Opinion
No. CV-02-0079025S
April 4, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISON ON DEFENDANT CAMRAC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( #113)
This is an action in two counts in which the plaintiff Crystal Cruz ("Cruz") seeks damages for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident which she alleges was the fault of the defendant Albert P. Teto, Jr. ("Teto") and one Leslie R. Givens ("Givens"), who is not a party, to this case. The defendant CAMRAC, Inc. ("CAMRAC"), the owner of the vehicle driven by Givens, has moved for summary judgment on the second count of the amended complaint which seeks to hold it liable under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-154a based on the fact that it leased the vehicle to Givens. CAMRAC maintains Massachusetts, rather than Connecticut, law applies in this case. Cruz concedes that if Massachusetts law applies, she has no cause of action against CAMRAC.
The following facts are undisputed: Cruz, a Connecticut resident, was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Teto, also a Connecticut resident. The Teto vehicle was involved in a motor vehicle accident on September 21, 2001 in West Springfield, Massachusetts. The other vehicle was owned by CAMRAC and driven by Givens, a Massachusetts resident licensed in Massachusetts. Givens rented the vehicle, a silver Pontiac Grand Prix registered in Massachusetts, from CAMAC, Inc., doing business as Enterprise Rent-A-Car, on September 21, 2001 in CAMRAC's West Springfield, Massachusetts office. The rental agreement granted Givens permission to operate the vehicle in states through Maryland.
In O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 648, 519 A.2d 13 (1986) and Willams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Conn. 359, 370, 641 A.2d 783 (1994), the Supreme Court "abandoned `categorical allegiance' to the doctrine of lex loci delicti in tort actions," id., 371, in favor of the flexible choice of law analysis contained in sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws (1971). "Section 145 of the Restatement lists the contacts of each jurisdiction that are factors in determining the choice of law under § 6. These contacts include: (a) the place of injury; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domiciles of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Id., 372.
In analyzing the § 145 factors in this case, both (a) and (b) clearly favor the application of Massachusetts law in that the accident occurred in Massachusetts. According to the Restatement, sub-sections (a) and (b) "are the most significant in determining which state's tort law is to apply." Id., 372. Ordinarily, the law of the state where the accident occurred will presumptively apply. See, e.g., Svege v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., 122 F. Sup.2d 226 (D. Conn. 2002). Moreover, as to CAMRAC, any liability it arguably has to Cruz arises out of conduct it performed in Massachusetts in renting the vehicle to Givens. It is undisputed that Givens, a Massachusetts resident with a Massachusetts license, rented the vehicle, which was registered in Massachusetts, from CAMRAC's office in West Springfield, Massachusetts. These facts also add significance to Massachusetts' relationship to the occurrence. Sec Matteis v. National Car Rental System, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. 111957 (Jan. 28, 1993, Rush, J.) ( 8 Conn.L.Rptr. 709). Cruz argues, however, that there is evidence that points to CAMRAC's contacts with Connecticut and relies on the police report which lists CAMRAC's address as "Box 3268, Windsor Locks, CT." Accepting this evidence as true for the purpose of the motion for summary judgment, it bears on factor (c) and supports the application of Connecticut law but is not conclusive. Finally, as there is no relationship at all between Cruz and CAMRAC, factor (d) has no bearing.
Teto's domicile in Connecticut does not factor into the court's consideration of CAMRAC's choice of law claim because Cruz's claim against CAMRAC is not derivative of any tortious conduct on Teto's part.
Under the Restatement approach to choice of law in a tort case, it is "the significance, and not the number, of § 145(2) contacts that determines the outcome . . ." O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 652. The choice of law also must reflect both the interests of the parties and the concerned jurisdictions. Id., 646. See Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 6. The court is required to consider the particular issue which gives rise to the conflict — in this case, whether a lessor can be held liable for the tortious operation of a rented vehicle — and determine the policies and interests of each jurisdiction in that regard.
Connecticut has a long-standing policy, embodied in General Statutes § 14-154a and its predecessors, of holding a lessor strictly liable for damages caused by the tortious operation of a rented vehicle by its lessee. Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 284, 287-88, 472 A.2d 306 (1984). The obligations the statute imposes "significantly supplement common-law principles of vicarious liability. We have construed the statute as having created a statutory suretyship . . . The purpose of the statutory suretyship imposed by § 14-154a is to protect members of the public from injuries caused by the improper use of a leased automobile." (Internal quotation marks omitted; internal citations omitted). Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc., 247 Conn. 342, 346, 721 A.2d 1187 (1998). The statute seeks to regulate the conduct of lessors of automobiles "by providing an incentive . . . to rent them to competent and careful operators . . ." Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc., 108 Conn. 333, 336, 143 A. 163 (1928).
