Opinion
02 Civ. 5385 (GEL)
December 20, 2002
Paul B. Dalnoky, New York, NY, for Plaintiff Leslie Cselle.
Paul Windels, Perry Windels, New York, NY, for Defendant Larry W. Falls, Sheriff of Giles County.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leslie Cselle brings this action against Larry W. Falls, the Sheriff of Giles County, Virginia, seeking to compel the Sheriff to execute on a New York default judgment that Cselle has caused to be docketed in a Virginia court. Sheriff Falls moves to dismiss on a number of grounds. It is unnecessary to go beyond the first of these: The action will be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Cselle obtained a default judgment for approximately $16,000 in a New York state court against one Carroll Martin, and seeks to enforce it by levying against Martin's property in Virginia. Cselle claims that Sheriff Falls has violated his rights under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution by failing to execute on the judgment. The Sheriff replies that Cselle has failed to take the steps necessary under Virginia law to enforce a foreign judgment.
Cselle seeks to resolve this dispute by suing the Virginia sheriff in New York for acts and omissions committed entirely in Virginia. Moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Sheriff Falls swears that he does no business whatsoever in New York, and that he has not even been in the state in the fifteen years he has served as sheriff. (Falls Aff. ¶ 2.)
"In assessing whether personal jurisdiction is authorized, `the court must look first to the long-arm statute of the forum state,'" and then, if the statutory requirements are met, determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Whitaker v. American Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 2001). Cselle cannot get past the first stage of this inquiry, since New York's long-arm statute does not authorize jurisdiction here.
Cselle argues that jurisdiction is available under CPLR § 302(a)(1). This section provides for jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who "transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state," with respect to any cause of action "arising from" such a transaction. CPLR § 302(a)(1). Even a single transaction of business in New York is sufficient to give rise to such jurisdiction, Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467 (1988), so long as there is a "substantial nexus" between the business transacted and the cause of action asserted. Agency Rent A Car Sys. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1996). This case meets none of these requirements. Although the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, Whitaker, 261 F.3d at 208, Cselle presents no evidence that Sheriff Falls has ever transacted business in New York, merely asking rhetorically how anyone in the United States could avoid utilizing banks, credit card companies, or communications providers based in New York. (P. Mem. at 4.) Even if such speculation could substitute for proof, Cselle ignores the fact that the causes of action asserted here do not "aris[e] from" any credit card or intent transaction in New York, but from alleged acts and omissions committed by a Virginia public official in Virginia. CPLR § 302(a)(1) is thus inapplicable.
Cselle next claims that jurisdiction can be based on CPLR § 302(a)(3), which authorizes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who commits a tortious act outside the state that causes injury to a person or property in New York, provided that the tort feasor satisfies certain conditions relating to business or revenue in New York or in interstate commerce, CPLR § 302(a)(3)(i) and (ii) — conditions that plaintiff disgracefully omits when quoting the statute. None of these requirements are met here. Sheriff Falls specifically denies doing business in New York or deriving revenue from interstate commerce (Falls Aff. ¶ 2), and there is no reason to infer that a local county sheriff in Virginia would. Plaintiff, once again, provides not a scintilla of evidence to the contrary, and makes no claim that discovery would produce any. Moreover, putting aside doubts about whether plaintiff has alleged any tortious conduct at all, the only conceivable effect in New York of the sheriff's inaction in Virginia is the New York plaintiff's failure to profit from the execution of the judgment. It is well established, however, that a purely economic impact in New York stemming from a legal injury completed in another state does not establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(3). Whitaker, 261 F.3d at 209; Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d Cir. 1990).
Cselle's assertion of personal jurisdiction is frivolous. Remarkably, his inept memorandum of law opens with the claim that defendant's motion, which asserts a number of substantial legal arguments in addition to the one herein found to require dismissal, is so devoid of merits that plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees for having to respond to it. (P. Mem at 1.) The author of the instant complaint is ill-placed to raise the question of sanctions.
It is too bad that Sheriff Falls has not had a chance to visit the greatest city in the world in the last fifteen years. The Court hopes he finds an opportunity to do so in the near future. But he does not have to come to defend this frivolous lawsuit. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted.
SO ORDERED.