The judicial abstention doctrine has also been employed outside the context of the UCL. In Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588( Biological Diversity ), plaintiffs alleged that the operators of wind turbine electric generators located in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties were, “by the operation of their wind turbines, responsible for killing and injuring raptors and other birds in violation of the public trust doctrine.” ( Id. at p. 1354, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588.)

As the trial court characterized the SAC, it sought a declaration that the Concession Agreement "is void and illegal because it violates the Public Trust Doctrine by allowing Feast to operate a restaurant in violation of the [Golf Course Lease] and because Feast holds private events." Citing Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349 (Center for Biological Diversity), the trial court explained that "[t]he public entity charged with preserving the public trust is the only party entitled to bring an action to stop a public trust violation.... If the entity declines to do so, a private party, such as [Herron], may seek to enforce the public trust doctrine by suing the public entity charged with protecting the public trust by way of a writ of mandate."

The Petition as to DFW seeks a writ setting aside approval of the NTMP “based on [DFW's] violations of, and failure to fulfill, its public trust and statutory obligations....” They allege that the public has a right to a judicial determination of whether DFW's actions in failing to submit a nonconcurrence to the NTMP violated its common law and statutory duties to protect and conserve wildlife resources, and were consequently arbitrary and capricious, citing Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 ( Center for Biological Diversity ). Respondents do not argue here that they are entitled to pursue a claim for declaratory relief. “It is settled that an action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision.

The Petition as to DFW seeks a writ setting aside approval of the NTMP "based on [DFW's] violations of, and failure to fulfill, its public trust and statutory obligations." They allege that the public has a right to a judicial determination of whether DFW's actions in failing to submit a nonconcurrence to the NTMP violated its common law and statutory duties to protect and conserve wildlife resources, and were consequently arbitrary and capricious, citing Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 ( Center for Biological Diversity ). The trial court found that the Petition did not state a cause of action against DFW.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1367, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 (2008).

(See Carstens, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at pp. 289–291, 227 Cal.Rptr. 135.) Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, also reflects sensitivity to the interplay between environmental review in the regulatory approval process and the mandate of the public trust doctrine. Although the court concluded a member of the public can bring suit against an agency that has allegedly acted in violation of the public trust doctrine, it also concluded abstention would have been warranted in the case before it because the agency (which had been asked to approve permits for the operation and expansion of windfarms) had been proceeding with the environmental review process required under CEQA. “Intervention by the courts [through a separate lawsuit under the public trust doctrine], other than by exercising oversight over the administrative process and ensuring that proper standards are applied, not only would threaten duplication of effort and inconsistency of results, but would require courts to perform an ongoing regulatory role as technology evolves and conditions change.”

Moreover, they maintain that courts have the authority to order a public entity to remedy a massive or complex problem. (See Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Groups, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349 (Center for Biological Diversity).) We agree with the homeowners that actions seeking an injunction to abate a public or private nuisance against a public entity are not automatically barred.

[Citation.]' [Citation.] Thus, the doctrine protects 'expansive public use of trust property.'" (San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Com. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 202, 233-234 (San Francisco Baykeeper) quoting Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1360 (Center for Biological Diversity).

Thus, courts have noted that a county is considered a legal subdivision of the state for various purposes. (See, e.g., Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844, 867, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 393 [in concluding that counties have "fiduciary duties involving groundwater," court noted that "[a] county is a legal subdivision of the state and references to the ‘state’ may include counties"]; Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1370, fn. 19, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 ["[T]he county, as a subdivision of the state, shares responsibility for protecting our natural resources"]; Baldwin v. County of Tehama (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 166, 175–176, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 886 [with respect to whether state law occupies field of water regulation for purposes of preemption of county regulation of groundwater, court noted that a county is a legal subdivision of the state and "references to ‘the State’ ... may include counties"].) Cases have addressed reasons why the Legislature, at times, may distinguish counties and cities with respect to their legal relationship to the state.

We grant EBRPD's request for judicial notice of the 11 documents submitted in the trial court and which appear in the appellate appendices, as well as document 12 (Legislative Counsel's Digest of Senate Bill No. 1298 – 1963 amendment to § 5541 ). (See Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc . (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1356, fn. 7, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 [court took judicial notice of fact of proceedings in administrative record, but did not assume the truth of the statements or opinions]; Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 7, fn. 2, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 129 P.3d 394 [judicial notice proper for city council resolution]; People v. Superior Court (Ferguson ) (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1532, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 481 [legislative history and "Legislative Counsel's Digest" are properly the subject of judicial notice]; Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (b), (d) [judicial notice permissible for "[r]egulations and legislative enactments issued by or under the authority of ... any public entity in the United States," and for "records of any court" of this state].