Massachusetts has no such statute and instead follows the common law in circumstances such as this. Strogoff v. Motor Sales Co., Inc., 302 Mass. 345, 18 N.E.2d 1016 (1939). The substantive law in Massachusetts imputes liability to an owner of a motor only if the owner "had the authority and means to control [the operator's] conduct." Thompson v. Auto Credit Rehabilitation, 56 Mass. App. 1, 5, 775 N.E.2d 414, review denied, 438 Mass. 1104, 780 N.E.2d 414 (2002). An agency or master-servant relationship between Givens and CAMRAC is required under Massachusetts law to hold CAMRAC liable. Cheek v. Econo-Car Rental System, 393 Mass, 660, 662, 473 N.E.2d 659, 660 (1985); McGonigle v. Tracy, 6 Mass.L.Rptr. 109, 996 Mass.Super. Although Massachusetts has a statute that creates a prima facie presumption that the registered owner of a motor vehicle is liable for the operation of the vehicle, Mass.Gen. Laws, ch. 231, § 85A, the statute is evidentiary only and liability, if any, is derivative of the relationship between the tortfeasor and the owner of the vehicle. Gangl v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 37 Mass. App. 561,641 N.E.2d 709 (1994), review denied, 419 Mass. 1104, 626 N.E.2d (1995). Furthermore, under Massachusetts law, any resident with comprehensive insurance coverage is covered in a rental vehicle for damages that person may tortiously cause and an uncovered person has the option of purchasing coverage through the rental company. See Mass.Gen. Laws, ch. 90, § 32E 1/2 (specifying insurance coverage that must be contained in a rental contract entered into in Massachusetts). Thus, the policy of Massachusetts appears to place the onus on the lessee, rather than the lessor, to protect others against any tortious conduct on the part of the lessee.
Clearly, then, Connecticut and Massachusetts regulate owner liability for rental cars very differently. Massachusetts' interest in applying its standards of conduct to govern the liability of those who use its highways is significant in this case because the injury occurred in Massachusetts. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 653. Furthermore, CAMRAC, engaged in Massachusetts in the business of renting a vehicle registered in Massachusetts to a Massachusetts resident with a Massachusetts license, has a significant interest in the application of Massachusetts law. Generally, a rental company has an interest in the predictability that the law of the state in which its vehicle was registered and rented will apply in the event of an accident. See Stathis v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 109 F. Sup.2d 55 (D.Mass. 2000). When this is coupled, in this case, with the fact that the accident and injury occurred in Massachusetts and that all of CAMRAC's conduct in relationship to this case occurred in Massachusetts, the logical conclusion is that Massachusetts has the most significant relationship both to the occurrence and the parties before the court under the principles of sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement.
Cruz relies on Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 138 A.2d 705 (1958) and Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co. Inc., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928) for the proposition that the Connecticut lease statute should apply here. In Graham, the court concluded that liability arose under Connecticut law because "the beneficial operation and effect of the [rental] contract was . . . in Connecticut, where the car was kept and to a considerable extent, at least, operated." Graham v. Wilkins, supra, 145 Conn. 40 In Levy, the rental contract itself was made in Connecticut for the direct benefit of the plaintiff. Levy, supra, 108 Conn. 338-39. Thus, the choice of law issue in both cases was governed by contract principles. However, since this case does not involve a contract dispute, the choice of law principles which must govern are those of tort, as applied in the text. See Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., supra, 229 Conn. 359; O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 647 (criticizing Levy for characterizing a complaint framed in tort as a contract matter). Furthermore, an analysis under contract principles, which allows the court to look to the state in which the bulk of the contracting transactions took place, see Reichhold Chemicals v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 252 Conn. 774, 750 A.2d 1051 (2000), would also favor the application of Massachusetts law in this case.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the law of Massachusetts applies to the second count of this case. As a result, since CAMRAC's liability is premised solely on Connecticut law, its motion for summary judgment on the second count of the complaint against it is granted.
LINDA K. LAGER, JUDGE