Opinion
H036361
12-15-2011
KATHRYN CSERNA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MOHINDER PAL SINGH et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV157408)
Following a 2007 rear-end automobile accident occurring in San Jose, Kathryn Cserna (Cserna) filed an action for personal injuries. After a court trial, judgment was entered in favor of defendants Gurpreet Kaur Singh (Singh) and Mohinder Pal Singh.
Cserna claims on appeal that the court erred in finding in favor of defendants, a claim that is, in essence, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court's decision. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Cserna testified that she was seatbelted while driving her Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck to work about 9:30 a.m. on December 1, 2007. After she exited the 101 freeway at the Old Oakland Road off-ramp and stopped with several cars ahead of her, she was struck from behind twice by Singh's vehicle. After Cserna and Singh exited their respective vehicles, Singh admitted that the accident had been entirely her fault, telling Cserna she had mistakenly depressed the accelerator instead of the brake pedal. Cserna went to work, and about 5:00 p.m., she drove to Valley Medical Center (VMC) to have her injuries attended to.
Cserna testified that she experienced neck stiffness, stiff and sore shoulders, and a swollen right knee (from banging it on the dashboard). She indicated that these symptoms persisted for about one month. She then indicated that, at the time of her testimony nearly three years after the accident, it was still difficult for her to walk, sit, lie down, carry anything, or drive. Cserna testified that "while [she is] walking, [her] right knee wants to just collapse and to just like keel over."
The court questioned Cserna about certain photographs introduced into evidence. The Court asked specifically about a photograph depicting Cserna the day after the accident in which she was wearing a brace on her left knee.
On cross-examination, Cserna testified that she worked for about five hours after the accident on December 1, 2007, and that her job involved standing in a public place holding and moving around a sign to attract the attention of passersby. She also worked the day after the accident. Cserna continued to work at this job until sometime in 2008, when she was laid off.
Cserna also was cross-examined about prior incidents in which she had been injured. In 1992, she was struck by a car while riding a bicycle and was treated at VMC for low back and hip pain. Cserna was assaulted by a dementia patient in 2003; although she denied that her back was injured, she indicated that her back initially hurt after the patient had pushed her against a wall. In 2004, she went to VMC with a complaint that she had injured her back after being rear-ended by a police car. She tried unsuccessfully to obtain disability for these injuries. And in August 2009, Cserna went to VMC after having been assaulted.
After initially testifying that she was treated by the hospital for low back and hip pain, Cserna denied that she sustained injuries to her back in the 1992 accident.
Singh testified that she was driving alone in her Toyota Camry to work at the San Jose Flea Market on December 1, 2007, about 10:30 a.m. As she was sitting in traffic on the offramp behind a long line of cars, she saw the light turn green and took her foot off the brake. She collided with the vehicle in front of her while she was moving forward at about six to eight miles per hour. The airbags of Singh's car were not deployed and the car remained drivable. After Singh and Cserna got out of their vehicles, Cserna began yelling and asking if she were bleeding. Singh told her she was not bleeding. Singh offered to call the police, but Cserna asked her not to call because she was late to work. Because Cserna continued yelling and refused to exchange information, Singh called 911 and a police officer arrived and took statements.
Singh testified that she and her father-in-law, Mohinder Singh, were sued by Cserna. Mohinder Singh did not own the Toyota involved in the accident and no evidence was presented to establish that he had any role in the accident.
Benjamin Ewers, a mechanical engineer, gave an expert opinion concerning the accident. Based upon his review of the police report, photographs of the vehicles, and knowing the weights of the vehicles and the specifics of their bumper systems, Ewers opined that the actual impact speed of Singh's vehicle was between six and eight miles per hour. He also opined that the "Delta V" (the difference in the speeds pre- and post-impact) of Cserna's truck was between four and five miles per hour. Based upon this low Delta V, Ewers testified that it was unlikely that the driver of the truck would have had her knee move forward to any significant degree; at the most, there was the "possibility of incidental contact with the knee, but very, very small impact." Ewers was also of the opinion that based on the low impact, it was unlikely that the driver would have sustained any back injury; however, although he would not expect it, it would not be "out of the realm of possibility" that the driver would have suffered a whiplash-neck injury from this low-impact collision.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Cserna filed a complaint for personal injuries on November 16, 2009. The case proceeded as a court trial on November 8, 2010. After deciding motions in limine and hearing evidence from the parties, the court announced its decision from the bench in favor of both defendants. In so ruling, the court noted, inter alia, that: (1) there was no evidence showing that Mohinder Pal Singh was in any way responsible for the accident; (2) there were no witnesses to the accident, other than Cserna and Singh; (3) there was no medical testimony or evidence verifying Cserna's claimed injuries; (4) there were no medical bills substantiating any damages; (5) there was no documentation substantiating any wage loss claim; (6) there was evidence that Singh collided with Cserna "at a low rate of speed" at a time when the latter was wearing a seat belt; (7) there was testimony from the accident reconstruction expert that "[g]iven the speed . . . , it was unlikely Ms. Cserna would [have] suffer[ed] any major injury"; and (8) it was "difficult for this Court to find that Ms. Cserna was injured from this incident because she went to work that same day and the very next day and because there is no evidence of any work lost around the time of the [incident]." The court concluded that since Cserna had "the burden of proof, and given the lack of evidence, [the court had] to find in favor of the defendant." Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on December 2, 2010. Cserna filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Cserna's Burden as Appellant
Before addressing any substantive issues that may have been raised in this appeal, we identify some serious procedural deficiencies existing in Cserna's opening brief, which does not comply with the California Rules of Court. She cites no legal authorities in her brief in support of her claim of error. (See rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Cserna fails either to clearly state each of her arguments with separate headings or subheadings summarizing the points made (ibid.), or to develop such arguments in a coherent fashion that the court can readily identify and evaluate. (See Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831, fn. 4.) The opening brief contains no citation to the record in support of Cserna's recitation of procedural matters, in violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). Cserna also cites to evidentiary matters that were not part of the record, contrary to the requirement that an opening brief summarize "significant facts limited to matters in the record." (Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Furthermore, the opening brief is filled with conclusory statements that are not supported by a detailed showing, citation to the record, or legal authority. As such, although it is clear to this court that Cserna challenges the court's adverse finding after trial and the subsequent judgment entered against her, the legal arguments in support of that challenge are much less clear.
Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise specified.
For instance, Cserna refers to matters allegedly contained in a police report. The police report, however, was excluded by the court when it granted defendants' motion in limine.
We acknowledge that Cserna is representing herself in connection with this appeal and therefore has not had the formal legal training that would be beneficial in advocating her position. The rules of civil procedure, however, apply to self-represented parties the same as they do to parties represented by attorneys. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Thus, a self-represented litigant " 'is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 (Nwosu).)
Based upon the noncompliant nature of Cserna's brief, it would be appropriate for us to entirely disregard her contentions because they have not been (1) clearly presented, (2) supported with proper citations to the record, or (3) supported with citations to applicable legal authority. In the interests of disposing of the merits of the case fairly, however, we believe it reasonable to address below the arguments we have identified in Cserna's appellate brief.
II. Judgment in Favor of Defendants
Cserna contends that she "has demonstrated wrongful entry of judgment and [the court] erred in it's [sic] ruling for defendant." (Capitalization omitted.) She argues that the court's decision "should be reversed . . ." (Capitalization omitted.) Cserna claims further that Ewers "falsify[ed] information" and the trial court "embarrassed" her when it incorrectly stated that Cserna had testified that her right knee had been injured. (Capitalization omitted.)
Cserna's objection to the trial court's decision in favor of defendants constitutes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment. Stated otherwise, Cserna claims that the court erred in its conclusion (announced from the bench) that Cserna had failed to meet her burden of proof in support of her claim for damages as a result of the accident. Disputed factual issues that have been resolved by the trial court are reviewed on appeal under the substantial evidence standard. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) As explained by the Supreme Court, "In reviewing the evidence on such an appeal all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. . . . [W]hen a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury. . . ." (Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.) An appellate "court is not in a position to weigh any conflicts or disputes in the evidence, or to assess the credibility of the witnesses; that is the province of the trial court alone." (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1121.) This substantial evidence test applies to appeals from judgments entered on either jury or court trials. (Poedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1489.)
An appellant claiming that there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment is required to recite in his or her opening brief all of the evidence on point, not merely the evidence favorable to the appellant. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) As we stated in Nwosu, 122 Cal.App.4th at page 1246: "[A]n attack on the evidence without a fair statement of the evidence is entitled to no consideration when it is apparent that a substantial amount of evidence was received on behalf of the respondent. [Citation.] Thus, appellants who challenge the decision of the trial court based upon the absence of substantial evidence to support it ' "are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed waived." [Citations.]' [Citation.]"
Here, Cserna has failed to meet this obligation as the appellant. Her opening brief consists of nothing more than conclusory statements and does not contain a recitation of the evidence, both favorable and unfavorable to her. Her claim that there was insufficient evidence in support of the judgment rendered in favor of defendants should, therefore, be deemed forfeited. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.)
Despite the inadequacy of Cserna's brief, we review her sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge and conclude that it lacks merit. In sustaining a claim for negligence, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving "that defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. [Citation.]" (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 292-293.) While the evidence was uncontradicted that Singh's car struck Cserna's truck from behind, the evidence was less clear as to what damage, if any, Cserna sustained that was proximately caused by Singh's negligence. The court below concluded that there was no medical testimony or evidence corroborating Cserna's claimed personal injuries and there were no medical bills or documentation substantiating economic damages. It observed that defendants' accident reconstruction expert testified that because of the slight impact, it was unlikely that Cserna would have sustained any major injury. The court also noted that Cserna worked after the accident, both the day it happened and the following day. And the court observed that there were inconsistencies in Cserna's testimony, specifically as to whether she claimed to have injured her left or right knee in the accident. Based upon the evidence presented, including credibility determinations of the trial court that we do not review on appeal, there was substantial evidence in support of the judgment rendered in favor of Singh. Further, as to Mohinder Pal Singh, there was no showing that he was present at the accident or that he owned the car Singh had been driving; hence, there was absolutely no evidence that would have supported a finding in Cserna's favor as against him.
Cserna did not claim any property damages as a result of the incident.
After the court noted this inconsistency during its announcement of its decision, Cserna denied that she had previously testified that she had injured her right knee in the accident, notwithstanding clear testimony to this effect.
It is the appellant's burden to establish that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.) Cserna did not sustain that burden, and her sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge therefore fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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Walsh, J.
WE CONCUR: ________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
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Mihara, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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