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Crystal B. v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Sep 11, 2007
No. B199671 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 2007)

Opinion


CRYSTAL B., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest. B199671 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Fifth Division September 11, 2007

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Valerie Skeba, Juvenile Court Referee, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK59447

Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc., Law Offices of Barry Allen Herzog, Ellen L. Bacon and Sue P. Dell for Petitioner.

Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles, Sophia Ali and Kelly Parker for the Children.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Associate County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

No appearance for Respondent.

KRIEGLER, J.

Crystal B. (mother), mother of M. B. and Cleveland T., petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. She seeks review of an order terminating her reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided her with adequate reunification services. We deny the petition.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother is a resident of Texas. By age 22, she had five children. Because she was financially unable to care for all her children, she sent the two youngest, M., then three, and Cleveland, then two, to live with her cousin in California. On May 23, 2005, three days after the children were left with her, the cousin approached DCFS for assistance in caring for them. She had a notarized statement from mother granting her temporary guardianship of the children.

Mother eventually asked the cousin to take all five children, but the cousin could not.

A public health nurse examined the children and found marks and bruises that indicated neglect and possible abuse. She directed the cousin to take the children to USC Medical Center for a full evaluation. The cousin also relayed information that M. might have a heart condition. However, when DCFS contacted mother at a telephone number the cousin provided, mother denied M. had any heart trouble. Mother also stated that the bruises and marks on her children were the result of accidents and said Texas authorities had already examined the children and agreed. When DCFS later contacted the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), it learned there had been five referrals regarding mother in the previous three years, and while abuse allegations had been ruled out each time, general neglect was noted.

Mother later admitted M. had a heart murmur and underwent surgery when she was younger, but asserted that M. did not need any further medical care.

For example, the children were found to be living in a filthy, unheated apartment while mother slept in her car, and after Cleveland fell on a hot plate and burned his face and neck, mother failed to seek medical attention for him.

When the children were evaluated at USC, M. was observed to have a failure to thrive, delayed development, multiple unspecified small scars or marks on her trunk and extremities, and she appeared to be neglected. Cleveland presented with “old pattern marks” on various planes of his body, a head bump and scabs in his occipital area, burn marks on his lips and right shoulder, and unusual pattern marks on both hands, all suggesting child abuse. Both children were below the fifth percentile for height and weight. DCFS called CPS to report the possible abuse. It also decided to take the children into custody, placing them with the cousin after her home was inspected and found to be appropriate. DCFS then filed a section 300 petition alleging mother had placed M. and Cleveland at risk of physical harm, failed to protect them, and abused them.

DCFS later filed an amended petition adding allegations that M.’s father had similarly failed to protect her. Mother reported that M.’s father had a drinking problem and had been unable to maintain employment, so could not assist mother with child support. M.’s father is not a party to this petition. Mother refused to identify Cleveland’s father, as he is married to another woman, so Cleveland’s father was never made a party to the proceeding.

DCFS notified mother that her children were detained and a section 300 petition was filed. Mother acknowledged that she was not in a position to care for M. and Cleveland because her sister, who used to care for mother’s children while mother worked, had died, and mother was unemployed. Mother indicated she could not meet the requirements for family reunification the social worker described, instead suggesting the cousin be given guardianship until mother could stabilize her life. On June 21, 2005, the juvenile court approved the detention, appointed counsel for mother, and ordered DCFS to provide reunification services to her.

By July 27, 2005, mother reported to DCFS that she was working and was ready to regain custody of her children. She had visited with the children by telephone every other day. She again explained the various marks on M.’s and Cleveland’s bodies as having been from accidents during play and attributed their small size to her and M.’s father’s slight stature. However, the social worker warned that DCFS would have to receive a favorable report from CPS before the children would be released to mother and suggested that mother contact a CPS office for referral to a low-cost parenting class and possible therapy. Mother promised to “get everything done.” The social worker also looked into securing an Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) report to have mother’s home approved for the children.

After months of continuances, the matter was set for mediation on February 23, 2006. The matter did not settle, so it was placed on calendar for a contested adjudication hearing. DCFS had changed its position from recommending reunification services for mother to recommending denial of services, because it had lost contact with mother and because a new medical report on M. indicated she was quickly gaining size while in the cousin’s care, suggesting the children’s small statures were due to mother’s failure to nourish them rather than just genetics. A court-appointed medical expert who considered the issue thought the child suffered from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder. Regardless of the precise cause, all parties agreed that M. no longer showed signs of abuse.

Far fewer reports were submitted on Cleveland’s progress than on M.’s. However, the record shows on the whole that Cleveland was also thriving in the cousin’s care.

DCFS wrote to mother on March 1, 2006, asking for an updated contact number and offering to assist her in locating a parenting class. On March 27, 2006, mother called DCFS, providing an updated telephone number, but stating she might move to another part of Texas because she had not been able to maintain a job at her then-current location. Mother’s new number was no longer working as of June 14, 2006, when DCFS again wrote to alert her that the adjudication hearing was scheduled for July 26, 2006. In that letter, the social worker suggested that mother obtain a loan from family to secure a bus ticket to Los Angeles for the hearing. The social worker noted that the children would profit from mother’s visit. That letter drew several return telephone calls from mother, who stated she was trying to get money from DCFS or CPS to enable her to travel to Los Angeles. However, mother ultimately could not obtain the funding, so was unable to attend the adjudication hearing. Still, mother provided proof that she had enrolled in a parenting class and attended two sessions.

The adjudication hearing went forward without mother. The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition as to allegations mother failed to protect M. and Cleveland, but dismissed allegations that her neglect constituted abuse. The court ordered DCFS to provide family reunification services to mother, including provision of a bus or train pass to permit mother reasonable monitored visitation with the children. Mother was directed to enroll in individual counseling in Texas to address issues that led to her circumstances and the need to send her children away. Later, at DCFS’s request, the court also ordered an ICPC report on the condition of mother’s home.

Over the next six months, DCFS continued to have trouble maintaining contact with mother. DCFS was able to contact mother on or about September 15, 2006, and mailed her counseling and parenting referrals for Texas. Four subsequent attempts to contact mother were unsuccessful. On November 17, 2006, mother called DCFS and reported a new address, but by November 29, 2006, DCFS was again unable to locate mother and several additional attempts to do so failed. By the time a review hearing was set for December 14, 2006, DCFS had not contacted mother and reported that no ICPC had been conducted, as mother had no stable residence to investigate. DCFS also noted that in her November 17, 2006 telephone call, mother reported that she had not yet enrolled in individual counseling and had dropped out of her parenting class when she relocated. CPS had also received a new referral on mother, alleging neglect of the three children still living with her, but mother moved before CPS could investigate that report.

DCFS also indicated that mother telephoned the children regularly, but made “inappropriate” promises to visit that she could not fulfill, causing the children to demonstrate regressive behaviors such as bed-wetting and head-banging. Because mother’s inability to fulfill her promises to visit between July 26, 2006, and December 14, 2006, stems, at least in part, from DCFS’s failure to provide her with a court-ordered bus or train pass, mother’s failure to visit will not be held against her here.

The December 14, 2006 review hearing was continued to January 25, 2007. DCFS sent mother a bus ticket to enable her to attend that hearing and to visit the children. However, the carrier canceled the trip due to poor weather conditions, so mother never made it to Los Angeles. At the January 25, 2007 hearing, the juvenile court found mother had made minimal attempts to comply with the treatment mandated by her case plan in order to alleviate the cause of the children’s detention.

From that date forward, mother lost contact with DCFS. DCFS made numerous attempts to reach mother by letter and telephone but was unsuccessful. Mother’s telephone visitation with the children also became sporadic. On April 9, 2007, the date set for an 18-month review hearing, DCFS requested a continuance to be allowed to obtain transportation for mother to the hearing should she contact DCFS. That continuance was granted, and the matter was set for May 16, 2007. DCFS managed to contact mother and provided her with an airplane ticket in order to attend the 18-month review and visit the children. Mother reported that she had reunited with M.’s father and the two were living together. The father was working as a temporary employee, and mother, though unemployed, had enrolled in a parenting class and individual counseling. By the time of the hearing, mother produced proof that she had attended parenting classes and four individual counseling sessions.

Nevertheless, the juvenile court found that mother was only in partial compliance with her case plan and that return of the children to mother would continue to pose a risk to them. The court further found that DCFS had offered reasonable services, and that even if additional services were offered to mother, there was no substantial likelihood the children could be safely returned to her care after another period of reunification. Accordingly, it terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. Mother filed this petition to obtain review of the juvenile court’s order. DCFS and counsel for the children oppose mother’s petition.

DISCUSSION

Mother’s sole assertion is that the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS’s reunification efforts were reasonable. Specifically, she contends that DCFS failed to provide her with a bus or train pass to permit greater visitation and failed to provide her with referrals to programs that would assist her in meeting her case plan. In reviewing a juvenile court’s findings, the appellate court is limited to considering whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762, 763.) The appellate court will not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment regarding the ruling, and will view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below. (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.) Every reasonable and legitimate inference will be construed in favor of the findings. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46.) The standard for finding reasonable reunification services is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Measured by those standards, the record shows that the juvenile court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.

DCFS was approached by the children’s caregiver with information that they were left in California by mother and appeared neglected, at best, or possibly abused. DCFS thereupon took charge of the children, ensured they were placed with an appropriate caregiver, and provided them with necessary medical care. DCFS followed up with mother and explained the reunification process to her, initially receiving an indication that mother did not want the children returned to her right away. Instead, mother promised she would eventually “get everything done” to stabilize her situation and obtain appropriate counseling. DCFS alerted mother that Texas authorities would have to be involved in the reunification process and recommended that she contact those authorities for additional assistance. Despite mother’s frequent moves, DCFS persisted in efforts to contact her, and did, in fact, send referrals to parenting classes and counseling programs in mother’s area that would enable her to meet her case plan. It is true that for six of the twenty-two months of reunification, DCFS was under a court-order to provide mother with a bus or train pass and failed to do so. However, during that time, the evidence shows that mother was often out of touch, and that DCFS did, ultimately, provide mother with transportation to Los Angeles.

Moreover, there is little to suggest that the missing bus or train pass was significant in mother’s failure to reunify with M. and Cleveland. During her 22 months of involvement with DCFS, mother failed to establish a stable home or obtain steady employment. She did not alleviate the conditions of neglect in her home. To the contrary, the record shows that as late as May 19, 2006, CPS received yet another referral regarding mother’s neglect of the three children still living with her. Mother enrolled in only one parenting class and dropped out of that class after one of her relocations. It was not until the eve of the 18-month review hearing that mother made an attempt to participate fully in her case plan by re-enrolling in parenting classes and entering counseling, but by that time it was too late. Indeed, the juvenile court specifically found that even if another period of reunification were offered to mother, there was no substantial likelihood M. and Cleveland could safely return to her care. In short, after almost two years of reunification efforts, mother is still not in a position to take custody of the children, regardless of any greater efforts DCFS might undertake.

DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary relief is denied. This opinion shall become final immediately upon filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).)

We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., MOSK, J.


Summaries of

Crystal B. v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Sep 11, 2007
No. B199671 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 2007)
Case details for

Crystal B. v. Superior Court

Case Details

Full title:CRYSTAL B., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF LOS…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division

Date published: Sep 11, 2007

Citations

No. B199671 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 2007)