(Emphasis added). Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 262, 121 A.2d 637 (1956). "To justify the grant of a variance, the hardship must be substantial, and similarly, the hardship must be shown to be serious, real, and of compelling force, as distinguished from reasons of convenience, profit, or caprice. By way of a guiding principle, it may be said that a variance should be granted where, and only where, the application of the regulation in question to particular property greatly decreases or practically destroys its value for any permitted use, so as to deprive the owner of the land of all beneficial use of the land.
Id., at 276, 624 A.2d 909. Similarly, in Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 260–61, 121 A.2d 637 (1956), and Libby v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 143 Conn. at 52–53, 118 A.2d 894, this court held that properties containing homes with a large number of rooms had been practically confiscated because the prohibitive cost of maintenance meant that they could no longer reasonably be used, sold, or marketed as single-family residences, despite the owners' best efforts. Thus, “to compel such a use would be confiscatory.” Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, at 259, 121 A.2d 637; see also Nielsen v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 120, 124–25, 203 A.2d 606 (1964) (factory building in industrial zone practically confiscated because interior design of building no longer suited for industrial purposes); Lessner v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 151 Conn. 165, 168–70, 195 A.2d 437 (1963) (variance properly granted to permit construction of one story house on vacant lot because property “cannot be used for any permitted purpose without a variance”).
Except where otherwise provided by constitutional or statutory provision, an appellate court is without power to make its own independent findings of fact. See Culinary Institute of America v. Board of Zoning App., 143 Conn. 257, 121 A.2d 637 (1956); Paurley v. Harris, 77 Idaho 336, 292 P.2d 765 (1956); Bills v. Boettcher, 116 Ind. App. 631, 65 N.E.2d 495, rehearing denied, 116 Ind. App. 631, 66 N.E.2d 131 (1946); Himelfarb v. Novadel Agene Corp., 305 Mass. 446, 26 N.E.2d 320 (1940). The rationale underlying such a prohibition becomes clear in this case.
In Caruso , this court noted prior cases holding that compelling the use of large homes as single-family homes when it would be prohibitively expensive to maintain the homes as such would result in a practical confiscation. Id., at 324–25, 130 A.3d 241, citing Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals , 143 Conn. 257, 260–61, 121 A.2d 637 (1956), and Libby v. Board of Zoning Appeals , 143 Conn. 46, 52–53, 118 A.2d 894 (1955). In Libby , the conclusion that the regulation amounted to a practical confiscation was sustained on the basis of the inability to market the property as a single-family residence.
A zoning regulation that prevents land from being used for its greatest economic potential, however, does not create the exceptional kind of financial hardship that we have deemed to have a "confiscatory or arbitrary" effect. In Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 121 A.2d 637 (1956), a case relied on by DeFrank, where a variance to erect a multiple-family apartment house was granted for land situated in a single-family residence zone, the zoning board had found that the large one-family house on the property could no longer be used as a residence because of the prohibitive cost of maintenance. The zoning board had also found that many similar properties in the area had been converted into multiple apartments, medical offices and one into a convalescent home.
It is well settled that "`"[t]his court cannot find facts, nor, in the first instance, draw conclusions of facts from primary facts found, but can only review such findings to see whether they might legally, logically and reasonably be found."' Wiegert v. Pequabuck Golf Club, Inc., 150 Conn. 387, 391, 190 A.2d 43; State v. Hudson, [ 154 Conn. 631, 634, 228 A.2d 132 (1967)]." State v. Clark, 160 Conn. 555, 556, 274 A.2d 451 (1970); see Kaplan v. Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387, 391, 441 A.2d 629 (1982); Brody v. Dunnigan, 162 Conn. 605, 608, 291 A.2d 227 (1971); Waterford v. Grabner, 155 Conn. 431, 434, 232 A.2d 481 (1967); Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 261, 121 A.2d 637 (1956); Claffey v. Bergin, 121 Conn. 695, 696, 182 A. 16 (1936). It is evident that if the trial court's conclusion that only a hearing in damages was required upon remand is allowed to stand, then the legal principle cited above will be violated. When this matter was previously before us, we stated: "In sum, the defendant Eldridge G. Yost, in both his individual capacity and his capacity as president of the defendant corporation, executed a note in order to obtain certain services of the plaintiff.
While the record reveals the difficulties of access and topography to which his parcel is subject in attempting to develop it for this purpose, Berliner, representing himself before the board, made no showing that this parcel could not reasonably be developed for some other use permitted in a Business 1 zone or that the effect of limiting the parcel to the permitted uses only would be confiscatory or arbitrary. See Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 262, 121 A.2d 637; Libby v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 46, 51, 118 A.2d 894. Although there is some evidence in the record that Berliner controlled the development of the Ramada Inn and Bitco Office Building located upon the remainder of the Business 1 tract and therefore suffered from a self-imposed hardship not warranting relief by variance; Abel v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 172 Conn. 286, 289, 374 A.2d 227; see 2 Yokely, Zoning Law and Practice (3d Ed.) 15-8; the record is insufficient to permit adequate discussion of this issue since the parties failed to brief this issue, we need not consider it in view of the other grounds for disposition presented by this appeal.
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130; Hyatt v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 379, 383, 311 A.2d 77; Damick v. Planning Zoning Commission, 158 Conn. 78, 83, 256 A.2d 428. It is only when the regulation practically destroys or greatly decreases the value of a specific piece of property that relief may be granted, provided it promotes substantial justice. Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 261, 121 A.2d 637. "The extent of that deprivation must be considered in light of the evils which the regulation is designed to prevent." Chevron Oil Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 170 Conn. 146, 152, 365 A.2d 387; see General Statutes 7-147f.
The plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the court erred in holding that the church had proved an exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship which would warrant the granting of the variance; that it erred in failing to hold that the granting of the variance would not be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning regulations and would be contrary to the comprehensive zoning plan; that it erred in failing to find that the defendant board acted in a legislative capacity rather than in a quasi-judicial capacity because it, in effect, rezoned the premises; and that it erred in failing to hold that the defendant board acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion as a matter of law. In response to these contentions the defendants rely heavily on Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 121 A.2d 637, a case in which this court affirmed a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing an appeal from the granting of a variance to allow the erection of a fifty-four-unit apartment building in a residence A zone in New Haven. In that case we said (p. 262): "If the board can reasonably conclude that a zoning regulation practically destroys or greatly decreases the value of a specific piece of property, it may vary the terms of the regulation, provided, of course, that the variance does not materially impair the effectiveness of the zoning regulations as a whole, and provided, further, that the board's action promotes substantial justice."
a variance upon the ground of unnecessary hardship, the record must show that (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character of the locality." Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment of Plan. Zon. Comm. (1962) 254 Iowa 380, 118 N.W.2d 78, 81; Nelson v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Indianapolis (Ind. App. 1959) 158 N.E.2d 167, 174; see Moody v. City of University Park (Tex.Civ.App. 1955) 278 S.W.2d 912, 920. It is generally held that a variance cannot be grounded on a disadvantage common to other property owners in the restricted zone, and that a mere financial disadvantage will not suffice. Application of Groves (1955) 226 S.C. 459, 85 S.E.2d 708, 710, 711; Culinary Institute of Am. v. Board of Zoning App. (1956) 143 Conn. 257, 121 A.2d 637, 639. In Libby v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1955) 143 Conn. 46, 118 A.2d 894, 896, the Court gave its interpretation of "unnecessary hardship" in these terms: