Opinion
No. 2022-102-Appeal. PC 21-314
04-26-2023
John J. CULLEN et al. v. TOWN OF LINCOLN.
Timothy K. Baldwin, Esq., for Plaintiff. Anthony DeSisto, Esq., for Defendant.
Timothy K. Baldwin, Esq., for Plaintiff.
Anthony DeSisto, Esq., for Defendant.
ORDER
The plaintiff, John J. Cullen (Mr. Cullen), appeals from a final judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Town of Lincoln (the town), and denying his cross-motion for summary judgment. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may decide this appeal without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this order, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Barbara T. Cullen was a plaintiff in the underlying action but did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise join in this appeal.
On January 14, 2021, Mr. Cullen filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the town violated the statute governing the award of municipal contracts, G.L. 1956 chapter 55 of title 45 (Municipal Contracts Act), in constructing its high school (the project). The town filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in its papers, in part, that Mr. Cullen lacked standing to file suit and that the case was moot because the project was complete. Mr. Cullen filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that he had standing as a taxpayer and, alternatively, that the court should apply the substantial public interest exception to the standing requirement and issue a declaratory judgment. He further argued that an exception to the mootness doctrine applied because the case presented an issue that was capable of repetition.
In a comprehensive written decision dated January 20, 2022, a justice of the Superior Court concluded that Mr. Cullen lacked standing and that the matter was moot. The trial justice thereafter entered final judgment in favor of the town, and Mr. Cullen filed a timely notice of appeal.
Mr. Cullen contends that the trial justice erred (1) in rejecting the substantial public interest exception to the standing requirement, and (2) in finding that the case is moot. He urges this Court to apply exceptions to these justiciability doctrines and to reverse and vacate the decision and order of the Superior Court. We decline to do so.
"On rare occasions this court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest." Burns v. Sundlun , 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992) (emphasis added). Relying on In re 38 Studios Grand Jury , 225 A.3d 224 (R.I. 2020), Mr. Cullen argues that the substantial public interest exception applies to the instant matter because the town received state funding and the project attracted significant media coverage. However, In re 38 Studios Grand Jury is easily distinguishable, as it involved a transaction "of immense public interest" that continued to generate statewide, front-page news coverage six years after the fact. In re 38 Studios Grand Jury , 225 A.3d at 234. Mr. Cullen cannot demonstrate that the project at issue is newsworthy to the same extent, or that the case otherwise presents a rare or novel issue that justifies overlooking the standing requirement. Compare Burns , 617 A.2d at 116 (applying the substantial public interest exception when "the plaintiff raise[d] a question of statutory interpretation of great importance to citizens in localities that could become home to gambling facilities seeking to simulcast and invite wagering on out-of-state events"); Gelch v. State Board of Elections , 482 A.2d 1204, 1207 (R.I. 1984) (contemplating the substantial public interest exception in the case of an objection to a mayoral candidate's eligibility); Sennott v. Hawksley , 103 R.I. 730, 731-32, 241 A.2d 286, 287 (1968) (applying the substantial public interest exception where a plaintiff sought to enjoin the actions of government officials in relation to a constitutional referendum); with Watson v. Fox , 44 A.3d 130, 138-39 (R.I. 2012) (declining to apply the substantial public interest exception to a declaratory judgment action that challenged the constitutionality of a legislative grant program).
This Court's mootness doctrine applies in all cases that come before us, including where litigants seek declaratory relief. See N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick ex rel. Moore , 964 A.2d 1141, 1144-45 (R.I. 2009) (clarifying that claims under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act must present a justiciable controversy); City of Cranston v. Rhode Island Laborers’ District Council, Local 1033 , 960 A.2d 529, 533 (R.I. 2008) (explaining that the court "must address the threshold issue of justiciability" even if neither party raises the issue). We have recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine for "cases that are ‘of extreme public importance, which [are] capable of repetition but which [evade] review.’ " City of Cranston , 960 A.2d at 533 (quoting Arnold v. Lebel , 941 A.2d 813, 819 (R.I. 2007) ). However, we have explained that matters of extreme public importance generally fall within narrow categories of cases, such as those involving "important constitutional rights, matters concerning a person's livelihood, or matters concerning citizen voting rights." Id. at 533-34 (quoting Cicilline v. Almond , 809 A.2d 1101, 1106 (R.I. 2002) ). We are not persuaded that Mr. Cullen's request for a declaration that the town violated the Municipal Contracts Act is a matter of extreme public importance that is capable of repetition which will evade review. See Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Providence , 754 A.2d 89, 91 (R.I. 2000). We are satisfied that, should the town violate the Municipal Contracts Act in the future, an aggrieved party could seek appropriate relief after the town awards a construction contract and before the work is completed, thereby potentially establishing a live case and controversy.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court without reaching the merits.