Cty. of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal Dist

6 Citing cases

  1. People ex Rel. Dept. of Transp. v. S. Pac. Transp

    84 Cal.App.3d 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 10 times

    Such a contention has been previously decided to the contrary. (See San Diego Land etc. Co. v. Neale (1891) 88 Cal. 50, 67 [20 P. 372]; County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal Dist. (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 836 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 60] ; People ex rel. Dept. of Public Wks. v. Murata (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 369, 379-380 [326 P.2d 949]; State of Cal. ex rel. State Pub. Wks. Bd. v. Stevenson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 60, 64 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 742].) To construe and apply Evidence Code section 822, subdivision (d), as urged by plaintiff would, in this instance, effectually deny the defendant recovery of just compensation for the land taken.

  2. State of Cal. ex rel. State Pub. Wks. Bd. v. Stevenson

    5 Cal.App.3d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 14 times
    In Stevenson, the expert's appraisal of the other property was not offered to show that he had based his valuation of the property at issue on any improper matter.

    The determinative factor in all of these cases was the purpose for which the admission of such evidence was sought. Where evidence of a prior inconsistent value opinion is offered to impeach the credibility of the expert valuation witness, such evidence has generally been held admissible. ( San Diego Land etc. Co. v. Neale (1891) 88 Cal. 50, 67 [25 P. 977]; County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal Dist. (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 836 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 60] hear. den.; People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Murata (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 369, 379-380 [ 326 P.2d 947] hear. den.; see also Hanton v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1918) 178 Cal. 616, 619 [ 174 P. 61]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 447, p. 403; § 499, p. 470; § 1219, p. 1127; § 1255, p. 1158; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) (1940) § 1041, p. 733; also see Evid. Code, §§ 351, 780, 1235.) Where the non-subject property opinion evidence has been offered for valuation purposes, ipso facto, it has been held inadmissible.

  3. El Monte Union High School Dist. of Los Angeles County v. Consumers Holding Co.

    247 Cal.App.2d 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 1 times

    [Citations.]" ( County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal Dist., 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 836 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 60].) To the same effect are People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Murata, 161 Cal.App.2d 360 [ 326 P.2d 947] and cases therein cited.

  4. State ex Rel. Symms v. Cole Fire Protection District

    451 P.2d 1011 (Idaho 1969)   Cited 7 times

    The witness at that time or on redirect examination has every opportunity to temper such other appraisal or appraisals and convince the jury they are not inconsistent. But the opposing party has every right to raise the spectre of inconsistencies and to attempt to impeach the witness thereby. City of Tucson v. LaForge, 8 Ariz. App. 413, 446 P.2d 692 (1968); Contra Costa County v. East Bay Municipal District, 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 1 Cal.Rptr. 60 (1959); Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Eubank, 369 S.W.2d 15 (Ky., 1963); Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Staton, 396 S.W.2d 766 (Ky., 1965). See also 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1041, p. 733 (3d Ed., 1940); 27 Am.Jur.2d 321, Eminent Domain, § 425 (1966).

  5. Langston v. City of Miami Beach

    242 So. 2d 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 13 times

    Although this evidence was given at another time and place and might not have been admissible in chief, it was available for impeachment purposes. City of Tucson v. LaForge, 8 Ariz. App. 413, 446 P.2d 692; County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal District, 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 1 Cal.Rptr. 60; State ex rel. Symms v. Cole Fire Protection District, 92 Idaho 810, 451 P.2d 1011. As to the third contention, the jury verdicts were within the range of the expert testimony and there was no probability shown that this property would be rezoned to permit a higher economic use.

  6. City of Tucson v. LaForge

    8 Ariz. App. 413 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 16 times

    We find no error in allowing the cross-examination of the State's expert with regard to his appraisals made of other nearby property in order to test, for impeachment purposes, his knowledge of land and his qualifications as an expert witness. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Eubank, Ky., 369 S.W.2d 15 (1963); State v. Weidel, 385 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964); County of Contra Costa v. East Bay Municipal District, 175 Cal.App.2d 834, 1 Cal.Rptr. 60 (1959). As heretofore noted, the property owner testified as to his opinion of value.