power of adjudication of a court.' 'Lack of jurisdiction' should not be used to mean merely 'that elements of a cause of action are absent,' but that the matter before the court was not the kind of matter on which the court had power to rule" (Garcia v Government Employees Ins. Co., 130 AD3d 870, 871 [2d Dept 2015], quoting Manhattan Telecommunications Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc., 21 NY3d 200, 203 [2013]). "A court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when it lacks the competence to adjudicate a particular kind of controversy in the first place" (Lischinskaya v Carnival Corp., 56 AD3d 116, 122 [2d Dept 2008], quoting Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat. Assn. v Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d 239, 243 [2d Dept 2007]). "As the Court of Appeals has observed, [t]he question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of judicial power: whether the court has the power, conferred by the Constitution or statute, to entertain the case before it" (Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat. Assn., 42 AD3d at 243 [internal quotations and citation omitted]).
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court should "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Biro v Roth, 121 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2014]; Parekh v Cain, 96 AD3d 812, 815 [2d Dept 2012]). "'[T]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law[,] a motion for dismissal will fail'" (Gawrych v Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan, 148 AD3d 681, 682 [2d Dept 2017], quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). "Nevertheless, bare legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the record are not presumed to be true" (Gawrych, 148 AD3d at 681 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]).
Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove his or her claims, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss (Biro v Roth, 121 AD3d at 735; see Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34, 38 [2d Dept 2006]). "Such a motion should be granted where, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action" (id.).
DISCUSSION
A. NYCHRL Claims - second , fourth , sixth causes of action
It is well-established that the Unified Court System is an arm of the State and would thus be entitled to sovereign immunity (see e.g. Gollomp v Spitzer, 568 F3d 355 [2d Cir 2009]). With regard to the NYCHRL, the Appellate Division, Second Department has held that "the City of New York does not have the power to waive the State's sovereign immunity by passing an antidiscrimination code provision applicable to instrumentalities of the State" (Jattan, 64 AD3d at 542; see Khalil v State of New York, 17 Misc 3d 777 [Sup Ct, New York County 2007]; Feingold v New York, 366 F3d 138, 149 [2d Cir 2004]). As instrumentalities of the State, the Court defendants are not subject to the provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law (see Jattan, 64 AD3d at 542). Furthermore, although plaintiff's opposition papers ostensibly oppose that branch of the Court defendants' motion which seeks dismissal of his NYCHRL claims, at oral argument on the record before the Court, plaintiff's attorney conceded that the NYCHRL claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity (see Court Tr. dated October 20, 2017 at 9, lines 7-25). Accordingly, the Court defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's second, fourth, and sixth causes of action against them is granted.
B. Defamation/Libel Per Se and Negligent Supervision Claims - seventh and eighth causes of action
Since the adoption of the Court of Claims Act (L 1929, ch 467) the State has been subject to suit for damages, but only in the Court of Claims (see, Court of Claims Act § 8; NY Const, art VI, § 9). The Court of Claims has limited jurisdiction to hear actions against the State itself, or actions naming State agencies or officials as defendants, where the action is, in reality, one against the State--i.e., where the State is the real party in interest (Morell v Balasubramanian, 70 NY2d 297, 300 [1987]).
Generally, actions against State officers acting in their official capacity in the exercise of governmental functions are deemed to be, in essence, claims against the State and, therefore, suable only in the Court of Claims (see id.; see also Borawski v Abulafia, 117 AD3d 662, 663 [2d Dept 2014]; Court of Claims Act § 9[2]).
Plaintiff's Complaint seeks monetary damages against the Court defendants, instrumentalities of the State, under the common-law torts of negligent supervision and libel and defamation per se. However, "[t]he Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for money damages against State agencies, departments, and employees acting in their official capacity in the exercise of governmental functions" (Dinerman v NYS Lottery, 58 AD3d 669, 669 [2d Dept 2009]; see Borawski, 117 AD3d at 663; Peterson v New York City Dept. of Environmental Protection, 66 AD3d 1027 [2d Dept 2009]). Accordingly, plaintiff's seventh and eighth causes of action must be dismissed inasmuch as this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims (Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 197 [1996]; Washington v Baruch (City Univ. of NY) Coll., 221 AD2d 163, 164 [1st Dept 1995]).
