Nor does the complaint allege that the employer took retaliatory actions because of plaintiff's failure to perform those instructions and demands that were set out in the complaint. In Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 443 N.E.2d 1069, it was alleged that the defendant discharged the plaintiff because he was unable to physically perform certain of the duties that had been assigned to him. The court in Cuerton stated:
On the other hand, Illinois courts have consistently held that "[p]arties to an employment at-will contract may terminate it for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, . . . ." Id. 23 Ill.Dec. at 459, 384 N.E.2d at 95 (citations omitted); Zewde v. Elgin Community College, 601 F. Supp. 1237, 1250 (N.D.Ill. 1984) (citing Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 111 Ill.App.3d 261, 66 Ill.Dec. 906, 910, 443 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (1982)). These two principles may appear to conflict.
Indeed, the more recent cases cited by Scott only serve to reconfirm Criscione's vitality. Dykstra v. Crestwood Bank, 117 Ill. App.3d 821, 826, 73 Ill.Dec. 307, 311, 454 N.E.2d 51, 55 (1st Dist. 1983); Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 66 Ill.Dec. 906, 909-910, 443 N.E.2d 1069, 1072-74 (2d Dist. 1982). Count II thus fails to state a claim under Illinois law.
Nevertheless, Illinois courts have consistently ruled that the parties to an employment at-will contract may terminate it for a good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all. See, e.g., Cuerton v. Abbot Laboratories, Inc., 111 Ill.App.3d 261, 263, 66 Ill.Dec. 906, 910, 443 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (1982); Criscione, 66 Ill.App.3d at 669-70, 23 Ill.Dec. at 460, 384 N.E.2d at 95. At first glance, these two principles seem to clash, but Judge Hart has suggested a reconciliation which, we believe, is consistent with how an Illinois court would approach the problem.
That rule has been held to be excepted where the issue on appeal is whether a particular theory was raised by the factual allegations in the complaint. (See Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 265 (deciding sufficiency of a complaint in the context of a section 2-615 motion to dismiss); Krautstrunk, 95 Ill. App.3d at 534-35 (same).) Based on these principles, we must determine whether sufficient facts are stated in plaintiffs' complaint which, if established, would entitle them to relief additional to that alleged under section 19(g).
Giacobbe and Woodside never sought leave to amend their fourth amended counterclaim in the trial court and have therefore waived this issue for purposes of review. Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 267; Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 664, 670. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
Implicit in every express contract in Illinois is the promise that the parties will act in good faith. ( Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 443 N.E.2d 1069; Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc. (1977), 51 Ill. App.3d 568, 366 N.E.2d 561.) There is apparently a divergence of opinion in the appellate districts as to whether the duty creates or could create an action for breach of contract in an at-will employment setting. In Powers v. Delnor Hospital (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 317, 321-22, 481 N.E.2d 968, 972, Hugo v. Tomaszewski (1987), 155 Ill. App.3d 906, 911, 508 N.E.2d 1139, 1142, and Gordon v. Matthew Bender Co. (N.D. Ill. 1983), 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1289-90, the Second and Fifth District Appellate Courts and the Federal District Court held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not create an independent action for breach of contract in the employment at-will setting.
• 13 As defendants point out, the general rule is that if a party appeals the dismissal of his complaint without presenting an amended complaint to the trial court, he waives his right to later amend his complaint. ( Mlade v. Finley (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 914, 445 N.E.2d 1240; Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 443 N.E.2d 1069.) However, as Johnson points out:
• 1 It is settled law in Illinois that an employee at will may be terminated by his employer at any time for any reason or none at all. ( Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co. (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998; Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 443 N.E.2d 1069; Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91.) A narrow exception to the "employment at will" doctrine has been established in those cases wherein an employee can demonstrate that he was terminated in retaliation for his actions, if his termination contravenes the public policy of this State. This common law tort of retaliatory discharge was first recognized in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353. In Kelsay, our supreme court held that the discharge of an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim was tortious and that an employee so harmed could bring suit for retaliatory discharge in an exception to the "employment at will" doctrine.
First, the contractual obligation not to lie about the reasons for termination would have to be derived from the duty of good faith and fair dealing included in every contract as a matter of law. (See Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 261, 263, 443 N.E.2d 1069, 1071.) However, the duty of good faith and fair dealing which the law implies does not create an independent cause of action ( Gordon v. Matthew Bender Co. (N.D. Ill. 1983), 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1289-90), and certainly cannot be interpreted to limit the right to terminate an at-will employment contract.