Such a contention has been previously decided to the contrary. (See San Diego Land etc. Co. v. Neale (1891) 88 Cal. 50, 67 [20 P. 372]; County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal Dist. (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 836 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 60] ; People ex rel. Dept. of Public Wks. v. Murata (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 369, 379-380 [326 P.2d 949]; State of Cal. ex rel. State Pub. Wks. Bd. v. Stevenson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 60, 64 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 742].) To construe and apply Evidence Code section 822, subdivision (d), as urged by plaintiff would, in this instance, effectually deny the defendant recovery of just compensation for the land taken.
The determinative factor in all of these cases was the purpose for which the admission of such evidence was sought. Where evidence of a prior inconsistent value opinion is offered to impeach the credibility of the expert valuation witness, such evidence has generally been held admissible. ( San Diego Land etc. Co. v. Neale (1891) 88 Cal. 50, 67 [25 P. 977]; County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal Dist. (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 836 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 60] hear. den.; People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Murata (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 369, 379-380 [ 326 P.2d 947] hear. den.; see also Hanton v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1918) 178 Cal. 616, 619 [ 174 P. 61]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 447, p. 403; § 499, p. 470; § 1219, p. 1127; § 1255, p. 1158; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) (1940) § 1041, p. 733; also see Evid. Code, §§ 351, 780, 1235.) Where the non-subject property opinion evidence has been offered for valuation purposes, ipso facto, it has been held inadmissible.
[Citations.]" ( County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal Dist., 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 836 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 60].) To the same effect are People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Murata, 161 Cal.App.2d 360 [ 326 P.2d 947] and cases therein cited.
The witness at that time or on redirect examination has every opportunity to temper such other appraisal or appraisals and convince the jury they are not inconsistent. But the opposing party has every right to raise the spectre of inconsistencies and to attempt to impeach the witness thereby. City of Tucson v. LaForge, 8 Ariz. App. 413, 446 P.2d 692 (1968); Contra Costa County v. East Bay Municipal District, 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 1 Cal.Rptr. 60 (1959); Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Eubank, 369 S.W.2d 15 (Ky., 1963); Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Staton, 396 S.W.2d 766 (Ky., 1965). See also 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1041, p. 733 (3d Ed., 1940); 27 Am.Jur.2d 321, Eminent Domain, § 425 (1966).
Although this evidence was given at another time and place and might not have been admissible in chief, it was available for impeachment purposes. City of Tucson v. LaForge, 8 Ariz. App. 413, 446 P.2d 692; County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal District, 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 1 Cal.Rptr. 60; State ex rel. Symms v. Cole Fire Protection District, 92 Idaho 810, 451 P.2d 1011. As to the third contention, the jury verdicts were within the range of the expert testimony and there was no probability shown that this property would be rezoned to permit a higher economic use.
We find no error in allowing the cross-examination of the State's expert with regard to his appraisals made of other nearby property in order to test, for impeachment purposes, his knowledge of land and his qualifications as an expert witness. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Eubank, Ky., 369 S.W.2d 15 (1963); State v. Weidel, 385 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964); County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal District, 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 1 Cal.Rptr. 60 (1959). As heretofore noted, the property owner testified as to his opinion of value.