Given this Court's finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's seventh and eighth causes of action, the Court shall not address the Court defendants' alternative argument that these causes of action fail to state a claim.
C. NYSHRL Claims - first , third , and fifth causes of action
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the NYSHRL claims against the Court defendants inasmuch as the State Legislature waived sovereign immunity when it passed this law and made its provisions applicable to the State (Koerner v State of NY, Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442 [1984]). Moreover, as the Court in Koerner noted, the Legislature, in passing the NYSHRL and granting the State Division of Human Rights the power to award compensatory damages against an employer, provided implicit consent that the State can be sued in a forum other than the Court of Claims (see id. at 449; Kimmel v State, 29 NY3d 386, 393-394 [2017] [Human Rights Law claims seeking monetary relief against the State could be brought in Supreme Court]). Thus, the issue before the Court is whether or not the Complaint states a claim against the Court defendants under the NYSHRL.
The Court notes that the Complaint alleges, and it is not otherwise in dispute, that plaintiff as well as Buckheit are employees of the City of New York (see Ganzman v Hess, 273 AD2d 352, 353 [2d Dept 2000]; Gryga v Ganzman, 991 F Supp 105, 109-110 [ED NY 1998]). In this regard, as the Court defendants have pointed out, under the SCPA, the salaries of the KCPA and its staff are paid by, and expressly required to be included in the annual budget of the City (see Ganzman, 273 AD2d at 353; SCPA § 1108[1]; General Municipal Law § 50-k[1] [a] and [e]). However, it is the Court defendants that placed Buckheit as the Commissioner of the Public Administrator for Kings County. Thus, the question of whether or not the Court defendants are subject to liability as employers under the NYSHRL centers around the issue of whether or not the Court defendants and the City may be deemed plaintiff and Buckheit's single employer.
"The standards for recovery under the NYSHRL are similar to the federal standards under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), and New York courts look to federal cases for guidance" (Macchio v Michaels Elect. Supply Corp., 149 AD3d 716, 719 [2d Dept 2017]; see Chiara v Town of New Castle, 126 AD3d 111 [2d Dept 2015]). Federal courts have applied the single employer doctrine in determining whether employees of interrelated entities may be aggregated for purposes of determining whether an entity is an "employer" subject to Title VII (Argyle Realty Assoc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 65 AD3d 273, 279 [2d Dept 2009]).
The single employer doctrine sets forth four criteria to determine whether two or more companies are sufficiently interrelated to constitute a single entity: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership or financial control of the entities in question (see id. at 278-279; see also Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 70 [3d Dept 2005]). "Of the four criteria, centralized control of labor relations is generally considered the most significant" (Argyle Realty Assoc., 65 AD3d at 279). Centralized control is determined by what entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to the person claiming discrimination (Strauss, 26 AD3d at 71).
Here, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that the Court defendants exercised control over the employment matters underlying plaintiff's discrimination claims. Specifically, the Complaint does not allege that the Court defendants had any authority to hire, transfer, promote, discharge or discipline plaintiff. Rather, all of the discriminatory actions, including desk assignments, suspensions, demotions, and retaliation are alleged to have been carried out by KCPA Buckheit. Further, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that the Court defendants exercised control over Buckheit with respect to internal, day-to-day employee matters such as suspensions, demotions, and desk assignments. In this regard, the provisions in the Administrative Board's Guidelines which plaintiff relies upon concern the Public Administrator's duties to the public and contain no guidelines regarding the supervision and control of the Public Administrator's employees.
While it is true, as plaintiff points out in his opposition papers, that the Court defendants have the authority to appoint and discharge the KCPA, in the absence of allegations or evidence that the Court defendants exercised control over the day-to-day supervision of KCPA employees, this is insufficient to establish that the Court defendants and the City acted as a single employer so as to state a claim against the Court defendants under the NYSHRL. Accordingly, plaintiff's first, third, and fifth causes of action against the Court defendants are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the motion by defendants New York State Unified Court System and Kings County Surrogate's Court for an Order, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) and (7), dismissing the Verified Complaint against them is granted, and Complaint is hereby dismissed in its entirety as against said defendants; and it is further,
ORDERED that counsel for defendants New York State Unified Court System and Kings County Surrogate's Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry upon the plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court who is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: 7/7/19
/s/ _________
PAUL WOOTEN J.S.C.